McCaffrey v. School Committee of Haverhill

• Decision Date: 03 May 1967
• Citation: 226 N.E.2d 232,352 Mass. 516
• Parties: Donald J. McCAFFREY et al. v. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF HAVERHILL et al. 1
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 232

226 N.E.2d 232

352 Mass. 516

Donald J. McCAFFREY et al. v. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF HAVERHILL et al. ¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

Argued April 3, 1967.

Decided May 3, 1967.

Theodore L. Schiavoni, Haverhill, for plaintiffs.

George Karelitz, Haverhill, for defendants.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and SPALDING, WHITTEMORE, CUTTER and REARDON, JJ.

CUTTER, Justice.

The plaintiffs are teachers in the Haverhill public and vocational schools. They appeal(a) from an interlocutory decree sustaining a demurrer to their amended bill for declaratory relief, and (b) from a final decree dismissing the bill.

The bill alleged, among other things, (1) that the plaintiffs had formed an association called Merrimack Educational Research and Counseling Institute (Merrimack) to provide individual tutoring in remedial reading and college board examination review and also classes for adults; (2) that the plaintiffs work for Merrimack outside their regular school curriculum hours; (3) that the plaintiffs were ordered by the defendants (fn. 1) to discontinue their association with Merrimack, but that the defendants refuse to state their reasons or to give a preliminary hearing to the plaintiffs concerning whether work for Merrimack conflicts with their school duties; (4) that the plaintiffs believe that the defendants intend to 'expel them from the * * * (s)chool (s) ystem' if they keep up their association with Merrimack; (5) that the school committee has refused to permit the plaintiffs' counsel or the public to be present at a hearing for 'dealing with disciplinary measures against the' plaintiffs; (6) that the defendants 'made final decision, ordering the * * * (plaintiffs) to desist from * * * any * * * connection' with Merrimack and informed the plaintiffs 'that their failure (so) to desist * * * would result in (further) disciplinary action'; (7) that the plaintiffs 'were 'suspended' * * * without any just cause'; (8) that the plaintiffs believe that 'such suspension has been entered upon their written records'; and (9) that the defendants (despite 'the absence of law prohibiting' the plaintiffs' proposed work for Merrimack in off-duty time) 'have threatened * * * further and continuous suspension until * * * (the plaintiffs) disassociate themselves' from Merrimack.

We find nothing in the bill (apart from allegations too confused and vague to have significance and from mere conclusions) which asserts more than that the defendants requested or directed a private conference with the plaintiffs as school teachers (without the presence of counsel, the public, or the press) about the plaintiffs' off-duty activities in a field so closely similar to their work as teachers as to raise serious doubts concerning its compatability with their public teaching work. For the school committee to investigate such matters is well within the scope of its official administrative functions. G.L. c. 71, §§ 37 and 38 (as amended through St.1960, c. 333, § 2). See O'Donnell v. Norwood, 346 Mass. 394, 396--397, 193 N.E.2d 330. Although the allegation that the plaintiffs have been 'suspended' perhaps could refer to action under G.L. c. 71, § 42, to suspend the plaintiffs as teachers, this allegation (when read in the context of the whole amended bill) appears to refer to an 'order' by the defendants that the plaintiffs cease work with...