McCarthy v. Inhabitants of Town of Leeds

• Decision Date: 13 July 1916
• Citation: 98 A. 72
• Parties: MCCARTHY v. INHABITANTS OF TOWN OF LEEDS.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

98 A. 72

MCCARTHY

v. INHABITANTS OF TOWN OF LEEDS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

July 13, 1916.

Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Androscoggin County, at Law.

Action by John M. McCarthy against the Inhabitants of the Town of Leeds. From judgment for defendants, plaintiff excepts. Exceptions overruled.

Argued before SAVAGE, C. J., and CORNISH, BIRD, HALEY, and HANSON, JJ.

McGillicuddy & Morey, of Lewiston, for plaintiff. Tascus Atwood and Henry W. Oakes, both of Auburn, for defendants.

HALEY, J. This is an action on the case brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for injuries to himself and property by reason of a defective bridge and rail in the defendant town. After the plaintiff had introduced his evidence, the court directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant, and the case comes to this court on exceptions to the ruling of the presiding justice in directing a verdict for the defendant as aforesaid.

The evidence in the case shows that the plaintiff, a resident of this state, his chauffeur, and two small girls, were riding in an automobile owned by the plaintiff upon a public highway in the defendant town. The automobile itself was registered under the dealer's license from whom the plaintiff had purchased it a few days prior to the accident. While riding along in the town of Leeds, at about six miles an hour, just as they had entered upon the bridge, the automobile was deflected from its course, the plaintiff claims by reason of striking some plank which had been placed upon the bridge for the purpose of patching it, and the automobile was thrown onto the rail, which was rotten, defective, and worthless as a rail, and the automobile and its occupants were plunged into Dead river, 12 feet below, and it is to recover for the injuries to the plaintiff's automobile and for the injuries sustained by himself by reason of being plunged into the river that this action was brought. The ruling of the court in directing the verdict for the defendant is sought to be sustained because the automobile of the plaintiff, in which he was riding at the time, was being operated upon a public highway, and had not been registered as required by the laws of this state.

It is the claim of the plaintiff that, although, at the time of the injury complained of, he was driving his automobile upon the highways of the state without registration as provided by law, and thereby doing an illegal act, that should not defeat his recovery, unless the illegal act charged had some causal connection with and was in some way a concurrent cause of the accident; that there must be some causal connection between the act of the plaintiff in driving his auto upon the highway and the injury resulting from the negligence of the defendant, to prevent his recovery for the damages sustained by reason of the defective highway.

The statutes of this state regulating the use of automobiles upon the highways are contained in chapter 162 of the Laws of 1911, and the provisions for registration are found in section 8, and so much as is material in this case reads as follows:

"All motor vehicles shall be registered by the owner or person in control thereof in accordance with the provisions of this act. Application for such registration may be made by mail or otherwise to the secretary of state, upon blanks prepared under his authority. The application shall, in addition to such other particulars as may be required by said secretary contain a statement of the name, place of residence and address of the applicant, with a brief description of the motor vehicle, including the name of the maker, the number, if any, affixed by the maker, the character of the motor power and the amount of such power, stated in figures of horse power, and with such application shall deposit an annual registration fee of * * *."

Section 11 provides:

"No motor vehicle of whatsoever kind shall be operated by a resident of this state of Maine, upon any highway, tramway, public street, avenue, driveway, park or parkway, unless registered as heretofore provided."

Section 16 imposes a penalty for the violation of the seven preceding sections.

Section 11 is a prohibition against their being operated upon any highway, tramway, public street, avenue, driveway, park or parkway, unless registered. It is firmly established that the Legislature has the right to limit and control the use of the highways of the state, whenever necessary to provide for and promote the safety, peace, health, and general welfare of the people. State v. Phillips, 107 Me. 249, 78 Atl. 283; State v. Mayo, 106 Me. 62, 75 Atl. 295, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 502, 20 Ann. Cas. 512; Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 199 Mass. 542, 85 N. E. 848, 127 Am. St. Rep. 513, L. R. A. 1915E, 264; Dudley v. Northampton Street Ry. Co., 202 Mass. 446, 89 N. E. 25, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 561.

There is apparently a conflict in the opinions of the courts of the states that have construed the laws relating to the use of motor vehicles upon the highways, but we think there is no real difference where the statutes are similar to those of the state of Maine. In the case of Hemming v. City of New Haven, 82 Conn. 661, 74 Atl. 892, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 734, 18 Ann. Cas. 240, it was held that the plaintiff might recover for injuries sustained while operating his automobile upon the public highways, although it had not been registered as required by statute. The court held that:

"His failure to register and display his number in no way contributed to cause the injury. The accident would have happened if the law in this respect had been fully observed. The plaintiff's unlawful act was not the act of using the street, but in making a lawful use of it without having his automobile registered and marked, as required by law. The statute contains no prohibition against using an unlicensed and unnumbered automobile upon the highways and streets of the state."

The court then refers to the case of Dudley v. Northampton Street Ry. Co., 202 Maas. 443, 89 N. E. 25, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 561, and says:

"In that case the Supreme Court of Massachusetts was called upon to construe the effect of a statute which provided that no automobile should be operated upon any public highway unless it was registered," and the "court held that Dudley was a trespasser against the rights of all persons lawfully controlling or using the public highways of Massachusetts. The difference between the Dudley Case and the one now under consideration is that in Massachusetts there was a statutory prohibition against using upon the highways of that state an automobile unregistered and unmarked. As already stated, no such provisions appear in the Connecticut statutes which were in force when the plaintiff's automobile was injured."

That case recognized the fact that, if there had been a prohibition against the use of the highway, the doctrine of Dudley v. Northampton Street Ry. Co. would have applied, and the plaintiff would have been barred from maintaining his action. The law of Connecticut was changed after the happening of the above accident, and the statute expressly provided that no recovery shall be had by the owner, operator, or passenger of a motor vehicle which is not registered as required by the act, for an injury to person or property received by reason of the operation of said motor vehicle in or upon the public highways of the state.

In Lockridge v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co., 161 Iowa, 74, 140 N. W. 834, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 158, the court said:

"It is next urged by the defendant that the plaintiff was a trespasser upon the streets of Des Moines and upon the crossing in question, for that he was traveling in an unregistered automobile; and the defendant owed...