McCrea v. Denison

• Decision Date: 22 December 1994
• Docket Number: No. 13532-2-III,13532-2-III
• Citation: 885 P.2d 856,76 Wn.App. 395
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: Tony McCREA, Appellant, v. Rick DENISON and Linda Denison, husband and wife, Respondents.

Page 395

76 Wn.App. 395

885 P.2d 856

Tony McCREA, Appellant, v. Rick DENISON and Linda Denison, husband and wife, Respondents.

No. 13532-2-III.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3 Panel One.

Dec. 22, 1994.

As Amended Jan. 12, 1995.

Robert A. Simeone, Colville, for appellant.

Mary E. Owen, Thomas S. Rice, University Legal Assistance, Spokane, for respondents.

Christopher Gray, Office of Spokane Tribal Atty., Wellpinit, for amicus curiae.

SWEENEY, Acting Chief Judge.

This case is before the court on stipulated facts. On April 13, 1991, Tony McCrea was a passenger in the car driven by Rick Dennison. ¹ While traveling on a state highway running through the Spokane Indian Reservation, Mr. Dennison rolled the car off the road and as a result Mr. McCrea was injured. Mr. Dennison is a member of the Spokane Indian Tribe and Mr. McCrea is a descendant of the Tribe; both reside on the reservation.

Mr. McCrea filed suit in state court for damages caused by Mr. Dennison's negligence. The Superior Court granted Mr. Dennison's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the alleged tort occurred on the Spokane Indian Reservation. We reverse and remand.

DISCUSSION

The question presented is whether RCW 37.12.010, which, among other things, grants the state concurrent "civil jurisdiction over Indians and Indian territory, reservations, country, and lands within this state ... [for] [o]peration of motor vehicles upon the public ... highways", confers jurisdiction for a tort action arising from an automobile accident on reservation highways.

While an understanding of the legislative history leading to the enactment of RCW 37.12.010 is not necessary to understand what we believe to be the clear meaning of the statute or the Legislature's intent, such history does provide an explanation for the state's unilateral assumption of criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indians while on Indian reservations. Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Melton, 74 Wash.App. 73, 78, 872 P.2d 87 (1994); Clarke v. Equinox Holdings, Ltd., 56 Wash.App. 125, 130, 783 P.2d 82, review denied, 113 Wash.2d 1001, 777 P.2d 1050 (1989).

Prior to 1953, all power to regulate both criminal and civil matters affecting Indians on reservations was exclusively With respect to the assumption of civil jurisdiction in actions in which Indians were parties, Public Law 280 provided that

                with the Congress of the United States and the tribes themselves.  Confederated Tribes v. Washington, 938 F.2d 146, 147 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1704, 118 L.Ed.2d 412 (1992).  In 1953, Congress removed preexisting federal restrictions on state jurisdiction over Indian country with the enactment of the Act of August 15, 1953, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, which has been commonly referred to as Public Law 280.  Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 879, 106 S.Ct. 2305, 2307, 90 L.Ed.2d 881 (1986).  The purpose of Public Law 280 was "to extend the jurisdiction of the States over Indian country and to encourage state assumption of such jurisdiction ...".  Three Affiliated Tribes, 476 U.S. at 887, 106 S.Ct. at 2311.   It required that certain states 2 assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over certain Indian tribes and lands and also authorized all other states to unilaterally assume civil and criminal jurisdiction by legislative fact.  Public Law 280 also provided procedures for the assumption of such jurisdiction.  Makah Indian Tribe v. State, 76 Wash.2d 485, 487, 457 P.2d 590 (1969)
                

the States ... shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country ... to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such State that are of general application to private persons or private property shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State:

28 U.S.C. § 1360(a).

Our state Legislature responded to this Congressional grant of authority by enacting the Laws of 1957, ch. 240, at 941 (as amended, this is the current RCW 37.12.010 ³). The statute Mr. Dennison's challenge to the state's assumption of jurisdiction begins with his assertion that the term "[o]peration of motor vehicles upon ... highways" is ambiguous. From that assertion, he then argues the "ambiguity" must be resolved in favor of the tribe, relying on State v. Schmuck, 121 Wash.2d 373, 396, 850 P.2d 1332, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 343, 126 L.Ed.2d 308 (1993). We disagree with the assumption that the language of the statute is ambiguous.

required a request by the tribe, tribal council, or other governing body in order for the state to assume criminal or civil jurisdiction. RCW 37.12.021. Eight specified categories were, however, excepted from the prerequisite of tribal consent, including "[o]peration of motor vehicles upon the public streets, alleys, roads and highways". RCW 37.12.010(8). The United States Supreme Court has concluded that the Washington statutory scheme complies with Public Law 280 and passes constitutional muster. Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes, 439 U.S. 463, 99 S.Ct. 740, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979).

We begin the process of statutory interpretation by first accepting the plain and unambiguous language of the statute. Applied Indus., 74 Wash.App. at 78, 872 P.2d 87. The statute, reduced to the essential terms applicable to this case, provides that the Operation of a motor vehicle likewise has a well defined and accepted meaning. While the definition section of the motor vehicles act (RCW 46.04) does not specifically define operation, it does define operator or driver to mean "every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle". RCW 46.04.370. Other states have defined the term operation of a motor vehicle to include " 'nearly any activity that deals specifically with the motor vehicle, i.e., the actual physical structure and attendant parts of the vehicle.' " Bowman v. Missouri, 763 S.W.2d 161, 162 (Mo.Ct.App.1988) (quoting Johnson v. Carthell, 631 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Mo.Ct.App.1982). Motor vehicle means "every vehicle which is self-propelled ...". RCW 46.04.320. Mr. Dennison was therefore operating a motor vehicle on April 13, 1991, at the time he was involved in this accident. The operation of the motor vehicle resulted in an accident which in turn resulted in a civil lawsuit, a lawsuit over which the state had assumed jurisdiction.

state of Washington has assumed civil jurisdiction over Indians and Indian country in certain specified areas, including "[o]peration of motor vehicles upon ... highways". RCW 37.12.010(8). Neither the fact of the assumption of jurisdiction by the state nor the scope of the assumption of that jurisdiction is ambiguous in our judgment. First, "civil jurisdiction" has a clear and well defined meaning. See Powell v. Farris, 94 Wash.2d 782, 784, 620 P.2d 525 (1980) (Public Law 280 authorized Washington to assume jurisdiction over "civil causes of action"). While the term is broad, it is not ambiguous and would most certainly encompass an action for money damages arising from the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. See Thomsen v. King Cy., 39 Wash.App. 505, 509, 694 P.2d 40, review denied, 103 Wash.2d 1030 (1985) (Public Law 280 civil jurisdiction is limited to private causes of action).

Mr. Dennison argues, however, that RCW 37.12.010 must be read narrowly because it was a "compromise bill" which rejected calls for the assumption of complete criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indians. While this may be true, the "compromise bill" ultimately passed and included the assumption of civil jurisdiction over the operation of motor The Montana case of Larrivee v. Morigeau, 184 Mont. 187, 602 P.2d 563 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 964, 100 S.Ct. 1653, 64 L.Ed.2d 240 (1980) is persuasive authority. There the defendant Morigeau was involved in an automobile accident with Larrivee. The accident occurred on the Flathead Reservation. Morigeau was an enrolled member of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of that reservation. Larrivee, 602 P.2d at 564-65. Larrivee took a default judgment and Morigeau moved to set it aside on the basis the state court had improperly assumed jurisdiction. The court ultimately held that the state court had subject matter jurisdiction as a result of the tribal ordinance granting state civil and criminal jurisdiction pursuant to a Montana statute similar to RCW 37.12.010. ⁵

                vehicles.  RCW 37.12.010(8).  There is legislative history which would support Mr. Dennison's contention that at least the governor intended that the statute apply to "traffic offenses" only. 4  There is no language in the final bill, however, which would so limit the jurisdiction of state courts
                

Mr. Dennison attempts to distinguish Larrivee, arguing that assumption of jurisdiction there followed the express Both the tribal statute in Larrivee and the state statute here extend civil jurisdiction to "operation of motor vehicles". Larrivee, 602 P.2d at 566-67; RCW 37.12.010(8). The primary thrust of the amicus in Larrivee and the amicus here is that this "language is intended to grant only criminal jurisdiction over the operation of motor vehicles and not civil jurisdiction." Larrivee, 602 P.2d at 568. The court in Larrivee dismissed the contention, noting that Tribal Ordinance 40-A (Revised) granted concurrent civil and criminal jurisdiction over controversies relating to the operation of motor vehicles on tribal highways. Larrivee, 602 P.2d at 568. The same should be said about RCW 37.12.010(8).

                intent of the tribe, as evidenced by the enactment of Tribal Ordinance 40-A (Revised) (the act conferring jurisdiction on the state).  Larrivee, 602 P.2d at 567.   The distinction however is not material to the disposition here.  As we have noted, the Congressional enabling act

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