McCourt v. Oneida Coal Co., Inc.

• Citation: 188 W.Va. 647,425 S.E.2d 602
• Decision Date: 16 December 1992
• Docket Number: No. 20992,20992
• Parties: , 69 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 915 . ONEIDA COAL COMPANY, INC., a West Virginia corporation, Defendant Below, Appellee. Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
• Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

Page 602

425 S.E.2d 602

188 W.Va. 647, 69 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 915

Betty L. McCOURT and Bernard L. McCourt, Plaintiffs Below, Appellants, v. ONEIDA COAL COMPANY, INC., a West Virginia corporation Defendant Below, Appellee.

No. 20992.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted Sept. 23, 1992.

Decided Dec. 16, 1992.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In circuit court cases alleging a discriminatory discharge from employment, which a complainant might bring in the West Virginia Human Rights Commission under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W.Va.Code, 5-11-1 et seq., the statute of limitations period for filing a complaint with the circuit court ordinarily begins to run on the date when the employer unequivocally notifies the employee of the termination decision.

2. A complainant who fails to file a complaint in a timely manner under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, unless the untimeliness is excused by waiver or estoppel, does not have the benefit of the alternative limitations period established by W.Va.Code, 5-11-13, for bringing an action in a circuit court of this State.

Robert Reed Sowa, Sutton, for appellants.

W.T. Weber, Jr., Weston, for appellee.

BROTHERTON, Justice:

This is an appeal by Betty L. McCourt and Bernard L. McCourt, her husband, from an order of the Circuit Court of Braxton County in an action brought by them against the Oneida Coal Company, Inc. The circuit court's order granted Oneida summary judgment on the ground that the appellants' action was barred by the statute of limitations. In the present proceeding, the appellants claim that the action was properly filed within the applicable limitations period and that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment. After reviewing the record and the questions presented, this Court believes that the appellants' claims for relief were barred by the statute of limitations, and the judgment of the circuit court is consequently affirmed.

Prior to 1987, the appellant, Betty L. McCourt, was an employee of Oneida Coal Company, Inc. In December, 1986, Oneida conducted a large lay-off of employees which the coal company called a "permanent reduction in force." The appellant, Betty L. McCourt, who was apparently contemplating quitting at this time to work in her own business, was not scheduled to be laid off.

According to documents filed in the present proceeding, on the night of lay-off the mine superintendent approached the appellant, Betty L. McCourt, and requested that she take a voluntary lay-off. Betty L. McCourt, who, according to her documents, believed that she would be recalled if she accepted, accepted the voluntary lay-off.

Later Oneida Coal Company's business improved, and it hired a number of new employees. The appellant, Betty L. McCourt, however, was not recalled.

After Betty L. McCourt learned that new employees were being hired by Oneida, she, in July, 1987, contacted the company and indicated that she was serious about returning to work. Oneida's administrative manager, H. Edsel Hogan, responded to her communication by letter dated July 16, 1987. In that letter he stated, in part:

[I]t was Oneida's position at the time of the layoffs in December 1986 and still is, that the layoffs were permanent layoffs. This position was stated in the letter given to you at the time. This was the reason for giving the severance pay and the six months of health insurance coverage. It was stated at the time of the layoff and is still Oneida's position that the company has no obligation to rehire any permanently laid off employee. Any employees rehired are done so only after reviewing their employment record and evaluating their potential contribution to the organization.

* * * * * *

Because it was our understanding that you left your employment with Oneida to manage your own business in Sutton, you were not considered for rehiring. Since you have now indicated a change of mind, we will consider your request, but will make no promises beyond that.

Oneida Coal Company over the next year continued to hire other individuals, and no earlier than September 6, 1988, more than one year after the July 16, 1987, letter, the appellant, Betty L. McCourt, filed a written complaint with the West Virginia Human Rights Commission, charging that Oneida Coal Company had engaged in sex discrimination in its employment practices. ¹

After a number of documents had been filed in the Human Rights action, Betty L. McCourt decided to discontinue that action and to bring an action against Oneida Coal Company in the Circuit Court of Braxton County. To prosecute that circuit court action, Ms. McCourt on May 18, 1989, procured a "notice of right to sue" pursuant to the provisions of W.Va.Code, 5-11-13, which provides, in relevant part:

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a complainant may institute an action against a respondent in the county wherein the respondent resides or transacts business at any time within ninety days after the complainant is given notice of a right to sue pursuant to this subsection (b) or, if the statute of limitations on the claim has not expired at the end of such ninety-day period, then at any time during which such statute of limitations has not expired. If a suit is filed under this section the proceedings pending before the commission shall be deemed to be concluded.

To institute the circuit court action, Betty L. McCourt and Bernard L. McCourt Ms. McCourt's husband, who was claiming loss of consortium, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Braxton County on August 15, 1989. ² In the complaint, they alleged that during Ms. McCourt's employment with Oneida, policy manuals and other documents had been distributed to her which represented that she would not be discharged except for "good cause" and through progressive disciplinary measures. She asserted that she was terminated without good cause and without progressive disciplinary measures in spite of the fact that she had performed her job in a satisfactory manner. Even though her discharge took the form of a lay-off, she claimed that it actually constituted a constructive discharge. She further claimed that as a direct and proximate result of her detrimental reliance upon the assurances of the coal company, she had sustained injury and damages in way of loss of advance opportunities, loss of earnings and earning capacity, loss of fringe and pension benefits, and loss of opportunity to pursue a career path of her choice. She also claimed that her husband had suffered "through the loss of the earning abilities, wages, and the benefits from the unemployment of his wife, and further suffered from the loss of her services through her sufferance of mental and emotional distress, anxiety, depression, loss of self esteem, self confidence, and self respect...."

In the second count of her complaint, the appellant, Betty L. McCourt, claimed that the conduct of Oneida Coal Company in persuading her to accept a voluntary lay-off, and then not rehiring her or recalling her, constituted unlawful sex discrimination in violation of W.Va.Code, 5-11-9, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.).

The defendant, Oneida Coal Company, filed an answer to the appellants' complaint in which it alleged, among other things, that the appellants' action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Subsequently, Oneida Coal Company moved for summary judgment and, by order dated August 9, 1991, the circuit court granted the motion for summary judgment. In its order, the court stated:

[T]he complaint of the plaintiff, Betty R. [sic] McCourt, as well as that of Bernard L. McCourt, whose complaint rests upon the complaint of the plaintiff, Betty L. McCourt, was at the time of the institution of the action herein barred by statute of limitations and ... defendant's motion for summary judgment should be, and the same is hereby sustained, with exception saved to the plaintiffs and each of them to the ruling and order of the court.

It appears that the court reasoned that the appellants' claim arose either on July 14, 1987, when Betty L. McCourt orally contacted Oneida about being rehired, or July 16, 1987, when H. Edsel Hogan wrote the letter, which has already been quoted, notifying Ms. McCourt that her lay-off was permanent. The Court apparently reasoned that since the appellants had waited more than two years after that date to file their circuit court action, their action was barred by the statute of limitations.

In the present proceeding, the appellants claim that the circuit court erred in finding that their action was barred by the statute of limitations.

Before addressing the appellants' assertions, this Court believes that it is important to note that the action which was the subject of the dismissal order was the action brought in the Circuit Court of Braxton County and not the action brought before the West Virginia Human Rights Commission. The Human Rights action has bearing on the present proceeding only insofar as the provisions of W.Va.Code, 5-11-13, afford an alternative limitation period to the normal limitation period for actions brought in a circuit court.

West Virginia Code, 55-2-12, in this Court's opinion establishes the basic two-year, circuit court limitation period for the action which the appellants brought in the circuit court. That Code section provides:

Every personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought: (a) Within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued, if it be for damage to property; (b) within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for damages for personal injuries; and (c) within one year next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for any other matter of such nature that, in case a party die, it could not have been brought at common law by or...