Shriver v. City of Okoboji

• Decision Date: 23 July 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-523,96-523
• Citation: 567 N.W.2d 397
• Parties: Jay M. SHRIVER and Margie E. Shriver, Appellants, v. CITY OF OKOBOJI, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 397

567 N.W.2d 397

Jay M. SHRIVER and Margie E. Shriver, Appellants, v. CITY OF OKOBOJI, Appellee.

No. 96-523.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 23, 1997.

Jay M. Shriver of Pappajohn, Shriver, Eide & Nicholas, P.C., Mason City, for appellants.

Michael J. Chozen of Narey, Chozen & Saunders, Spirit Lake, for appellee.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and CARTER, LAVORATO, NEUMAN, and TERNUS, JJ.

TERNUS, Justice.

This case forms the latest chapter in a fourteen-year disagreement between two neighbors. Nixon and Nancy Lauridsen want to build a garage, but the applicable 25-foot setback requirement has prevented them from doing so. The Lauridsens' neighbors, appellants Jay and Margie Shriver, fear a garage on the Lauridsen property would interfere with the Shrivers' view of West Okoboji Lake.

In previous litigation, the Lauridsens unsuccessfully sought a determination that their lot was not subject to the 25-foot setback requirement. See Lauridsen v. City of Okoboji, 554 N.W.2d 541 (Iowa 1996). The appellee, City of Okoboji, then amended the zoning ordinance to render the 25-foot setback line inapplicable to lots such as the Lauridsens' property. Because the Lauridsens may now construct a garage unrestricted by the former setback requirement, the Shrivers challenged the City's action in district court. The district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment. We conclude summary judgment was properly granted and so affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The Shrivers have owned property near West Okoboji Lake since 1947. In the early 1980s, the Lauridsens purchased a lakeshore lot due west of the Shrivers' property. The Lauridsens' property lies between the Shrivers' land and the lake. To the north of both properties is Funnel Street. Funnel Street intersects at the northwest corner of the Lauridsens' lot with Lake Shore Road, which runs along the shoreline of the lake. Both Funnel Street and Lake Shore Road were vacated by the City in 1934, leaving these rights-of-way for pedestrian use only.

In 1983, the Lauridsens decided to add an attached garage to the existing structure on their property. This addition would come within nine feet of the northern property line. The City's zoning ordinance, however, required a 25-foot setback for "corner lots." At the time, the ordinance defined a corner lot as "[a] lot located at the intersection of two or more streets and having the street right-of-way abut the front and one or more sides of the lot." Based on this definition, the city zoning administrator denied the Lauridsens' September 1983 application for a building permit, finding their lot was subject to the 25-foot setback requirement for corner lots. The Lauridsens then unsuccessfully sought a variance from the board of adjustment.

The matter rested there until 1994 when the Lauridsens became interested in selling their property. They believed their property would be more valuable if it was not subject to the setback restriction for corner lots. Having failed to obtain a variance in 1983, this time the Lauridsens sought a determination, first from the zoning administrator and later from the board of adjustment, that their lot was not a corner lot. Having no success in convincing the administrator and board of their position, the Lauridsens filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the district court. The district court quashed the writ, and we affirmed on appeal. Lauridsen, 554 N.W.2d at 544.

While the Lauridsens' appeal was pending, their lawyer, Jim Ladegaard, appeared before the Okoboji city council and asked the council to amend the definition of "corner lot." The council referred the matter to the planning and zoning board for study and recommendation. After consideration of the requested amendment and its ramifications, the zoning board decided to recommend amending the ordinance to redefine "corner lot" as [a] Lot located at the intersection of two or more streets designed to accommodate licensed motor vehicular traffic and having the street right-of-way abut the front and one or more side lines of the lot. This definition shall not be so interpreted as to include any lot adjacent to the front and/or side of a public access or pedestrian walk-way as a corner lot.

Under this amendment, the Lauridsens' property, as well as several other properties in the City, would no longer be corner lots, subject to the more restrictive setback line for such lots. When the issue came before the city council, attorneys for the Lauridsens and the Shrivers expressed their views on the merits of the proposed amendment. The council then approved an ordinance amending the definition of "corner lot" as recommended by the zoning board.

The Shrivers filed this action in district court (1) seeking a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was void, and (2) asking for damages based on the decreased market value of their property caused by an impaired view of the lake. The district court dismissed the Shrivers' claims on the City's motion for summary judgment. The Shrivers now appeal, raising several issues.

They first challenge the district court's determination that, as a matter of law, the City did not act illegally, arbitrarily or in excess of its authority. The Shrivers claim there are genuine issues of material fact concerning (1) whether the council illegally assumed the duties of the zoning administrator and board of adjustment, and (2) whether the council enacted the amendment to benefit a private citizen rather than for the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the community. The Shrivers' final claim on appeal is that the district court erred in determining the Shrivers had no protectible property interest that would support a claim for damages. ¹

II. Scope of Review.

We follow familiar rules in the appeal of a summary judgment:

We review a summary judgment ruling for error. The district court correctly enters summary judgment when the record shows "no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Iowa R. Civ. P. 237(c). Thus, on review, we examine the record before the district court to decide whether any material fact is in dispute, and if not, whether the district court correctly applied the law. In considering the record, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment.

General Car & Truck Leasing Sys., Inc. v. Lane & Waterman, 557 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa 1996) (citations omitted). A factual dispute precludes summary judgment only when the dispute is over facts that would affect the outcome of the suit. Farm & City Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 509 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Iowa 1993). "If the conflict in the record concerns only the legal consequences flowing from undisputed facts, entry of summary judgment is proper." Thompson v. City of Des Moines, 564 N.W.2d 839, 841 (Iowa 1997).

III. Validity of Ordinance.

A. Principles of law governing challenge to city ordinance. Zoning decisions are "an exercise of the police powers delegated by the State to municipalities." Neuzil v. City of Iowa City, 451 N.W.2d 159, 163 (Iowa 1990) (citing Iowa Code § 414.1 (1985)); Montgomery v. Bremer County Bd. of Supervisors, 299 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Iowa 1980). As part of its zoning power, a city may regulate "the percentage of [a] lot that may be occupied" and "the size of yards" for the purpose of "promoting the health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community." Iowa Code § 414.1 (1995). Moreover " 'a municipality may amend its zoning ordinances any time it deems circumstances and conditions warrant such action ... if ... it is not unreasonable or capricious....' " F.H. Uelner Precision Tools & Dies, Inc. v. City of Dubuque, 190 N.W.2d 465, 469 (Iowa 1971) (quoting Keller v. City of Council Bluffs, 246 Iowa 202, 207-08, 66 N.W.2d 113, 116 (1954)); accord Hanna v. Rathje, 171 N.W.2d 876, 879 (Iowa 1969).

City zoning ordinances, including any amendments to them, enjoy a strong presumption of validity. Neuzil, 451 N.W.2d at 163, 165; Business Ventures, Inc. v. City of Iowa City, 234 N.W.2d 376, 381 (Iowa 1975). The burden is on the person challenging the ordinance to rebut the presumption and demonstrate the ordinance's invalidity. Business Ventures, 234 N.W.2d at 381; Hanna, 171 N.W.2d at 880. To carry this burden, the challenger must show the ordinance is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory, with no reasonable relationship to the promotion of public health, safety, or welfare. Anderson v. City of Cedar Rapids, 168 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Iowa 1969); Plaza Recreational Ctr. v. City of Sioux City, 253 Iowa 246, 252-53, 111 N.W.2d 758, 762-63 (1961).

In considering the challenger's claim, the court will not substitute its own judgment for that of the city council by passing on the wisdom or propriety of the ordinance. Neuzil, 451 N.W.2d at 166; Hanna, 171 N.W.2d at 880. If the ordinance is facially valid and its "reasonableness" is "fairly debatable," the court will not interfere with the city's action. Neuzil, 451 N.W.2d at 163; Stone v. City of Wilton, 331 N.W.2d 398, 402 (Iowa 1983).

"An ordinance is valid if it has any real, substantial relation to the public health, comfort, safety, and welfare, including the maintenance of property values." Neuzil, 451 N.W.2d at 164; accord F.H. Uelner Precision Tools, 190 N.W.2d at 468. Our prime consideration is the general purpose of the ordinance, not the hardship it may impose in an individual case. Neuzil, 451 N.W.2d at 164; see F.H. Uelner Precision Tools, 190 N.W.2d at 468 (stating zoning for "the public good is a proper exercise of the police power even though it works some onerous consequences on landowners"). We do not focus on individual hardships because property owners in the area affected by a zoning ordinance, as well as adjacent landowners, have no vested right to the continuation of the current zoning. See Kenneth H....