McCaughn v. Young

• Decision Date: 13 February 1905
• Citation: 37 So. 839,85 Miss. 277
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: WILLIAM C. MCCAUGHN v. GEORGE YOUNG

37 So. 839

85 Miss. 277

WILLIAM C. MCCAUGHN v. GEORGE YOUNG

Supreme Court of Mississippi

February 13, 1905

FROM the circuit court of, first district, Coahoma county, HON SAMUEL C. COOK, Judge.

Young the appellee, was plaintiff, and McCaughn, the appellant, was defendant in the court below. The action was an ejectment. From a judgment in plaintiff's favor the defendant appealed to the supreme court. The opinion states the facts of the case.

Reversed and remanded.

D. A Scott, for appellant.

It should be borne in mind that the land in controversy was uncleared woodland until after the same was purchased in 1900 by appellant, and was not susceptible of being occupied as cleared or improved land would be. The appellant, and those through whom he claims title to the land, did, however, take possession of the same, and use and claim title to it, in the only possible way by which possession can be taken of the character of land in controversy. They paid taxes on the same for a period of more than fifteen years; it was assessed to them on the land assessment rolls; timber was cut from it from time to time and appropriated by them as owners ownership was claimed and asserted, and they repeatedly offered the same for sale. The records show that Roselle was conveying the same from time to time, and it also appears that the appellee was fully aware of all of these facts long before and at the time of the purchase of the land by this appellant, and should not, therefore, be permitted, at this late date, to oust the appellant, who is a bona fide purchaser.

We now insist, with confidence, that the court below erred in granting a peremptory instruction directing the jury to return a verdict in favor of the appellee. The question as to whether the facts in the evidence did or did not constitute adverse possession for the length of time sufficient to toll the appellee's right of entry, being a question of fact, should have been submitted to the jury for their determination. We can scarcely conceive of how it is possible to prove adverse possession of wild, uncultivated woodland by evidence other than such as is developed by this record.

As to what does or does not constitute adverse possession of land depends largely upon its character, the uses and purposes to which it can be put or to which the owner may choose to put it; and we also insist that whatever is sufficient to cause the owner to inquire is amply sufficient, as to woodland, if such inquiry would lead him to a full knowledge of the facts. It is not always necessary that there should be any actual occupation or enclosure to constitute adverse possession.

The supreme court of the United States has held--and, indeed, it is now considered a settled doctrine of that court--that to constitute an adverse possession there need not be a fence, building, or other improvement made, and that it suffices for this purpose that visible and notorious acts of ownership are exercised over the premises in controversy for the time limited by the statute; much depends upon the nature and situation of the property, the uses to which it can be applied, or to which the owner, or claimant, may choose to apply it; that it is difficult to lay down any precise rule in all cases, but that it may be safely said that where acts of ownership have been done upon land which, from their nature, indicate a notorious claim of property in it, and are continued sufficiently long, with the knowledge of an adverse claimant, without interruption or adverse entry by him, such acts are evidence of an ouster of the former owner, and an actual adverse possession against him, provided the jury shall think that the property was not susceptible of a more strict possession than had been so taken and held; that neither actual occupation, cultivation, nor residence is necessary to constitute adverse possession, when the property is so situated as not to admit of any permanent, useful improvement, and the continued claim of the party has been evidenced by public acts of ownership such as he would exercise over property which he claimed in his own right and would not exercise over property which he did not claim. Ewing v. Barnett, 11. Pet. (U. S .), 53; Elliott v. Pearl, 10 Pet. (U. S.), 442; Barclay v. Howells, Lessee, 6 Pet. (U. S.), 513.

See also the following authorities: Royal v. Lessee of Lyle Ga.), 60 Am. Dec., 712; Draper v. Shoot (Mo.), 69 Am. Dec., 462; Key v. Jennings, 60 Mo. 367; Mormant v. Eureka Co. (Ala.), 39 Am. St. Rep., 45; Ewell on Ejectment, 725; Sawyers v. Giddings, 90 Mich. 50; Coogar v. Morris, 48 N. J. Law, 607; Langworthy v. Myers, 4 Iowa, 18; Woods v. Montville, etc., Co., 84 Ala. 560; Clemmons v. Perry, 34 Iowa 564; Beck v. Farr, 66 Iowa 684; Forey v. Bigelow, 56 Iowa 381; Welder v. Clark, 74 Cal. 11; Omaha, etc., Co. v. Barrett, 3 Neb., 803; Brown v. Clark, 89 Cal. 196; Brooks v. Bryan, 18 Ill. 533; Kerr v. Hitt, 75 Ill. 51; Coleman v. Billings, 89 Ill. 183; Downing v. Mays, 46 Am. St. Rep., 896; Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. v. Ragsdale, 54 Miss. 200; Willie v. Brooks, 45 Miss. 542; Nixon's Heirs v. Carcos, 28 Miss. 414.

O. G. Johnson, on the same side.

We invoke against appellee the doctrine of estoppel in pais, or equitable estoppel. This doctrine, having its origin in equity, has by universal custom become a well-settled and important branch of the law. The fundamental principle upon which this doctrine is based is the equitable one of suppression of fraud and the enforcement of honesty and fair dealing. The term "equitable estoppel" was applied to it for the reason that the jurisdiction of enforcing this equity belonged originally to the courts of equity, and was not exercised by courts of law until a comparatively recent date. It has been said, however, in a modern case, that "these estoppels are now called equitable tribupels, not because their recognition is peculiar to equitable tribunals, but because they arise upon facts which render their application in the protection of right equitable and just." The doctrine of estoppel is applicable to the sale of land, as well as personal property, and is available in action at law for land. Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578; Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U.S. 68; Pickard v. Sears, 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 469.

The supreme court of the United States, in the case of Dickerson v. Colgrove, supra, has admitted that where the title to land is in question, the doctrine of equitable estoppel was available at law, though it states that "this is certainly not the common law." The old maxim that "estoppels are odious" is not properly applicable to equitable estoppels, as they are founded on the highest principles of morality and justice, and are regarded by all courts as tending to suppress fraud and injustice. Since this decision, the doctrine has become well established in all of the courts, both of law and equity, throughout the union.

These estoppels are not to be construed strictly, but are entitled to a fair and liberal application, in the same manner as other equitable doctrines which are admitted to suppress fraud and promote honesty and fair dealing. Burkhalter v. Edwards, 16 Ga. 573; Shaw v. Bebee, 35 Vt. 205.

The rule of law, as laid down in Pickard v. Sears, supra, is clear that where one by his words or conduct willfully or negligently causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things and induces him to act upon that belief, so as to alter his previous position, the former is precluded from offering against the latter a different state of things as existing at the same time. The conduct of one on standing by, thus giving a kind of sanction to the proceedings, is in fact of such a nature that the opinion of the jury should be taken as to whether or not he had in point of fact ceased to be the owner. Conduct by negligence or omission, where there is a duty cast upon a person to disclose the truth, will frequently have the effect of estopping the party guilty of such negligence or omission from afterwards claiming his rights. Caddy v. Owen, 34 Vt. 598; Smith v. Paysinger, 2 Mill. (La.), 59.

One who has so conducted himself cannot afterwards gainsay the reasonable inference to be drawn from his words or conduct. Cornish v. Abingdon, 4 H. & N., 549.

This doctrine of equitable estoppel, as stated above, is a very broad one, instituted for the purpose of the suppression of fraud and dishonesty; and unless the courts at law are willing to abandon the duty of administering this equitable doctrine effectually in the suppression of fraud and unfair dealing, its application cannot be confined within the limits of any narrow technical definition, such as will relieve the court from looking, as in other cases depending on fraud and dishonesty, to the circumstances of each particular case. The court in the case of Swan v. Australasian Co., 7 H. & N., 603, makes the following statement regarding the general rule now acted upon with reference to estoppels by negligence and of the limitations of that rule. It states in part that "if he has led others into the belief of a certain state of facts, by conduct of culpable negligence calculated to have that result, and they have acted upon that belief to their prejudice, he shall not be heard afterwards as against such persons to show that the state of facts did not exist." In short, and in popular language, a man is not permitted to charge the consequences of his own fault on others, and complain of that which he himself brought about. However, after all is said, the exclusive warrant for an equitable estopped is that it is necessary to sustain the cause of right and justice. Ferguson v. Millikin, 42 Mich. 202.

We submit that in the cause at bar, the cause of right and justice would suffer irreparably if ...