McCullough v. City of Montgomery
| Decision Date | 23 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:15-cv-463-RCL |
| Parties | ANGELA MCCULLOUGH, et al., individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, v. THE CITY OF MONTGOMERY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
The Court once again considers a case arising from the system of collecting traffic fines in Montgomery, Alabama between 2009-2014. During that time, the Montgomery Municipal Court routinely jailed traffic offenders for failing to pay fines without inquiring into their ability to pay. In carrying out that system, the Municipal Court deprived offenders of their due process and equal protection rights not to be incarcerated for their poverty. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-73 (1983). During that period, the City of Montgomery contracted on behalf of itself and the Municipal Court with Judicial Correction Services, Inc. ("JCS") to supervise Municipal Court-ordered misdemeanor probation.
The plaintiffs are Montgomery residents who served probation with JCS after they were unable to pay their traffic tickets. The plaintiffs sued the City and JCS on behalf of themselves and purported classes of similarly situated persons. Their operative complaint alleges causes of action for violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for false imprisonment and abuse of process.
The plaintiffs moved to certify three classes (ECF No. 281). The parties have fully briefed that motion (ECF Nos. 282, 294, 296, 322). They also submitted evidence in support of their briefs before (ECF Nos. 282, 295, 297, 323) and during a hearing on the motion (ECF Nos. 337, 338, 339, 341, 342, 343, 344).
Each party has also sought reconsideration of part of the Court's summary judgment decision (ECF Nos. 301, 310, 311). Those motions have been fully briefed as well (ECF Nos. 316, 317, 321, 325, 326, 331, 334, 340, 346, 348).
Upon consideration of the motions; briefs in support of and opposition thereto; evidentiary submissions; all other papers of record; and the arguments made, testimony offered, and evidence received over the course of a ten-hour hearing, the Court will:
The Court assumes familiarity with the factual background of this case. See Mem. Op. 5-11 (July 7, 2020), ECF No. 269 ("Summ. J. Op."); see also Carter v. City of Montgomery, No. 2:15-cv-555-RCL, 2020 WL 4559360, at *2-5 (M.D. Ala. July 17, 2020) ("Carter Summ. J. Op.").
In brief:
the Municipal Court sentenced traffic offenders who could not afford to pay their fines to probation with JCS. JCS operated probation pursuant to an annual contract with the City. JCS probation consisted primarily of facilitating extended paymentplans, and probationers [paid] JCS monthly fees for that service. When a probationer could not make payments or missed appointments, JCS would petition the Municipal Court to revoke probation. When the Municipal Court revoked a probation, it would "commute" the probationer's fines into a jail term: the offender would "sit out" his fine at the rate of $50 per day. At revocation and commutation hearings, the Municipal Court routinely failed to inquire as to whether a defendant could pay his fines before sentencing him to jail time. The City did not supervise JCS's operations, but evidence suggests that it may have been on notice of how JCS operated probation as early as July [16,] 2012.
Summ. J. Op. 5 (citations omitted).
In preliminary proceedings, the Court dismissed several claims and parties. See Order (Mar. 10, 2017), ECF No. 132; Order (May 14, 2019), ECF No. 184; Order (June 20, 2019), ECF No. 186; Order (Nov. 4, 2019), ECF No. 231. Following discovery, the City and JCS moved for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment. The Court granted the City's and JCS's motions in part and denied them in part; it denied the plaintiffs' motion. See Order (July 7, 2020), ECF No. 270. Later, the Court reconsidered its summary judgment opinion and held that plaintiff Algia Edwards's § 1983 claims are time-barred. See Order (Sept. 11, 2020), ECF No. 279.
As a result of those proceedings, only three claims remain live in this case:
The Court previously denied a motion for class certification without prejudice, determining that it should address class certification after summary judgment. Order (May 2, 2016), ECF No. 95.
Rule 54(b) confirms the Court's power to reconsider its interlocutory orders. The Court has discretion in deciding whether to reconsider a previous order. Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 806 (11th Cir. 1993). In exercising that discretion, the Court disfavors reconsideration. "Reconsideration of a previous order is an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly." United States v. Gumbaytay, 757 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1154 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). Reconsideration is appropriate only to address an intervening change in controlling law or newly available evidence, or to correct clear error or manifest injustice. Id. Reconsideration is not an appropriate mechanism to raise new arguments for the first time. Corley v. Long-Lewis, Inc., 965 F.3d 1222, 1235 (11th Cir. 2020).
When the Court reconsiders a motion for summary judgment, it applies the same standards as it would to any summary judgment motion. The Court grants summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The movant bears the burden of showing its entitlement to summary judgment: that the non-movant has not produced enough evidence to meet his burden at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). To decide whether material facts are in dispute, the Court construes facts and makes inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). "[W]hen conflicts arise between the facts evidenced by the parties, [the Court] credit[s] the nonmoving party's version." Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis omitted). Facts, however, are disputed only if areasonable jury could believe either side of the dispute. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. A fact is material if it is necessary to the Court's decision. See United Stales v. Gilbert, 920 F.2d 878, 883 (11th Cir. 1991).
Class actions operate as an "an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only." Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979). The party seeking class certification bears the burden of demonstrating that class certification is appropriate after rigorous analysis.1 Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1267 (11th Cir. 2009). Unless the proponents of a class action can show that all of Rule 23's requirements have been met, the Court must presume that the case should not be certified as a class action. Brown v. Electrolux Home Prod., Inc., 817 F.3d 1225, 1233 (11th Cir. 2016); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
Class certification often requires some examination of the merits of the underlying claims and defenses. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350-52 (2011). That examination, however, should go only as far as required to decide if the proponents of certification have met Rule 23's requirements. Babineau v. Fed. Express Corp., 576 F.3d 1183, 1190 (11th Cir. 2009).
Before a class can be certified, it must be "adequately defined and clearly ascertainable." Little v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). At minimum, ascertainability means that objective criteria define class membership. 1 Newberg on Class Actions, supra, at § 3.3. The parties dispute whether the method of ascertaining class members must additionally be administratively feasible.2 A method is administratively feasible when it does not require extensive individualized fact-finding. Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 355 (3d Cir. 2013). In other words, a method is administratively infeasible when determination of class membership requires a series of mini-trials. See Karhu, 621 F. App'x at 949. The Court assumes, without deciding, that ascertainability does not require an administratively feasible method of ascertaining class membership.3
Even when courts do not demand administrative feasibility, they require classes to be clearly defined based on objective criteria. See, e.g., Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2015). A class may fail to meet the standard if a significant segment of the class cannot be identified under the class definition. See, e.g., Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 495 (7th Cir. 2012) (). It may also fail if it contains too many people who have not been injured, see, e.g., Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2006), if it depends on subjective criteria, see, e.g., DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970), or if the class definition assumessuccess on the merits, see, e.g., Randleman v. Fid. Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 646 F.3d 347, 352 (6th Cir. 2011). Under any standard, the party seeking class...
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