O'Donnell v. Town of Norwood
| Decision Date | 01 November 1963 |
| Parties | Martin M. O'DONNELL v. TOWN OF NORWOOD. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
James P. Lynch, Jr., Boston, for plaintiff.
Walter J. Gotovich, Town Counsel, for defendant.
Before SPALDING, CUTTER, KIRK, SPIEGEL and REARDON, JJ.
This is an action of contract by which the plaintiff, a teacher and submaster in the public school system of the defendant, seeks to recover salary for the period from September 8, 1958, to December 29, 1958. A judge of the Superior Court reported the case without decision upon the pleadings and a statement of agreed facts.
The plaintiff is a school teacher and submaster in the Norwood public schools, serving at the discretion of the school committee ('on tenure'); he was lawfully suspended from his duties on September 8, 1958, by the committee upon its finding of insubordination. On December 21, 1958, the school committee voted to terminate the suspension and to return him to his duties on December 29, 1958. The plaintiff, during the period of his suspension, was 'ready, willing and able' to perform his duties. On December 29, 1958, the defendant resumed his work as teacher and submaster. During the period of the plaintiff's suspension he was not paid any salary by the defendant. If the plaintiff had been paid during the period of his suspension he would have received $2,420. The plaintiff was not dismissed from the school system either upon or after the termination of his suspension.
The sole issue before us is whether a school teacher, suspended for cause but not dismissed, is entitled to be paid his salary during the period of his suspension.
The plaintiff bases his right to recovery on the provisions of G.L. c. 71, § 42, as amended through St.1956, c. 132, § 2. 1 He maintains that the pertinent language 'determinative of the instant case in his favor' is contained in the last sentence of the section, which reads: 'No teacher or superintendent who has been lawfully dismissed shall receive compensation for services rendered thereafter or for any period of lawful suspension followed by dismissal.'
The plaintiff, in his brief, argues at some length that the 'statutory history' of the act favors his interpretation. We have examined the legislative history of this statute and are not convinced that the plaintiff's argument is sound.
The plaintiff theorizes that the form of the predecessor section in St.1914, c. 714, § 4, 'is clearer than the present wording * * * although the sense is the same: '* * * [I]f the teacher or superintendent so suspended is subsequently dismissed because of such conduct, he shall not receive any salary for the period of his suspension.'' The plaintiff maintains that because the 'sense' of the wording is the same in the present statute we must conclude that this was a mandate from the Legislature to the effect that 'a teacher who is suspended is entitled to pay unless the suspension is followed by dismissal.'
In our view the sole purpose of this language is to prevent the payment of salary to a dismissed teacher. It does not compel the payment of salary during the period a teacher is lawfully suspended for misconduct, where the suspension is not followed by dismissal. We note that, at the same time the language that is now the last sentence of § 42 was introduced into the statute, 2 the Legislature also inserted the following language, 'Neither this nor the preceding section shall affect the right of a committee to suspend a teacher * * * for unbecoming conduct * * *.' It seems obvious that the purpose of this language was to preserve rather than limit an existing right. Indeed, the earlier version of this language said: 'Nothing herein contained shall be construed as limiting the right of a school committee to suspend a teacher * * *' (St.1914, c. 714, § 4).
Prior to this statute, the right of the school committee to dismiss a teacher for any good cause appears to have been absolute. Knowles v. Boston, 12 Gray, 339, 340. We accept the thesis that the power to dismiss includes the power to suspend. See Goldsmith v. Board of Education of Sacramento City High School Dist., 66 Cal.App. 157, 163-164, 225 P. 783. It follows that at the time the statute was enacted school committees were vested with the power to suspend teachers for cause without salary. We have repeatedly held that the authority of a school committee to manage the public schools is to be broadly interpreted. McDevitt v. School Committee of Malden, 298 Mass. 213, 214, 10 N.E.2d...
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DeCanio v. School Committee of Boston
...not left to doubtful implication.' Davis v. School Committee of Somerville, 307 Mass. 354, 363, 30 N.E.2d 401, 406. O'Donnell v. Norwood, 346 Mass. 394, 397, 193 N.E.2d 330. 3. The plaintiffs' principal contention is that their suspension and dismissal, without adequate notice of the charge......
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Dupree v. School Committee of Boston
...G.L. c. 71, § 42D, appears not to authorize a suspension for a period exceeding one month. As pointed out in O'Donnell v. Norwood, 346 Mass. 394, 396, 193 N.E.2d 330 (1963), prior to St. 1914, c. 714, § 4, "the right of the school committee to dismiss a teacher for any good cause appears to......
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Martin v. School Committee of Natick
...conclusion. "[T]he authority of a school committee to manage the public schools is to be broadly interpreted." O'Donnell v. Norwood, 346 Mass. 394, 396-397, 193 N.E.2d 330 (1963). Martin's thirty-day suspension did not rest on a basis which was "arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable, in bad f......
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McCaffrey v. School Committee of Haverhill
...of its official administrative functions. G.L. c. 71, §§ 37 and 38 (as amended through St.1960, c. 333, § 2). See O'Donnell v. Norwood, 346 Mass. 394, 396--397, 193 N.E.2d 330. Although the allegation that the plaintiffs have been 'suspended' perhaps could refer to action under G.L. c. 71, ......