Eason v. Gould, Inc., 8310SC115
Decision Date | 07 February 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 8310SC115,8310SC115 |
Citation | 66 N.C.App. 260,311 S.E.2d 372 |
Parties | Rochelle L. EASON, Claimant-Appellant, v. GOULD, INCORPORATED and Employment Security Commission of North Carolina, Respondents-Appellees. |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
East Central Community Legal Services by Victor J. Boone, Raleigh, for claimant.
Donald R. Teeter, Raleigh, for Employment Sec. Com'n of North Carolina.
Claimant contends that the trial judge erred in concluding that claimant left her job voluntarily without good cause attributable to her employer, and was therefore ineligible for unemployment benefits under N.C.Gen.Stat. § 96-14(1) (1981).
Findings of fact made by the Employment Security Commission are binding on appeal where there is any competent evidence to support the findings. In re Cantrell, 44 N.C.App. 718, 263 S.E.2d 1 (1980). Conclusions of law, however, may be fully reviewed on appeal.
An analysis of N.C.Gen.Stat. § 96-14(1) (1981) shows that an applicant will be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits if two things are shown: (1) claimant left work voluntarily (2) without good cause attributable to the employer. If a claimant either left work involuntarily or with good cause attributable to the employer, then the claimant may collect benefits, provided of course, the other requirements of the Employment Security Act are met. Our courts have examined the meaning of the term "voluntary" job termination in several recent cases. See, e.g., Milliken and Co. v. Griffin, 65 N.C.App. 492, 309 S.E.2d 733 (1983) ( ); Sellers v. National Spinning Co., Inc., 64 N.C.App. 567, 307 S.E.2d 774 (1983); In re Werner, 44 N.C.App. 723, 263 S.E.2d 4 (1980) ( ); and In re Scaringelli, 39 N.C.App. 648, 251 S.E.2d 728 (1979) ( ). These cases teach that an employee has not left his job voluntarily when events beyond the employee's control or the wishes of the employer cause the termination.
Our courts have also construed the meaning of the term "good cause attributable to the employer" for purposes of the Employment Security Act. See, e.g., Tastee Freez Cafeteria v. Watson, 64 N.C.App. 562, 307 S.E.2d 800 (1983) and In re Bolden, 47 N.C.App. 468, 267 S.E.2d 397 (1980) ( ); In re Clark, 47 N.C.App. 163, 266 S.E.2d 854 (1980) ( ). It is clear from these cases that a good cause within the meaning of N.C.Gen.Stat. § 96-14(1) (1981) includes a reaction to requests or policies of the employer which would be considered valid by "reasonable minds." Compare "good cause" definition under N.C.Gen.Stat. § 96-14(2) (1981), (discharge for misconduct); Intercraft Industries Corp. v. Morrison, 305 N.C. 373, 289 S.E.2d 357 (1982), and "good cause" under N.C.Gen.Stat. § 96-14(3) (1981), (disqualification for failure to seek or accept suitable work); In re Watson, 273 N.C. 629, 161 S.E.2d 1 (1968).
Turning now to an analysis of the case before us, we first consider whether claimant left her job voluntarily within the meaning of N.C.Gen.Stat. § 96-14(1) (1981). It is undisputed that claimant was told by her employer that she would be laid off beginning 19 March 1982, and that as of that date at least, claimant would be forced out of work due to an action by the employer. There is no indication that claimant was terminated for misconduct. The courts of a number of other states have held that an employee who leaves work before the effective date of an impending layoff or termination has not quit voluntarily and is not disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. See, e.g., Elizabeth v. Caldwell, 160 Ga.App. 549, 287 S.E.2d 590 (1981) ( ); McCammon v. Yellowstone Co., Inc., 100 Idaho 926, 607 P.2d 434 (1980) ( ); Johnston v. Florida Department of Commerce, 340 So.2d 1229 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1976) ( ); Department of Labor & Industry v. Unemployment Comp. Board of Review, 133 Pa.Super. 518, 3 A.2d 211 (1938) ( ). But see Ferguson v. Arizona Dept. of Economic Security, 122 Ariz. 290, 594 P.2d 544 (1979) ; and Berkowitz v. Levine, 41 A.D.2d 791, 341 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1973) ( ).
Appellees contend, however, that under our statute the crucial time for considering whether a claimant left his job voluntarily is the date of application for unemployment benefits, rather than the last day worked or the effective date of the termination. Appellees point to N.C.Gen.Stat. § 96-14(1) (1981) which disqualifies claimants who are "... at the time such claim is filed, unemployed because [they] ... left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer." Because claimant filed for benefits on 10 March 1982, nine days before the effective date of her layoff, appellees contend that she was voluntarily unemployed at the time of her...
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