McClelland v. ITT Rayonier, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 April 1992
• Docket Number: No. 14163-9-II,14163-9-II
• Citation: 65 Wn.App. 386,828 P.2d 1138
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: Robert E. McCLELLAND, Appellant, v. ITT RAYONIER, INC., Respondent.

Page 386

65 Wn.App. 386

828 P.2d 1138

Robert E. McCLELLAND, Appellant, v. ITT RAYONIER, INC., Respondent.

No. 14163-9-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington Division 2.

April 27, 1992.

Carol Hepburn, Susan M. Landa, Reaugh Fischnaller & Oettinger, Seattle, for appellant.

Calhoun Dickinson, Perkins Coie, Seattle, for respondent.

DALE M. GREEN, Judge Pro Tem. ^*

Robert E. McClelland appeals a Grays Harbor County Superior Court order denying his motion for summary judgment and granting that of ITT Rayonier on review of an order of the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals that denied McClelland's claim for worker's compensation benefits. The issue before this court is whether McClelland's psychological condition of major depression coupled with "simple phobia" is an occupational disease giving rise to a compensable disability. We affirm.

Robert McClelland was employed at ITT Rayonier's pulp mill for 25 years in a series of progressively more complex and responsible jobs. As his responsibilities increased, he began to perceive himself as unable to handle the work and became preoccupied with fears that he would make a mistake with serious consequences. In 1986, shortly after his last promotion, at age 62, from screen tender to the position of bleacherman, McClelland became even more anxious about his ability to do the work and had recurring thoughts of suicide. His wife, understandably concerned, had him admitted voluntarily to Fairfax Hospital.

A psychiatrist, Dr. Donald E. Rice, treated McClelland during two stays at Fairfax. Dr. Rice opined that his patient was suffering from a major depressive disorder and simple phobia (fear of the workplace), conditions he attributed to McClelland's employment at ITT Rayonier after hearing McClelland describe the stress he experienced while trying to do his work. Dr. Rice also, however, diagnosed a preexisting brain disorder in Mr. McClelland, i.e., organic cerebral dysfunctions manifested by "constructural dyspraxia and clear visual spatial deficits." According to Dr. Rice, the brain disorder "had nothing to do with" McClelland's depression, but "he has some decrease in elements of his cognitive functioning and his ability to think that might have interfered with his doing some of the sequential operations or some of the organizational tasks that he had with respect to his work." Constructural dyspraxia "means that when he looks at geometric objects and tries to reproduce them someplace else, he's unable to do that well." In addition, McClelland is slightly hearing impaired, has difficulty spelling common words and difficulty finding the right word to say, and has mildly dysarthric speech. When asked in his deposition whether McClelland's cerebral dysfunctions affected his feelings of stress at work, Dr. Rice replied that they

would impact on his perception of how comfortably he could do the work. I mean, he could experience some of the work tasks as being beyond him or too complex, or there was too much going on for him to manage and prioritize, would lead to that kind of an experience.

Dr. Rice conceded that McClelland's inability to organize tasks could cause him anxiety in any job. Indeed, McClelland confirmed to Dr. Rice that responsibility was stressful for him.

ITT Rayonier put on two witnesses who testified about the nature of McClelland's employment and his reaction to it. Jack Schumacher, ITT's employee relations supervisor, described the jobs in the mill's sulphite department, where McClelland had his last two jobs, screen tender and bleacherman, and said that those jobs were not unusually stressful or any more stressful than similar production-type jobs found generally in industry (which McClelland concedes), that he was not aware of any other screen tender or bleacherman having filed a claim because of job stress, and that the stress described by McClelland was internal with him rather than inherent in either of those jobs.

ITT's other witness, Dr. Richard Carter, was a psychiatrist who examined McClelland in September of 1987 at the request of the Department of Labor and Industries. He told Dr. Carter that he often felt depressed and nervous and had thoughts of suicide. Dr. Carter diagnosed a major depression, single episode, in partial remission, which he opined did not result naturally and proximately from Mr. McClelland's employment at ITT, which was not unusually stressful. Instead, Dr. Carter concluded essentially that McClelland's depression had two principal, but overlapping causes, one environmental and one organic: the early loss of his father and his "chaotic" childhood, combined with his minimal brain disorder and speech impediment, which made him feel insecure and overly sensitive to the demands of his job, so that he found the job abnormally stressful and became depressed over his inability to cope. Dr. Carter opined that Mr. McClelland's perception of the work situation as highly stressful varied from reality because McClelland "tends to view situations as being more onerous, more stressful than the so-called average individual. This appears to relate to not only his work in the more recent years [at ITT], but to his work in the years considerably in the past." The reason for this perception distortion is that it is "colored by his internal world which is obviously influenced by his chaotic childhood and his brain dysfunctioning, so his perceptions are colored by those earlier experiences."

Mr. McClelland filed a claim with the Department of Labor and Industries for worker's compensation benefits on October 16, 1986, claiming that his major depression combined with simple phobia was an occupational disease resulting from stressful conditions of his employment. The Department denied the claim. McClelland protested the decision, and the Department affirmed on reconsideration. McClelland then appealed to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals. An administrative law judge conducted a hearing and issued a proposed order affirming the Department's decision, and the Board adopted that order on October 12, 1988. McClelland appealed to superior court, which granted summary judgment to ITT. From the court's denial of a motion for reconsideration, McClelland now appeals to this court.

Our review is governed by RCW 51.52.140, which provides that an appeal shall lie from the judgment of the superior court as in other civil cases, and that ordinary practice in civil cases shall apply. The findings and decision of the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals are considered prima facie correct. The hearing in superior court on review is de novo, but is based on the same evidence and testimony before the Board. RCW 51.52.115; Dupont v. Department of Labor and Indus., 46 Wash.App. 471, 476, 730 P.2d 1345 (1986). The superior court may substitute its own findings and decision for the Board's if it finds, "from a fair preponderance of credible evidence," that the Board's findings and decisions are incorrect. Weatherspoon v. Department of Labor and Indus., 55 Wash.App. 439, 440, 777 P.2d 1084 (1989); Department of Labor and Indus. v. Moser, 35 Wash.App. 204, 665 P.2d 926 (1983). As the instant appeal is from a summary judgment in favor of the employer, the role of this court, as in other civil cases, is to decide if the record before the superior court, with all facts and inferences considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (McClelland), demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash.2d 434, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982); CR 56(c). The motion should be granted only if, from all the evidence, reasonable persons could reach but one conclusion. Wilson, at 437, 656 P.2d 1030.

RCW 51.32.180 provides that a worker suffering disability from an occupational disease shall receive benefits under the Industrial Insurance Act. "Occupational disease" is defined in RCW 51.08.140 as "such disease or infection as arises naturally and proximately out of employment ..." A worker suffering from a mental disease is eligible for compensation if the mental disease arose naturally and proximately out of his or her employment. Department of Labor and Indus. v. Kinville, 35 Wash.App. 80, 88-89, 664 P.2d 1311 (1983), overruled on other grounds Dennis v. Department of Labor and Indus., 109 Wash.2d 467, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987). In an occupational disease case, it is the resulting disability, not the disease, that is compensable. Bremerton v. Shreeve, 55 Wash.App. 334, 341, 777 P.2d 568 (1989).

The underlying purpose of industrial insurance was well stated in Favor v. Department of Labor and Indus., 53 Wash.2d 698, 703, 336 P.2d 382 (1959):

[O]ur workmen's compensation act was not intended to provide workmen with life, health, or accident insurance at the expense of the industry in which they are employed. It was intended to provide, at the expense of the industry employing them, a sure...