Mcbride v. State

• Decision Date: 12 May 2011
• Docket Number: No. 2008–CT–01347–SCT.,2008–CT–01347–SCT.
• Citation: 61 So.3d 138
• Parties: Jerry McBRIDEv.STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

61 So.3d 138

Jerry McBRIDE

v.STATE of Mississippi.

No. 2008–CT–01347–SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 12, 2011.

Office of Indigent Appeals by W. Daniel Hinchcliff, attorney for appellant.Office of the Attorney General by Lisa Lynn Blount, attorney for appellee.EN BANC.WALLER, Chief Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Mississippi law both afford an accused the right to a speedy trial. And, once an accused is brought to trial, the State bears the burden of proving each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jerry McBride argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated, and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of sexual battery. We disagree. His conviction and sentence, therefore, are affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. The following history is taken from the facts and trial-court proceedings set out in the opinion of the Court of Appeals.

... In May 2006, McBride was indicted for sexual battery of his daughter, who was under the age of fourteen at the time of the incident, pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97–3–95(1)(d) (Rev.2006). The indictment stated the battery occurred “on or about or between January 2002, and December 2005” in Coahoma County. McBride was subsequently arrested, arraigned, and assigned a court-appointed attorney.

... McBride did not go to trial until several terms of court had passed. The court docket indicates that in September 2007, an order setting trial was filed. Representations at the pre-trial hearing indicated that this trial setting was for November 2007. Then, the record shows that in December 2007, an order reset trial for January 2008, but in January 2008 an agreed order reset trial to February 2008. In December 2007, McBride filed two pro se “Motion[s] for Directed Verdict of Acquittal,” within days of one another, complaining that he had been incarcerated for sixteen months in violation of his constitutional rights. Therefore, he asked that the charges against him be dismissed. Additionally, he noted he never received a copy of the indictment, never had a preliminary hearing, and never asked for a continuance of his trial, among other complaints. Also, in January 2008, McBride, dissatisfied with his court-appointed attorney's performance, filed a motion requesting termination of the services of his attorney. Pretrial hearings were held on McBride's motions, which were denied. The trial judge, considering McBride's pro se motions together, stated that McBride's “most significant complaint” was concerning the delay in his trial. However, the trial judge made a detailed analysis of the appropriate factors outlined in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) regarding the speedy-trial complaint and found no prejudice.

... McBride's trial commenced on February 19, 2008. The State produced three witnesses: the victim, a middle-school counselor, and a Department of Human Services (DHS) specialist. The victim, who was eighteen years old at the time of trial, testified regarding two sexual incidents with McBride. At the time of the sexual incident, she was approximately eleven years old and McBride was living with his mother. He drove her and his seven-year-old son to “a friend's house,” which was in “the Brick Yard” in Clarksdale, Mississippi. When they arrived at the house, nobody was home. McBride took his daughter to the back of the house. He began hugging and touching her. Then, he pulled down her pants, unzipped his pants, and put his penis in her vagina. She testified she fought and screamed, but she did not tell anyone about the incident because she was scared.

... The victim also testified about a second sexual incident with McBride that occurred when she was approximately fifteen years old. She and McBride went on the back roads outside of Clarksdale in order to let her drive. McBride's daughter testified she did not want to go with him. When they were approximately thirty minutes from Clarksdale, while she was driving, McBride began fondling her breasts and touching her between her legs, on top of her clothes. The victim, who lives with her mother, admitted that McBride had been mostly absent from her life and did not provide her money or material possessions. Also, there was “bad blood” between her mother and her father, who did not live together. The victim stated these were the only incidents of sexual abuse by her father.

... The next witness for the State was a counselor from Oakhurst Middle School in Clarksdale. She testified that the victim approached her at school. Based on what the victim told her, the counselor alerted DHS, which came to the school and interviewed the victim. The last witness for the State, a family-protection specialist with DHS, explained she was employed by DHS to investigate allegations of child abuse. She testified that she investigated the allegation and spoke with the victim, as well as the victim's family members. The victim had a “forensic interview” with DHS in December 2005.

... No witnesses testified for the defense. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and McBride was sentenced to twenty-five years in the custody of the MDOC. McBride filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, a new trial, which was denied.

McBride v. State, 61 So.3d 174, 176–78 (Miss.Ct.App.2010).

¶ 3. The trial court granted McBride's motion for out-of-time appeal, and he appealed his conviction and sentence. We assigned the case to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court. We granted certiorari and now consider whether McBride was denied his constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial, and whether the State carried its burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

DISCUSSION

I. Neither McBride's constitutional nor statutory right to a speedy trial was violated.

A. Constitutional right to a speedy trial

¶ 4. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides an accused the “the right to a speedy and public trial....” U.S. Const. amend. VI. That right applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222–23, 87 S.Ct. 988, 993–94, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). Article 3, Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 likewise guarantees a criminal defendant the right to “a speedy and public trial....” Miss. Const. art. 3, § 26.

¶ 5. The Supreme Court of the United States has set forth four factors to consider whenever a defendant alleges that his constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). None of these four factors is necessary or sufficient on its own to find a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial. Id. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182. All are related and must be considered alongside other relevant circumstances. Id. The analysis thus entails “a difficult and sensitive balancing process.” Id.

¶ 6. Where, as here, a trial court articulates findings of fact and sets forth reasons for its decisions concerning the Barker factors, this Court will uphold those findings so long as they are based upon substantial, credible evidence. See State v. Ferguson, 576 So.2d 1252, 1255 (Miss.1991).

1. Length of the delay

¶ 7. A full Barker analysis is warranted only if the delay was presumptively prejudicial. Stark v. State, 911 So.2d 447, 450 (Miss.2005) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182). In Mississippi, a delay of more than eight months is presumptively prejudicial. Stark, 911 So.2d at 450 (citing Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 408 (Miss.1989)).

¶ 8. A formal indictment or information or an arrest—whichever first occurs—triggers the constitutional right to a speedy trial. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S.Ct. 455, 463, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971); Smith, 550 So.2d at 408 (citing Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194, 198 (Miss.1982)). Accordingly, McBride's constitutional right to a speedy trial attached when he was indicted on May 30, 2006. His trial, however, did not occur until February 19, 2008–a delay of almost twenty-one months. The delay here is thus presumptively prejudicial, and a full analysis of the remaining Barker factors is required.

2. Reasons for the delay

¶ 9. Once the delay is deemed presumptively prejudicial, “the burden shifts to the prosecution to produce evidence justifying the delay and to persuade the trier of fact of the legitimacy of these reasons.” Ferguson, 576 So.2d at 1254. Different weights are assigned to various reasons for the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182. “A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government[,]” whereas “[a] more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily....” Id. Neutral reasons, nevertheless, “should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant.” Id. Valid reasons, such as a missing witness, justify appropriate delay. Id.

¶ 10. At a pretrial hearing on McBride's Motion for Directed Verdict of Acquittal, the State offered essentially four reasons for the delay in bringing McBride to trial: (1) the timing of McBride's arrest; (2) negligence or administrative oversight; (3) an overcrowded docket; and (4) the unavailability of a key witness for the State. The trial court denied McBride's motion and issued an order explaining, court term by court term, its analysis of the reasons for the delay. It ultimately found that this factor weighed against the State, but not heavily.

May 30, 2006, to January 2007

¶ 11. McBride was indicted on May 30, 2006,...