McCraw v. C.I.
| Decision Date | 03 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | NO. 09-16-00302-CV.,09-16-00302-CV. |
| Citation | 525 S.W.3d 701 |
| Parties | Steven MCCRAW, Appellant v. C.I., Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Ken Paxton, Attorney General, Jeffrey C. Mateer, First Assistant Attorney General, Seth Byron Dennis, Assistant Attorney General, Austin, for Appellant.
Ryan W. Gertz, Gertz Law Firm, Beaumont, for Appellee.
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.
In the suit underlying this interlocutory appeal, C.I. seeks declaratory and injunctive relief from efforts by state and local officials to require him to register under the Texas sex offender registration program ("SORP") of Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See generally Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 62.001 –.408 (West 2006 & Supp. 2016). Appellant, Steven McCraw, in his official capacity as the Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety, appeals from an order of the trial court denying his plea to the jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court's ruling.
The facts underlying this case are undisputed. In 1986, C.I. pled guilty to the offense of Indecency with a Child in the Criminal District Court of Jefferson County, Texas. That court accepted the plea, substantiated C.I.'s guilt, and, pursuant to article 42.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as it then existed, "defer[red] further proceedings without entering an adjudication of guilt" and "place[d] [C.I.] under [community] Supervision for a period of ten (10) years," subject to various conditions of probation. C.I. successfully completed the full term of his probation, and in 1996, the Criminal District Court entered an order dismissing the case against him. In 2014, the Beaumont Police Department contacted C.I. and notified him, for the first time, that he was required to register as a sex offender. C.I. is listed by the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) on the State's sex offender registry as having been convicted of indecency with a child in its online database.
C.I. filed suit against DPS1 , McCraw, the City of Beaumont, and James P. Singletary, Chief of Police for the City of Beaumont, under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act ("DJA"), seeking "to determine his rights under the plea agreement into which he entered with the State of Texas, to determine his status in regard to whether or not he was convicted of a felony, and to determine his offender registration status." McCraw, the City of Beaumont, and Singletary each filed pleas to the jurisdiction. After a hearing, the trial court granted the pleas filed by the City of Beaumont and Singletary, but denied the plea by McCraw. McCraw then filed notice of interlocutory appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (West Supp. 2016); Texas A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu , 233 S.W.3d 835, 846 (Tex. 2007) ().2
A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea that challenges a trial court's authority to decide a case on the merits. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). When a plea to the jurisdiction asserts sovereign immunity in a suit against a government official, the claimant bears the burden of pleading sufficient facts to affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda , 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Whether the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review under a de novo standard, construing the pleadings liberally in plaintiff's favor and looking to his intent. See id. We also review matters of statutory construction de novo. In re Mem'l Hermann Hosp. Sys. , 464 S.W.3d 686, 700 (Tex. 2015).
In three issues, McCraw argues that: (1) he has not waived sovereign immunity; (2) C.I.'s plea agreement and successful completion of deferred adjudication do not nullify the requirement that C.I. register as a sex offender; and (3) C.I. cannot obtain a declaratory judgment on an issue arising under a penal statute. We will address the issue concerning the applicability of the SORP requirements first, as the resolution of that issue controls the question of sovereign immunity in this matter.
The Texas legislature first enacted the sex offender registration statutes in 1991. Act of May 26, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 572, §§ 1, 4–5, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 2029–32 () (amended, codified, and redesignated); Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). At that time, the registration requirements "applie[d] only to a reportable conviction or adjudication [of delinquent conduct] occurring on or after September 1, 1991." Act of May 26, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 572, § 1, sec. 1(5), 8(a), 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 2029, 2030. In 1993, the Legislature expanded the definition of "reportable conviction or adjudication" to include deferred adjudications for specific offenses, including indecency with a child, but applied the expanded definition only to offenses "for which an order of deferred adjudication [was] entered by the court on or after September 1, 1993." Act of May 30, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 866, §§ 1, 3(a)(2), 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3420–21 () (amended, codified, and redesignated). Thus, it is undisputed that C.I. had no duty to register under the SORP either at the time of its enactment in 1991, nor at the time that the criminal case against him was dismissed in 1996.
In 1997, the Legislature redesignated the statute as Chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and for the first time, made the registration requirements retroactively applicable to any "reportable conviction or adjudication occurring on or after September 1, 1970...." Act of June 1, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 668, § 1, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 2253, 2260 () (repealed 2005). However, that legislation also included an "uncodified ‘savings clause’ " that limited the retroactive application to individuals who were, as of September 1, 1997, incarcerated in a penal institution or under state supervision. Act of June 1, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 668, § 11, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 2253, 2264; Reynolds v. State, 385 S.W.3d 93, 95–96 (Tex. App.—Waco 2012), aff'd 423 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). That limitation on retroactivity was subsequently eliminated in 2005 when the Legislature repealed article 62.11 and enacted article 62.002, which maintained the language applying the SORP to any "reportable conviction or adjudication occurring on or after September 1, 1970," but did not include the previous savings clause. Act of May 26, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 1008, § 1.01, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 3385, 3388, 3410 (codified at Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.002(a) (West 2006)); Reynolds, 385 S.W.3d at 98.
Similarly, in its current form, Chapter 62 imposes a duty to register upon any person who has "a reportable conviction or adjudication occurring on or after September 1, 1970," and defines a reportable conviction or adjudication as "a conviction or adjudication, including an adjudication of delinquent conduct or a deferred adjudication, that, regardless of the pendency of an appeal, is a conviction for or an adjudication for or based on ... a violation of [s]ection ... 21.11 (Indecency with a child), ... Penal Code." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.001(5)(A) (West Supp. 2016), 62.002(a), (b). Thus, the law is clear that current successful completion of deferred adjudication for particular offenses does not relieve an offender of a duty to register under the SORP. However, interpretation of the SORP in its current form, or even its 2005 form, does not end the inquiry, as C.I.'s initial Deferred Adjudication Order was entered in July 1986, and his case was dismissed without adjudication in June 1996. Therefore, determining the status of C.I.'s case for purposes of the SORP requires an analysis of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure under which C.I.'s case was originally probated, then dismissed.
Consistent with the SORP's current registration requirement after deferred adjudication, the Code of Criminal Procedure now expressly prohibits courts from dismissing proceedings against a defendant after the successful completion of a term of community supervision for a charge of indecency with a child. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42A.111(b) (West 2017) () However, at the time that C.I. was placed on community supervision, the statute in effect provided that:
On expiration of a probationary period imposed under Subsection (a) of this section, if the court has not proceeded to adjudication of guilt, the court shall dismiss the proceedings against the defendant and discharge him .... A dismissal and discharge under this section may not be deemed a conviction for the purposes of disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law for conviction of an offense , except that upon conviction of a subsequent offense, the fact that the defendant had previously received probation shall be admissible before the court or jury to be considered on the issue of penalty.
Act of May 21, 1985, 69th Legis., R.S., ch. 427, § 1, sec. 3d(c), 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1531, 1534 (amended 1999 and recodified 2017) (current version at Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42A.111(b) ) (emphasis added). As of June 1996, when C.I.'s case was dismissed without an adjudication of guilt, the nondiscretionary mandate for a trial court to dismiss and...
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