McCray v. Bennett
| Decision Date | 15 December 1978 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 78-27-N. |
| Parties | Robert G. McCRAY, Plaintiff, v. Larry D. BENNETT, Commissioner of the Board of Corrections, Thomas Staton, Marion Carroll, John Vickers, Louis Wilkinson, and W. F. Hamner, Members of the Alabama Board of Corrections, Eddie Nagle, Joseph Oliver, and General Caldwell, Members of the Segregation Review Board, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
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John L. Carroll, Montgomery, Ala., for plaintiff.
William J. Baxley, then Atty. Gen., and Larry R. Newman and Linda C. Breland, Asst. Attys. Gen., State of Alabama, Montgomery, Ala., for defendants.
Plaintiff Robert G. McCray, an inmate in the Alabama prison system, challenges as unconstitutional the sentencing practices followed in confining prisoners to segregation cells for disciplinary reasons. He sues under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He invokes the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(3). McCray sues on his own behalf and on behalf of all inmates who have been, are, or will be arbitrarily confined to segregation. As defendants he names Larry D. Bennett, Commissioner of the Board of Corrections; Thomas Staton, Marion Carroll, John Vickers, Louis Wilkinson, and W. F. Hamner, Members of the Alabama Board of Corrections; and John Edward Nagle, Joseph A. Oliver, and Gene T. Cardwell,1 Members of the Segregation Review Board. Each is sued individually and in his official capacity. Plaintiff seeks declarative and injunctive relief for himself and the class.
This case was tried before the Court on the merits of plaintiff's claims; both parties presented testimony and evidence, and having considered the evidence, the Court incorporates in this memorandum opinion the following findings of facts and conclusions of law, as authorized by Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff McCray requests that the Court allow him to sue on behalf of a class composed of all inmates of the prison system of the State of Alabama who have been, are, or will be arbitrarily confined to punitive segregation. The Court finds that this suit is properly maintainable as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court finds that the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; that there are questions of law and fact common to the class; that the claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class; and that the representative parties fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). Further, the Court finds that the defendants have acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to the class as a whole. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2).
In this suit the named plaintiff asserts that the defendants have violated his rights to due process and equal protection of the laws. To support his equal protection claim, he argues that black prisoners are confined to and retained in punitive segregation in a racially discriminatory manner. In light of the separate claims presented by the representative plaintiff, the Court considers it appropriate to divide the class into subclasses: (1) all inmates of the prison system of the State of Alabama who have been, are, or will be arbitrarily confined to and retained in punitive segregation; and (2) all black inmates of the prison system of the State of Alabama who have been, are, or will be confined to and retained in punitive segregation on account of their race. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(4).
The segregation unit for the entire Alabama penal system is located at Holman Prison. All inmates who are sentenced to segregation are transferred to Holman. The segregation unit is located on the west side of Holman prison; it consists of 244 individual cells, including 48 cells in the old death row unit. Not all of these cells are in operation at the present time. Inmates who are housed in the segregation unit are restricted to single cells. They are not allowed to work. They receive a maximum of thirty minutes of exercise per day. They have no access to the general population of the prison. They are allowed to have visitors, but even on these occasions they are kept isolated from the rest of the prisoners. Normally, a prisoner is released from his segregation cell only when he is accompanied by two guards.2
Inmates are assigned to the segregation unit for a number of different reasons. Some are there at their own request; they are considered to be in "safekeeping" or "non-punitive isolation." Others, suspects in serious prison incidents, are isolated there for a relatively short time during investigations into the incidents. Known homosexuals are housed there. Inmates who are classified as "maximum custody" or "close custody" prisoners, designations given to individuals with histories of institutional violence, also are confined in the segregation unit. In addition, prisoners who are deemed escape risks are placed in segregation. Finally, some men are confined to segregation cells as punishment for violating prison rules. It is this last group, those in punitive segregation, who are the subject of this suit.
An inmate can be sentenced to punitive segregation if a prison disciplinary board convicts him of a major infraction.3 A disciplinary board, composed of three prison officials, is convened when a prisoner is accused of violating certain prison rules. If the board, after hearing the witnesses and other evidence presented by the prisoner and by his accusers, finds the prisoner guilty, it may sentence him to segregation. The disciplinary board has the power to sentence an inmate either to a fixed term (e. g., six months) or to an indeterminate amount of time (e. g., "six months or until released by the Segregation Review Board").4 In practice, the disciplinary boards mete out indeterminate sentences a majority of the time.
Two boards review prisoners sentenced to segregation. The Institutional Segregation Review Board, composed of the warden, the chaplain, and the senior classification officer, meets weekly. Its power is limited; it can release only those inmates who have completely served a fixed term, not those who are serving indeterminate sentences. The Board members review the files of all those in punitive segregation. The inmates do not appear in person. The weekly meeting takes approximately two hours.
The Administrative Segregation Review Board, composed of the commissioner or his designee, the warden or his deputy, the senior classification officer, the chaplain supervisor, and the assistant director of social services, meets every sixty days. It reviews the files of those held in maximum and close custody, as well as those confined to punitive segregation. It has the power to change classifications and to release inmates serving indeterminate sentences.
The bi-monthly review follows a fixed format. Inmates are called before the Board one at a time. A Board member asks whether the prisoner is receiving his exercise, meals, showers, and visits from medical personnel. The inmate then is given a chance to address the Board. He may submit pertinent documents, but may not present witnesses in his behalf. After the inmate leaves, the Board members discuss his case. Three prison officials — a classification officer and two psychologists — who are not members of the Board but are customarily present join in the discussion and offer their opinions as to whether the prisoner should be released from segregation. In addition, the Board often solicits information about the inmate from guards who are in the room. After this discussion the five Board members reach a consensus decision; they do not take a vote. At no time in their deliberations do the members of the Segregation Review Board rely on written guidelines in determining when inmates should be released from segregation. In fact, no list of criteria to be considered in evaluating the behavior of inmates in segregation exists.
The inmates in punitive segregation learn of the Board's decision a few days later when a list of those to be released from the segregation unit is published. They do not receive a statement of reasons for the Board's actions in their individual cases. They receive neither a written explanation of the Board's operations nor a description of the behavior that is required of them before they can be released from segregation.
The Court concludes that this system violates the prisoners' rights to due process. The Supreme Court has delineated the due process requirements which must be present when prison officials punish inmates for serious misconduct. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). The due process issue, however, arises in a somewhat different context in the case at bar. The plaintiff class does not contest the procedures of the disciplinary boards which sentence prisoners to punitive segregation. Rather the class complains of the procedures, or lack of them, used by the boards which review and retain inmates in segregation. The class contends that the role of the review boards is an especially crucial one in light of the frequent imposition of indeterminate sentences.
Courts which have examined this issue have stated that due process requires a meaningful review of prisoners held in segregation for an indefinite length of time. Kelly v. Brewer, 525 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1975); Fitzgerald v. Procunier, 393 F.Supp. 335 (N.D.Cal.1975).5 As the court declared in Kelly v. Brewer:
The reasons for the segregation must not only be valid at the outset but must continue to subsist during the period of the segregation. . . . Where an inmate is held in segregation for a prolonged...
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