Mccabe v. State
| Citation | 1 Ga.App. 719,58 S.E. 277 |
| Decision Date | 03 May 1907 |
| Docket Number | (No. 370.) |
| Parties | McCABE. v. STATE. |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
Larceny — What Constitutes House — Wharf.
A house or building, within the meaning of Pen. Code 1895, §§ 178, 179, defining larceny from the house, is a structure having a roof and lateral inclosure of some sort, in which persons live or work, animals are confined, or property is stored or contained. A wharf or landing place, where vessels are brought to discharge or take on cargoes, and where freight is placed awaiting removal, covered by a roof, but otherwise wholly uninclosed, is not a house or building, within the above sections.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 32, Larceny, §§ 48, 98.]
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Error from Superior Court, Chatham County; Cann, Judge.
One McCabe was convicted of larceny from a house, and brings error. Reversed.
O'Connor, O'Byrne & Hartridge, for plaintiff in error.
William W. Osborne, Sol. Gen., for the State.
The defendant in the court below was indicted for the offense of larceny from the house; the house described in the indictment as "the storage wharf, same being a building of the Ocean Steamship Company of Savannah." The goods were piled up on the wharf, and sheds were built over the wharf for the protection of the freight from the weather. The evidence does not show that this wharf was inclosed at the sides, and it is fair to presume that the wharf was simply a platform upon which the freight was stored, and was only protected from the top by the shed, and that there was no inclosure or protection on the sides. The main question for our decision is whether this structure constituted a house or building under sections 178 and 179 of the Penal Code of 1895, which define the offense of larceny from the house.
Under the common law there was no such offense as larceny from the house, but such offense was included within the definition of simple larceny. 4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 239. But, beginning with the statute of Henry VIII, the distinct offense of larceny from the house was created, the evolution as to the kind of house in which larceny could be committed being, first, the dwelling house and outhouses within the protection or curtilage of the dwelling house, and then any outhouse, shop, warehouse, or storehouse, and finally any building in which anything of value was contained or stored. The fact that such places were invaded to consummate the larceny made the offense more aggravated, and a severer punishment was inflicted than in cases of simple larceny. Our own statute is very broad in its classification of buildings protected; the language being, "any dwelling house, store, shop, warehouse, or any other building." The words "any other building" must be construed in connection with the character of buildings specifically enumerated. The building or structure protected by the statute must have the distinguishing features of a house. A house is defined to be "a place of abode or shelter; * * * a building used for storing or sheltering something;" and a "building" is defined as "an edifice for any use; that which is built, as dwelling house, barn, etc." Standard Dictionary. The Supreme Court of Georgia, in particular cases, has made several very broad applications of the word "house, " as used in the statute defining larceny from the house. In Carter v. State, 106 Ga. 372, 32 S. E. 345, 71 Am. St. Rep. 262, it declared that, "a freight car body, which had been detached from the wheels and placed upon permanent posts near a railway track at a station, and to which a platform had been attached, thus constituting a structure to be used as 'a freight warehouse, ' and which is used for this purpose only, is a 'house, ' within the meaning of section 136 of the Penal Code of 1895, " defining arson. And in Williams v. State, 105 Ga. 814, 32 S. E. 129, 70 Am. St Rep. 82: "A structure which is stationary, which is eight feet tall, covered with shingles and inclosed with wire, erected for the purpose of the safe-keeping of birds and fowls, is a house, within the meaning of our Code, which defines the offense of larceny from the house." In Bone v. State, 121 Ga. 147, 48 S. E. 986, the court upheld a convic-tion of larceny from the...
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...building must be protected from intrusion or trespass by some sort of material. It may be stone, wood, wire, or cloth,' McCabe v. State, 1 Ga.App. 719, 58 S.E. 277, 278. The case of People v. Blair, 52 Ill.2d 371, 288 N.E.2d 443, 445, contains a particularly workable definition. The Illinoi......
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...developed as an aggravated form of simple larceny because such places had to be invaded to consummate the larceny. McCabe v. State, 1 Ga.App. 719, 58 S.E. 277 (1907). Furthermore, even if the definition of "building" found in § 13A-7-1(2), § 13A-7-40 and § 13A-3-20, Code of Alabama 1975 app......
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