McCluskey v. Town of E. Hampton, 13-CV-1248 (SJF)(AKT)
| Decision Date | 07 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | 13-CV-1248 (SJF)(AKT) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
| Parties | JOHN WILLIAM McCLUSKEY, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF EAST HAMPTON, VILLAGE OF EAST HAMPTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, TOWN OF EAT HAMPTON COURT, POLICE OFFICER NICHOLAS LLOYD, RICHARD H. SCHNEIDER, POLICE OFFICER JOHN DOE 1, POLICE OFFICER JOHN DOE 2, POLICE OFFICER JOHN DOE 3, COURT OF EAST HAMPTON EMPLOYEES, JUSTICE LISA R. RANA, TOWN SUPERVISOR WILKENSON, DISTRICT ATTORNEY SPOTTA [sic], Defendants. |
Before the Court are two (2) motions to dismiss the complaint.1 Defendants Town of East Hampton, Town of East Hampton Court, Court of East Hampton Employees, Justice Lisa R. Rana and Town Supervisor Wilkenson ("Town defendants") move to dismiss pro se plaintiff John William McCluskey's ("plaintiff") complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. DE 43. Defendants Village of East Hampton Police Department, Police Chief Larsen, Police Officer Nicholas Lloyd and Richard Schneider ("Village defendants") move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to FRCP 12(c). DE 42. For the following reasons, both motions are GRANTED in their entirety.
Plaintiff resides in Amagansett, New York. Compl. ¶ 2. The Town and Village of East Hampton defendants are municipal entities organized under the law of New York State and are responsible for the policies, procedures and practices implemented through their various agencies, agents, departments and employees. Id. at ¶ 3. Defendant Village of East Hampton Police Department is a political sub-division of the Village of East Hampton and is responsible for the policies, procedures and practices implemented through its various agencies, agents, departments and employees. Id. at ¶ 4. Defendants Police Chief Larsen, Lieutenant John Doe, Sergeant John Doe and Police Officer Nicholas Lloyd, Richard Schneider and John Does 1 and 2 are employees of the Village of East Hampton Police Department who engaged in the illegal activities described herein. Id. at ¶ 5. Plaintiff sues the public employee defendants in their official and individual capacities and alleges they were acting under color of state law at all relevant times. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7.
On April 23, 2010 at approximately 4:00 p.m. and as plaintiff was backing up his car in the Reuthershan parking lot in the Village of East Hampton, plaintiff's vehicle lightly tapped a parked 1995 Jaguar automobile. Id. at ¶ 9. The Jaguar belonged to Susan Goodfriend of Wainscott, New York. Id. At that time, plaintiff, his son and two (2) witnesses unanimously agreed that the Jaguar had sustained no damage, while another witness, Ms. Fuchs, wanted the police called. Id. at ¶ 10. Plaintiff left his information with Ms. Fuchs in the event she continued to insist that the police be called, but based on his legal background, was certain there was no damage and no need to report anything under "section 600 of the law." Id. On April 24, 2010 at approximately 10:00 a.m., plaintiff received a telephone call from East Hampton Village police officer Nicholas Lloyd ("Lloyd") who advised plaintiff that the East Hampton Village Policewere charging him with leaving the scene of an accident, despite defendant Lloyd's admission that there was no damage to the bumper and therefore no probable cause. Id. at ¶ 11.
Plaintiff immediately went to the police station to meet with Lloyd, who refused to give plaintiff the police report with the damages; Lloyd advised plaintiff that it would be seventy-two (72) hours before he received a copy of the report or ticket and he was given a court date of April 28, 2010, i.e. six (6) days later. Id. at ¶ 12. "Many days later," police made available to plaintiff an "amended" report and ticket. Id. On Monday, April 27, 2010, plaintiff served the court with a three (3) page letter advising it that he had a prior commitment in another criminal court with "Mr. Giuliani and the Town of Southampton" on the date he was due to appear. He also filed a motion for dismissal. Id. at ¶ 13.
As to the offense, the traffic ticket allegedly written at the scene states "LEAVING/SCENE PROPERTY DAMAGE ACC," yet defendant Lloyd knew there was no damage because he wrote an amended police accident report on April 23, 2010, which reported no damage to the vehicle. Id. at ¶ 14. After months of asking for the reports and after he was jailed, the report was released to plaintiff on or about June 21, 2010. Id.
Plaintiff contends that the charge for leaving the scene of an accident was the "opening round" of a conspiracy by defendants Police Chief Larsen, reviewing officer Richard Schneider, Lloyd, District Attorney Spota, Justice Rana and others to cause plaintiff harm and loss of reputation. Id. at 15.
As an initial matter, despite the grant of a number of extensions,2 plaintiff did not oppose the Town defendants' motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the motion is deemed unopposed.
Pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(1), a party may, prior to serving a responsive pleading, move to dismiss a complaint on the ground the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. When a federal court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate a case, it must be dismissed irrespective of its merits. Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). Thus, "[w]hen defendants move for dismissal on a number of grounds, the court should 'consider the Rule 12(b)(1) challenge first since if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the accompanying defenses and objections become moot and do not need to be determined.' " Lipin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 202 F. Supp. 2d 126, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Rhulen Agency, Inc. v. Alabama Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 896 F.2d 674, 678 (2d Cir. 1990)). When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged under Rule 12(b)(1), a court may consider evidence beyond the pleadings. Kamen v. Amer. Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Cir. 1986). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court's subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113.
It is well settled that judges are absolutely immune from suit for actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10 (1991) () (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1872)). "[J]udicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)). See Bliven v. Hunt, 418 F. Supp. 2d 135, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) () (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553-54 (1967)).
There are two (2) exceptions to absolute judicial immunity: "First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity; . . . Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Id. at 11-12 (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that defendant Town Justice Lisa R. Rana, acting in concert with District Attorney Spota, "became increasingly more aggressive in their [pursuit] of the plaintiff' by assigning trial dates without releasing the accident and traffic reports and ignoring and declining to review evidence and appeals, including the amended accident report. Compl. ¶ 16. The complaint also alleges that during court appearances before Justice Rana, she attacked and ridiculed plaintiff while vigorously and repeatedly refusing "appeals," openly stating that the rules do not apply in her court. Id. at ¶¶ 18, 19. Defendant Rana, acting under color of state law in her respective domain, made it possible for plaintiff to be arrested on the streets of EastHampton Village and jailed on a bench warrant. Id at ¶¶ 20,21. While incarcerated, plaintiff was subject to torture and harassment which resulted in a heart attack. Id. at ¶¶ 22, 23. When plaintiff sought to postpone further court appearances, defendant Rana suspended his driver's license without cause or reason and the suspension made no reference to the charge for leaving the scene of an accident. Id. at ¶¶ 24, 25.
The complaint's allegations against defendant Rana are for actions taken within the scope of her jurisdiction and capacity as Town Justice. Accordingly, Rana is entitled to absolute judicial immunity and the Town defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is granted. Plaintiff's complaint is, therefore, dismissed with prejudice as to defendant Rana.3
Plaintiff also names the Town of East Hampton Court and its employees as defendants. The complaint alleges that the court employees, acting under color of state law, could have read the reports to see there was no damage to the Jaguar, but instead acted with malice in choosing not to do so. Compl. ¶ 17. Plaintiff also alleges that during court appearances, Rana whispered and laughed openly as she criticized plaintiff's motions to "court [bailiffs] and others surrounding her from the bench." Id. at ¶ 32.
Judicial immunity "also...
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