Mcdaniel v. Harrell
| Decision Date | 01 February 1921 |
| Citation | 87 So. 631,81 Fla. 66 |
| Parties | McDANIEL v. HARRELL. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Error to Circuit Court, Leon County; E. C. Love, Judge.
Action by J. J. Harrell against J. R. McDaniel. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.
Reversed.
Syllabus by the Court
Plea to merits allowing defense to action by proof thereunder is not demurrable. Where a plea to the merits is of such nature that under it a defense to the action may be proved, the plea is good, and a demurrer thereto should not be sustained.
Not civilly liable for judicial acts in excess of jurisdiction involving decision of jurisdiction. The judge of a court of superior or general jurisdiction is not civilly liable for his judicial acts in excess of his jurisdiction when such acts involve affirmative decisions of the fact of jurisdiction of such court, even though such decisions may be erroneous, provided there is not a clear absence of jurisdiction.
Inferior court judge exempt from liability for acts even in excess of jurisdiction. Judges of inferior courts, as well as judges of courts of superior and general jurisdiction, are exempt from civil liability in damages for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, provided there is not a clear absence of jurisdiction.
Not civilly liable for exceeding authority in imposing sentence under unconstitutional ordinance. The judge of a court which has jurisdiction of the person and jurisdiction to try an accused for an offense with which he is charged is not civilly liable for exceeding his authority in imposing sentence and inflicting punishment under an ordinance which is later declared to be unconstitutional, and therefore unenforceable.
Myers & Myers, of Tallahassee, for plaintiff in error.
W. C Hodges and Fred II. Davis, both of Tallahassee, for defendant in error.
In an action of trespass for false imprisonment there was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Writ of error from this court was taken by defendant.
The declaration alleges, in substance, that the defendant caused the plaintiff to be unlawfully and forcibly restrained of his liberty by the chief of police of the city of Tallahassee and did unlawfully and falsely imprison plaintiff in the city jail of the city of Tallahassee, where the plaintiff was injured and damaged, was brought into public infamy, scandal, and disgrace, was brought into contact with filth and vermin in said city jail, and greatly suffered in body and mind by reason thereof, was forced to be absent from his business as a dealer in merchandise for a stated period to his great loss, and was otherwise injured and damaged.
Defendant demurred to this declaration, and upon a hearing the demurrer was overruled. Thereupon defendant filed his plea of not guilty, and thereafter during the progress of the trial filed a second plea to the declaration, which on demurrer was held insufficient as a defense to the action.
The first assignment of error questions the correctness of the ruling of the court in overruling defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's declaration. The essential allegations of the declaration are substantially set out herein. The case is to be reversed because of error in other rulings, and a discussion of the questions presented by this assignment will be unnecessary. It is sufficient, we think, to say that the declaration contains sufficient allegations to withstand the demurrer interposed.
The second assignment of error is predicated upon the ruling sustaining the demurrer to the second plea of defendant. This plea contains averments to the effect that defendant was mayor of the city of Tallahassee; that it was his duty as such mayor to see to it that the ordinances of said city were faithfully executed; that he was empowered by the charter and ordinances of the city by his warrant to have brought before him persons charged with violating the ordinances of the city, to inquire into the truth or falsity of such charges, and to decide upon the guilt or innocence of accused persons and impose penalties upon those found to be guilty of violations of the ordinances; that the plaintiff was arrested and brought before the defendant as mayor upon a charge of violating a designated ordinance of the city, which ordinance had been duly passed by the governing board of the city; that the plaintiff was tried by the defendant as mayor and found guilty as charged and sentenced by the defendant as mayor to pay a fine of a stated amount, and in default thereof to be imprisoned for a stated period; that the plaintiff, having failed and refused to pay said fine, was thereupon committed to the city jail of the city by the chief of police of the city in pursuance of said judgment and there held until released upon a writ of habeas corpus issued by the Supreme Court of the state; that in the habeas corpus proceeding it was adjudged that the ordinance under which plaintiff was sentenced by the defendant as mayor was void; that the arrest, trial, judgment, sentence, and imprisonment of plaintiff was done in good faith and without malice on the part of defendant in the belief that the ordinance under which he proceeded was valid, and that the proceedings thereunder were regular.
The rule is that, where a plea to the merits is of such nature that under it a defense to the action may be proved, the plea is good, and a demurrer thereto should not be sustained. Hammers v. Southern Express Co., 85 So. 246; F. E. C. Ry. v. Chesser, 77 Fla. 57, 80 So. 750; National Surety Co. v. Williams, 74 Fla. 446, 77 So. 212; Tampa & J. R. Co. v. Crawford, 67 Fla. 77, 64 So. 437; Standard Phosphate Co. v. Lunn, 66 Fla. 220, 63 So. 429.
The defense interposed by this plea is that the defendant in imposing sentence upon plaintiff was acting officially as mayor of the city under authority of the charter and ordinance of the city in the exercise of judicial power conferred upon the mayor by such charter and ordinances, that the proceeding was upon a charge duly made against plaintiff in a cause within the jurisdiction of the mayor of the city, was orderly and regular, and that, even if there was error in holding an ordinance of the city valid and enforceable when in fact such ordinance was void, defendant cannot be held civilly liable to plaintiff for imposing sentence upon him after conviction for its violation pursuant to the provisions of the charter and ordinances of the city.
It is not necessary that the plea should set up the evidence upon which the defense rests. A 'charge' upon which a prosecution in a municipal court for the violation of a municipal ordinance is based may be, and usually is, much less formal than a charge which is made a proper basis for a criminal prosecution under a state law. It is also true generally that, where an offense is committed in the presence of an officer authorized to make arrests, a formal written warrant directing such arrest is unnecessary. It appears from the evidence of the plaintiff himself that he was arrested while keeping his store open contrary to the provisions of the ordinance of the city, which he did for the avowed purpose of testing the question of its validity, in which case no warrant was necessary to authorize his arrest.
The plea, we think, contains averments of ultimate facts sufficient to permit the defendant to offer proof of its material averments, and in that respect it is sufficient under the rule stated above, but it is contended that, if all the material averments of the plea were proved, they would constitute no defense to the action upon the theory that the mayor's court of the city of Tallahassee is an inferior court of limited jurisdiction, and the judge of such court is not, under the law, exempt from liability in damages for errors committed by him in the exercise of such judicial power as he may possess.
It is conceded that a judge of a court of superior or general jurisdiction is not civilly liable for his judicial acts in excess of his jurisdiction when such acts...
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