Miller v. Wellman Dynamics Corp., 86-1202

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
• Writing for the Court: SNELL
• Citation: 419 N.W.2d 380
• Parties: Dean A. MILLER, Executor of the Estate of Christopher John Miller, Deceased, Plaintiff, and Renee Squires, Appellant, v. WELLMAN DYNAMICS CORPORATION, Vincent Bobenhouse, and Steel Cruiser Manufacturing Co., Inc., Appellees.
• Docket Number: No. 86-1202,86-1202
• Decision Date: 17 February 1988

Page 380

419 N.W.2d 380 Dean A. MILLER, Executor of the Estate of Christopher John Miller, Deceased, Plaintiff,
and Renee Squires, Appellant,
v.
WELLMAN DYNAMICS CORPORATION, Vincent Bobenhouse, and Steel Cruiser Manufacturing Co., Inc., Appellees. No. 86-1202. Supreme Court of Iowa. Feb. 17, 1988.

Page 381

David S. Wiggins and Robert K. DuPuy of LaMarca, Marcucci, Wiggins & Anderson, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellant.

David H. Luginbill of Ahlers, Cooney, Dorweiler, Haynie, Smith & Allbee, Des Moines, for appellee Wellman Dynamics Corp.

B. Ronald Pogge and Thomas J. Logan of Hopkins & Heubner, Des Moines, for appellees Steel Cruiser Mfg. and Vincent Bobenhouse.

Considered by LARSON, P.J., and SCHULTZ, NEUMAN, SNELL, and ANDREASEN, JJ.

SNELL, Justice.

On May 21, 1984, Christopher John Miller, an employee of Steel Cruiser Manufacturing Company (Steel Cruiser), sustained injuries in a fall through a skylight while working on the premises of defendant Wellman Dynamics Corporation (Wellman). Miller died eight days later as a result of these injuries. He was eighteen years old on the date of his death. On February 6, 1986, the executor of Miller's estate filed a petition against Wellman and Vincent Bobenhouse, an employee of Steel Cruiser. Wellman subsequently filed a cross-claim petition against Steel Cruiser. On May 14, 1986, Miller's biological mother, Renee Squires, filed an amendment to the estate's petition, seeking damages for the loss of Miller's aid, comfort, companionship, services, society and consortium. All defendants moved to dismiss the amendment, contending the cause of action and damages sought were not recognized or recoverable, respectively, under Iowa law. The district court agreed and dismissed Squire's amendment accordingly. This appeal followed.

I. The Jurisdictional Issue.

We are faced initially with a procedural matter. Wellman filed its motion to dismiss on June 4, 1986. Bobenhouse and Steel Cruiser joined in a motion to dismiss which was filed on June 6, 1986. On August

Page 382

5, 1986, the district court sustained Wellman's motion and dismissed Squires' petition. On August 7, 1986, by way of nunc pro tunc order, the district court realized it had "inadvertently omitted two defendants from the [August 5] ruling on the motions to dismiss," and "amended [the August 5 ruling] to include and sustain [the motion of Bobenhouse and Steel Cruiser]." Squires' original and amended notices of appeal refer only to the district court's August 7 ruling. Wellman, whose motion was the subject of the August 5 ruling, now maintains we have no jurisdiction over Squires' appeal against it because the notice of appeal did not refer to the August 5 ruling.

Our rules of appellate procedure provide that a notice of appeal "shall specify the parties taking the appeal and the decree, judgment, order or part thereof appealed from." Iowa R.App.P. 6(a). In applying the forerunner of rule 6(a), we stated the following guiding principles:

Substantial compliance with the provisions of rule 336 is sufficient. In considering the sufficiency of the content of the notice we now hold that if the intent of the appellant to appeal from a judgment may be inferred from the text of the notice and if the appellee has not been misled by the defect the appeal will be entertained. This more liberal rule of construction is consistent with our oft repeated preference for disposition of cases on the merits and not on mere technicalities.

Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373, 378 (Iowa 1972) (citations omitted).

In the context of the present appeal it is important to note that a nunc pro tunc entry makes the record "show now what was actually done then." McVay v. Kenneth E. Montz Implement Co., 287 N.W.2d 149, 150 (Iowa 1980). The purpose of such an order is to make the record show truthfully what judgment was actually rendered. General Mills Inc. v. Prall, 244 Iowa 218, 225, 56 N.W.2d 596, 600 (1953). Our statutes grant the district court nunc pro tunc authority "only to correct an evident mistake." Iowa Code § 602.17 (1983).

The district court's August 7 nunc pro tunc order amended its August 5 ruling so as to "include and sustain" Bobenhouse and Steel Cruiser's motion to dismiss. Squires' notice of appeal,...