McCormick v. State

• Decision Date: 08 February 1971
• Docket Number: No. 55784,No. 2,55784,2
• Citation: 463 S.W.2d 789
• Parties: Donnie Ray McCORMICK, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 789

463 S.W.2d 789

Donnie Ray McCORMICK, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. 55784.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

Feb. 8, 1971.

Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Court En Banc Denied

March 8, 1971.

Charles Clayton, St. Louis, Edward A. Glenn, Louisiana, Missouri for movant-appellant.

John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Gene E. Voigts, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

DONNELLY, Presiding Judge.

Appellant, Donnie Ray McCormick, was convicted of murder in the first degree in the Circuit Court of Ralls County, Missouri, and his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. State v. McCormick, Mo.Sup., 426 S.W.2d 62 (1968).

On June 25, 1969, appellant filed a motion to vacate under S.Ct. Rule 27.26, V.A.M.R. Evidentiary hearings were held by the trial court, with appellant present, on February 19, 1970, and on March 9, 1970. Appellant's motion to vacate was denied and he appeals.

Appellant urges that he 'has been denied a fair trial and equal protection of the law as a result of the failure of the trial court to hold a hearing under the provisions of Section 552.020 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri.' He relies solely on Brizendine v. Swenson, D.C., 302 F.Supp. 1011 (1969). He cites the Brizendine case for the proposition that, under the dictates of Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966), if a Missouri trial court orders a psychiatric examination of an accused under V.A.M.S. § 552.020, a 'bona fide doubt' is thereby 'judicially established,' and an evidentiary hearing on the accused's competency to stand trial must follow.

We believe it would serve no useful or proper purpose for this Court to speculate or comment on the legal effect of the Brizendine opinion. V.A.M.S. § 552.020 requires only that the trial court may hold a hearing on the issue of competency to stand trial on its own motion, and shall hold a hearing when the psychiatric report is contested. In our opinion, the provisions of § 552.020 do not conflict with the prevailing federal standards.

In Green v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 408, 389 F.2d 949, 954, 955 (1967), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit said: '* * * Pate simply has given 'constitutional proportions' to the denial of a judicial competency hearing not only when specifically requested or when a certification of competency is challenged, but now also when the particular facts of a given case would make it an abuse of the trial judge's discretion not to hold such further investigation by the court into the accused's mental capacity, despite a prior medical certification of competency and whether that certification be conclusory or otherwise.

'(12 In recapitulation, our previous opinion in Green (Green v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 226, 349 F.2d 203) gave a particular application to the law of this circuit. That law, which has two aspects, may be summarized as follows: (1) There is no error in foregoing a hearing 'in the absence of objection by the defendant and of any other circumstances which render the superintendent's opinion substantially suspect.' (2) Where there are circumstances that cast substantial suspicion on the superintendent's opinion, however, the trial judge must sua sponte hold a hearing.

'We do not understand Pate to lay down any substantially different standard, though it does predicate the hearing required by this standard on constitutional rather than statutory grounds. In Green, therefore, this court has already ruled en banc that no circumstances rendering the hospital's opinion substantially suspect came to the court's attention. Since the general standard in effect in this circuit was not affected by Pate, we see no reason for an en banc reconsideration of a previous en banc determination that application of that standard to Green's case properly led to the conclusion that no hearing was required.'

In United States v. Kaufman, 393 F.2d 172, 176 (1968), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit said:

'Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a hearing on his mental competency to stand trial. The applicable statute is 18 U.S.C.A. § 4244, which provides, in part, that upon the filing of a motion for judicial determination of the accused's competency to stand trial, 'the court shall cause accused * * * to be examined as to his mental condition by at least one qualified psychiatrist, who shall report to the court * * *. If the report of the psychiatrist indicates a state of present insanity or such mental incompetency in the accused, the court shall hold a hearing * * *.' Pursuant to this provision, on appellant's motion, the court appointed a psychiatrist to examine him. The psychiatrist found that appellant was a sociopathic personality with paranoid state, but that this condition did not preclude his understanding the nature of the charges against him and assisting in his defense. His opinion was that appellant was competent to stand trial. On the basis of this report, the trial court was not required to hold a hearing. See, Stone v. United...