McBride v. City of Sioux City

• Decision Date: 19 July 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-82,88-82
• Citation: 444 N.W.2d 85
• Parties: H. Allen McBRIDE, Appellant, v. CITY OF SIOUX CITY, K.R. Castner, Gary Worth, and Karen Hoss, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 85

444 N.W.2d 85

H. Allen McBRIDE, Appellant, v. CITY OF SIOUX CITY, K.R. Castner, Gary Worth, and Karen Hoss, Appellees.

No. 88-82.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 19, 1989.

Dennis L. Eaton, Des Moines, for appellant.

C. Maurice Rawe and George A. Carroll, Sioux City, Asst. City Attys., for appellees.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LARSON, CARTER, NEUMAN, and SNELL, JJ.

NEUMAN, Justice.

This is an appeal from H. Allen McBride's unsuccessful attempt to redress his firing by the Sioux City Department of Housing, including claims for damages based on alleged slander by a city employee. The district court dismissed McBride's termination claim by way of summary judgment, and his slander case on the merits. We affirm.

I. Background. In January 1978, McBride was hired by Sioux City as assistant housing manager. His duties included reviewing and approving applications for low income housing. The position, as advertised, was non-civil service. After successful completion of a probationary period, McBride was classified as a "Full Time Regular Non-Civil Service" employee. He neither disputed nor appealed this classification.

In January 1984, McBride was discharged from his employment after his supervisor, Karen Hoss, discovered that he had backdated an applicant's housing application and thereby expedited her ability to obtain subsidized housing. Hoss expressed concern that McBride's act appeared to have been prompted by some personal favor or monetary gain. Before firing him, Hoss gave McBride the opportunity to offer some legitimate explanation for his action, but he was unable or unwilling to do so. He was then fired.

Following his discharge, McBride told the supposedly advantaged tenant what Hoss had said about the "personal favors." She apparently interpreted the accusation to infer that she had slept with McBride to obtain housing. The tenant called Hoss and, in a later meeting witnessed by two of the tenant's friends, Hoss allegedly made the same or similar statement regarding the appearance of impropriety surrounding McBride's actions.

Six months later, McBride sued the city on a variety of theories: (1) for declaratory judgment that he was a civil service employee entitled to the discharge procedures of Iowa Code chapter 400 (1983); (2) for money damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983; (3) for breach of his employment contract; (4) for sex discrimination; and (5) for slander by Karen Hoss.

On the city's motion for summary judgment, all but the discrimination and slander issues were decided adversely to McBride. He later dismissed the discrimination claim. The parties proceeded to trial on the slander claim alone.

Based principally on the noncredible testimony of the witnesses, the district court found insufficient evidence to support McBride's allegation of slander. McBride now appeals the trial court's dismissal of that claim on the merits, as well as the adverse rulings on issues previously decided by way of summary judgment.

II. Sufficiency of Notice of Appeal. The city, as a preliminary matter, urges us to dismiss McBride's appeal of the matters resolved on summary judgment. It claims to have been insufficiently notified of McBride's intent to appeal those issues.

We have often said that substantial compliance with the notice requirements of Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6(a) is sufficient so long as the notice does not confuse, mislead, or prejudice the appellee. See Miller v. Wellman Dynamics Corp., 419 N.W.2d 380, 382-83 (Iowa 1988); In re Guardianship of Ankeney, 360 N.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Iowa 1985); In re Marriage of Schissel, 292 N.W.2d 421, 423 (Iowa 1980). We prefer to dispose of cases on the merits and not on mere technicalities. Hawkeye Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373, 378 (Iowa 1972).

Although the text of McBride's notice of appeal refers only to the final judgment in the slander trial, his posttrial rule 179(b) motion referred to the civil service and termination issues as well. We believe the city could therefore discern McBride's intent to appeal from the earlier grant of summary judgment. Moreover, the city has claimed no prejudice beyond the "tension and distraction" suffered by its employees as a result of this lengthy litigation. Accordingly, we overrule the city's motion to dismiss and proceed to a consideration of McBride's appeal on the merits.

III. Appellate Issues. The central question on this appeal is whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment for the city on McBride's claim that he either held civil service status or some other constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment with the city such that his summary discharge denied him rights of due process. The material facts giving rise to McBride's claim are undisputed and thus the case is ripe for summary adjudication under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 237(c). Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Milne, 424 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Iowa 1988). We turn first to McBride's claim of civil service eligibility before considering his other "entitlement" claims and alleged due process violations.

A. Chapter 400. McBride's claimed status as a civil servant rests on alternative theories: first, that if he was not originally classified civil service, he should have been; second, that he qualifies for "covering in" under Iowa Code section 400.4; or third, that he is entitled to the benefits of chapter 400 by operation of law. We shall consider the arguments in the order presented.

It is undisputed that McBride was not hired pursuant to chapter 400. He did not take a civil service exam. See Iowa Code § 400.17; Downs v. Board of Trustees of Police Retirement System, 312 N.W.2d 563, 567 n. 4 (Iowa 1981) (dictum; police officer who did not pass civil service exam is subject to removal at any time, and not covered by chapter 400). He was not certified on a list to the city council. See Iowa Code §§ 400.11, 400.17. He was not appointed to his position by the City Manager of Sioux City. See Iowa Code § 400.15; 1938 Op.Iowa Att'y Gen. 264, 265 (librarians, assistants, and employees do not fall within civil service act because not appointed by city); see also Dennis v. Bennet, 258 Iowa 664, 668, 140 N.W.2d 123, 126 (1966) ("appointment" to civil service position means designation or assignment to position by proper appointing authority).

Given these circumstances, McBride has aimed his challenge at the original classification of his position as non-civil service. His claim, however, misses the target.

The creation of civil service classifications "is an administrative matter, usually vested in the commission, and concerning which the commission may exercise a wide discretion, subject to review by the courts only when corrupt, arbitrary or erroneous in law, provided suit is timely instituted." 3 E.P. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 12.77, at 306 (3d ed. 1982) (hereinafter "E.P. McQuillin"); see People ex rel. McKeown v. Hurley, 343 Ill.App. 413, 419-20, 99 N.E.2d 355, 358-59 (1951) (commission's action in classifying plumber lower than plumbing inspector was not abuse of discretion); 1976 Op.Iowa Att'y Gen. 716, 717-19 (classification of positions by commission acceptable so long as not arbitrary or unreasonable) (quoting 3 E.P. McQuillin at § 12.134).

While our civil service statute does not clearly designate whether it is the municipality itself or the civil service commission that has the responsibility to establish civil service classifications, we note that Iowa case law and other authority indicate that both entities may share this responsibility. See Helgevold v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 367 N.W.2d 257, 261 (Iowa App.1985) (municipality may reclassify positions "in furtherance of successful function of the service"); cf. 1977 Op.Iowa Att'y Gen. 15, 16 (city or commission has discretion to place employees under chapter 400 when new or reclassified position created).

Irrespective of which entity possessed the authority to classify McBride's position in the first instance, we find no abuse of discretion demonstrated by the facts in this case. Iowa Code section 400.6 specifically excepts the "principal assistant of each department" from civil service appointment. Neither the commission's decision to place the position of assistant housing manager outside chapter 400 nor the city's failure to reclassify the position as civil service have been shown by McBride to have been made "on grounds or for reasons clearly unreasonable." Sheer Constr., Inc. v. W. Hodgman & Sons, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 328, 334 (Iowa 1982).

Furthermore, McBride's challenge to his classification comes too late and by the wrong procedural device. The proper way to challenge his lack of classification would have been by writ of mandamus while still employed. See 3 E.P. McQuillin at § 12.77 (writ of mandamus available to compel classification of position); Leahey v. Department of Water & Power, 76 Cal.App.2d 281, 285, 173 P.2d 69, 71-72 (1946); Iowa Code § 661.1 (mandamus proper action to compel inferior tribunal, board, or corporation to perform a duty). At least two jurisdictions have held that a civil service classification cannot be challenged collaterally by an employee seeking to be restored to a position. People ex rel. Corkill v. McAdoo, 113 A.D. 770, 773, 99 N.Y.S. 324, 326 (1906); see Leahey, 76 Cal.App.2d at 285-86, 173 P.2d at 71-72 (declaratory relief inappropriate means to attempt to circumvent lost right to mandamus action to compel civil service classification); see also 4 E.P. McQuillin at § 12.268 (citing McAdoo ). We think the district court properly refused to recognize McBride's attempt to gain declaratory relief in this way.

McBride's second claim with regard to his chapter 400 status is that he should be "covered in" by operation of Iowa Code section 400.7. This section allows employees to be "grandfathered" under the chapter 400 umbrella if their positions were not covered by a civil...