McCoy v. Goldston

• Decision Date: 26 June 1981
• Docket Number: No. 79-1102,79-1102
• Citation: 652 F.2d 654
• Parties: Leroy McCOY and Ladie Byrd Crawford, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Arthur B. GOLDSTON, Jr., Richard Papciak and the City of Detroit PoliceDepartment, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 654

652 F.2d 654

Leroy McCOY and Ladie Byrd Crawford, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Arthur B. GOLDSTON, Jr., Richard Papciak and the City of

Detroit PoliceDepartment, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 79-1102.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 20, 1980.

Decided June 26, 1981.

John C. Kaplansky, Southfield, Mich., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Roger E. Craig, Corp. Counsel, William Dietrich, William M. Moss, Isadore Torres, Detroit, Mich., for defendants-appellees.

Before MARTIN and JONES, Circuit Judges, and REED, District Judge. ^*

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs appeal the district court's denial of their motion for either an evidentiary hearing or a new trial. In support of their motion, plaintiffs argued that one juror failed to disclose information during voir dire concerning her competency to sit on the case. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing.

I.

Arthur Goldston, Jr. and Richard Papciak, two Detroit police officers, were on a routine patrol on October 17, 1974 in an area of Detroit which had an infestation of narcotics trafficking. In an alley behind Ladie Crawford's Beauty Salon, Goldston and Papciak observed two men handling a syringe and a small plastic package. One of the men fled and was chased by Papciak. The other, Leroy McCoy, who was employed at the salon, entered or was forced by Goldston into the salon. As Papciak returned to and entered the back room of the salon, he observed McCoy and Goldston engaged in an altercation. Goldston drew his weapon and shot McCoy. Ladie Crawford, who was also involved in the altercation, witnessed the shooting. McCoy and Crawford were arrested. Charges of resisting arrest and obstructing a police officer were filed, but they were subsequently dropped.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, McCoy and Crawford filed a complaint alleging that their civil rights had been violated by false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and assault and battery.

Before trial, counsel submitted proposed voir dire questions to the district court. ¹ Pursuant to plaintiffs' counsel submissions, the district court asked the following questions to ascertain a prospective juror's possible or probable bias:

The Court: Does anyone else have any experience with any law enforcement agency, or any way with the law, whether it is a police department or any other agency?

Do any of you have any close friends or relatives who are connected or associated with any law enforcement agency or police department?

Three prospective jurors answered affirmatively. One disclosed that several of his friends were retired police officers. He was later excused by the district court because of a hearing problem. Another prospective juror stated that he had served as a military policeman while in the Army and had worked as a records supervisor and substitute corrections officer in 1953. He was peremptorily challenged by plaintiffs' counsel. A third prospective juror revealed that her husband was an auxiliary police officer who assisted in traffic control and similar duties. ² She sat as a juror. Despite the disclosures of her fellow prospective jurors, Mrs. Cleo Green, the foreperson, did not reveal that her son was about to complete a training program as a parole officer.

After an unfavorable jury verdict on August 3, 1978, plaintiffs' counsel filed a Motion for a New Trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. ³ Thereafter, the district court reluctantly permitted plaintiffs' counsel to interview three jurors. Plaintiffs' counsel interviewed two jurors. During these interviews, plaintiffs' counsel first learned that Mrs. Green's son was about to complete a training program as a parole officer. The juror who revealed to plaintiffs' counsel that Mrs. Green's son was training to become a parole officer allegedly stated: "Oh, I shouldn't have told you that, should I have?" He then attempted to interview Mrs. Green, the foreperson. She refused. ⁴ Based upon these and other facts, plaintiffs' counsel filed a Supplemental Motion for Relief From Judgment, Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), alleging inter alia, that Mrs. Green's silence during voir dire abrogated plaintiffs' right to peremptorily challenge her.

The district court denied plaintiffs' counsel's request for either an evidentiary hearing or a new trial, stating:

Mrs. Green's response to the question regarding law enforcement may well be, in the technical sense, inaccurate, but not necessarily to a lay person. Then, too, the information obtained indicated that Mrs. Green's son was in training, not yet a parole officer. However, the critical issue is whether Mrs. Green was prejudiced or would favor police officers and her answer to the question of credibility was negative. At most, then, we have an inadvertent concealment of less than prejudicial impact.

Plaintiffs appeal.

II.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs' motion for either a new trial, relief from judgment, or an evidentiary hearing because of juror misconduct.

It is well settled that a district court's determination on a motion for either a new trial or relief from judgment because a juror failed to fully disclose information during voir dire is reversible only for either an abuse of discretion, Vezina v. Theriot Marine Service, 610 F.2d 251, 252 (5th Cir. 1980); Thomas v. Nuss, 353 F.2d 257, 259 (6th Cir. 1965), or a clear error of law in the exercise of this discretion; Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 429 F.2d 1033, 1045 n.16 (5th Cir. 1970). An evidentiary hearing on a juror's alleged failure to disclose information during voir dire must be granted when the movant has alleged facts which establish a prima facie case of impropriety. Standard Alliance Industries, Inc. v. The Black Clauson Company, 587 F.2d 813, 828, n.32 (6th Cir. 1978); Vezina v. Theriot Marine Service, Inc., 554 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1977); Pepper v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 387 F.2d 248, 254 (8th Cir. 1968). See also, Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963); Hathorn v. Trine, 592 F.2d 463, 464 (8th Cir. 1979). Any doubt should be resolved in favor of granting the motion for an evidentiary hearing. Compare United States v. Franzese, 525 F.2d 27, 31-2 (2nd Cir. 1975), with Universal Film Exchanges, Inc. v. Lust, 479 F.2d 573, 576 (4th Cir. 1973). Applying these principles, we hold that plaintiffs' Motion for Relief From Judgment establishes a prima facie case of impropriety. Thus, the district court abused its discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on Mrs. Green's failure to disclose that her son was about to commence a career as a probation officer. ⁵

The right to an impartial jury in civil cases is inherent in the Seventh Amendment's preservation of a "right to trial by jury" and the Fifth Amendment's guarantee that "no person shall be denied of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Kiernan v. VanSchaik, 347 F.2d 775, 778 (3rd Cir. 1965). Though the Constitution guarantees only a fair and impartial jury, free from actual bias or prejudice, "a juror's impartiality may not be assumed without inquiry." Id. at 779. The proper occasion for such determination is upon the voir dire examination. Though an answer on voir dire may not disclose a legal basis for challenge for cause, it "will be available in the intelligent use of the peremptory challenge." Id. As was aptly stated in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965):

The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control. State v. Thompson, 68 Ariz. 386, 206 P.2d 1037 (1949); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (13 S.Ct. 136, 139, 36 L.Ed.2d 1011). While challenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality, the peremptory permits rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is less easily designated or demonstrable. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (7 S.Ct. 350, 351, 30 L.Ed. 578).

Id. at 220, 85 S.Ct. at 836.

The persistence of peremptories and their extensive use demonstrate the long and widely held belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury. See Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (13 S.Ct. 136, 138, 36 L.Ed. 1011). Although "(t)here is nothing in the Constitution of the United States which requires the Congress (or the States) to grant peremptory challenges," Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (40 S.Ct. 28, 30, 63 L.Ed. 1154), nonetheless the challenge is "one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused," Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (14 S.Ct. 410, 414, 38 L.Ed. 208). The denial or impairment of the right is reversible error without a showing of prejudice, Lewis v. United States, supra; Harrison v. United States, 163 U.S. 140, (16 S.Ct. 961, 41 L.Ed. 104); cf. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Shane, 157 U.S. 348 (15 S.Ct. 641, 39 L.Ed. 727). "For it is, as Blackstone says, an arbitrary and capricious right; and it must be exercised with full freedom, or it fails of its full purpose." Lewis v. United States, supra, (146 U.S.) at 378 (13 S.Ct. at 139).

Id. at 219, 85 S.Ct. at 835.

The principles and reasoning articulated in Swain are a well-established part of this Circuit's jurisprudence. In Beatty v. United States, 27 F.2d 323 (6th Cir. 1928), this Circuit recognized that:

Though an affirmative answer to (a) question would not disclose legal basis for challenge for cause, but quite plainly, it would be a natural inducement as to the exercise of a peremptory challenge. While it would not be presumed that a juror would have from such association, any prejudice which would prevent him from obeying the instructions of the court...