McCammon v. Yellowstone Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 February 1980
• Docket Number: No. 12875,12875
• Parties: Robert W. McCAMMON, Claimant-Appellant, v. YELLOWSTONE COMPANY, INC., Employer, and Department of Employment, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 434

607 P.2d 434

100 Idaho 926

Robert W. McCAMMON, Claimant-Appellant, v. YELLOWSTONE COMPANY, INC., Employer, and Department of Employment, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 12875.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Feb. 29, 1980.

Stephen L. Beer of Beer & Cain, Boise, for claimant-appellant.

Larry C. Hunter of Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett & Blanton, for defendant-respondent Yellowstone Co., Inc.

David H. Leroy, Atty. Gen., R. Lavar Marsh, Roger B. Madsen, Deputy Attys. Gen., Boise, for defendant-respondent Dept. of Employment.

DONALDSON, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission denying claimant-appellant's unemployment benefits. Claimant Robert W. McCammon filed for unemployment benefits on March 22, 1977. Originally he was declared eligible for benefits but his employer, Ossie Rhash, protested, requesting a redetermination. Redetermination was bypassed at the request of the Industrial Commission and the matter was forwarded as an appeal to the Appeals Examiner, who concluded that McCammon had voluntarily left his employment and was thus ineligible for unemployment benefits. Review of the appeal was held in October, 1977, which resulted in the decision of the Industrial Commission dated January 3, 1978, affirming the order of the Appeals Examiner for the Department of Employment and denying unemployment benefits to McCammon. McCammon was employed as a field adjuster for Yellowstone Company, Inc., for approximately four years. On March 18, 1977, his manager Ossie Rhash informed him that his job would be terminated as of April 1, 1977. Reasons for the termination were McCammon's failure to dress properly for his job, failure to keep adequate records, failure to keep the company car clean and improper use of company time for personal matters. McCammon denied all of these allegations.

McCammon told Rhash that he would quit effective March 18, 1977 instead of waiting until April 1, giving as his reason the strained relations between the two men. Rhash consented to the early termination. Thereafter, McCammon filed for unemployment benefits which were denied by the Appeals Examiner on the basis of his conclusion that McCammon, who could have continued in his employment for two more weeks, had voluntarily quit without good cause.

On appeal we address the issue of whether the Industrial Commission's finding that McCammon voluntarily left his employment without good cause should deprive him of unemployment benefits for the period after he was fired. We note at the outset that McCammon, at oral argument, requested benefits for the period beginning April 1, 1977, the date he was fired, rather than from the period beginning March 20. We believe there is a significant distinction between an award of unemployment benefits that would begin on a claimant's effective date of termination rather than on the date claimant voluntarily resigned. For reasons discussed below we affirm the denial of benefits for the period of March 20 to March 31, 1977, but reverse the denial of benefits for the period beginning April 1 and remand for further proceedings.

The issue of whether a terminated employee is entitled to unemployment benefits after voluntarily leaving work prior to the effective termination date is one of first impression in Idaho; however, other jurisdictions have had an opportunity to address the issue and have allowed an employee who voluntarily left his employment a short time prior to an effective termination date to recover unemployment benefits for the period of involuntary unemployment. In Department of Labor & Industry v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 133 Pa.Super. 518, 3 A.2d 211 (1938), the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a decision of the Compensation Board which awarded unemployment benefits to a claimant whose job was terminated effective December 24, 1937, but who left work voluntarily on December 20.

In discussing the issue of whether claimant's leaving on December 20 constituted a voluntary departure which would deprive the claimant of benefits, the court reviewed the record and found that claimant's "leaving work under the circumstances did not cause the unemployment for which he claimed benefits." 3 A.2d at 215.

The court concluded its decision by noting:

"In our view of the case the claimant's employment was broken or severed as a result of the act of the employer in notifying him that he would be laid off on December 24, seven days later. His leaving was due to this positive act of the employer, which was never withdrawn or modified. His leaving a few days in advance of the time fixed for his lay-off, with the employer's full assent, cannot be construed as 'voluntarily leaving work', but only as anticipating by a few days, with the consent of the employer, the effective date of his dismissal. He did not leave the work of his own motion or accord, but in consequence of the action of the employer laying him off. His dismissal became effective as of December 24, 1937. . . ." (emphasis added) 3 A.2d at 215.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court was cited with approval by the Florida District Court of Appeals in Johnston v. Florida Department of Commerce, 340 So.2d 1229, 1231 (Fla.App.1976). There, an employee whose job was terminated with two weeks advance notice sought unemployment benefits after she had voluntarily quit prior to the effective date of termination. Claimant's original application for benefits was denied on the basis that her voluntary termination prior to the effective notification date constituted quitting without good cause.

In quashing the order of the Industrial Relations Commission which had denied claimant unemployment benefits, the Florida court construed its unemployment statutes to mean that where an employer notifies its employee that his employment is being definitely terminated as of a given date, the employee has not voluntarily left his employment without good cause attributable to his employer if he chooses not to work all or part of the period between notification and the date of termination. 340 So.2d at 1230.

The court went on to distinguish the period of voluntary unemployment as that period during which the employee chooses not to work, and held...