Tampa & J. Ry. Co. v. Crawford

• Decision Date: 03 February 1914
• Citation: 67 Fla. 77,64 So. 437
• Parties: TAMPA & J. RY. CO. v. CRAWFORD et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

64 So. 437

67 Fla. 77

TAMPA & J. RY. CO. v. CRAWFORD et al.

Florida Supreme Court

February 3, 1914

Error to Circuit Court, Alachua County; J. T. Wills, Judge.

Action for damages by C. Y. Crawford and another, partners as Crawford & Davis, against the Tampa & Jacksonville Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Where in an action for damages, the declaration, when fairly considered as an entirety, states facts from which it may reasonably be inferred that the negligence alleged was a proximate cause of the stated injury, a demurrer addressed to that point is properly overruled.

A judgment will not be reversed for harmless errors in rulings on the admissibility of testimony.

While the legal effect of evidence is a question of law to be passed upon by the court when properly presented, the credibility and probative force of conflicting testimony are for the determination of the jury.

When there is substantial legal evidence to support the verdict and there is nothing to indicate that the jury misapplied the law, and it does not appear by an overwhelming preponderance of the weight of the evidence or otherwise that the jury were not governed by the evidence in making their finding, the appellate court will not reverse the judgment on the ground that the verdict is not supported by the evidence.

COUNSEL Hampton & Hampton, of Gainesville, for plaintiff in error.

E. G Baxter and W. S. Broome, both of Gainesville, for defendants in error.

OPINION

WHITFIELD J.

Crawford & Davis brought an action for damages and alleged in effect that they were the owners of a certain building used as a barn, containing 116 tons of hay, etc., situated within a short distance from the track of the defendant company, and that the defendant railway company 'negligently and carelessly run and operated one of its engines over and along its railroad track near to and by the said barn of the plaintiffs, and as a result of defendant's negligence in failing to perform its duty, and provide its engines with proper and necessary appliances, instruments, and spark arresters, sparks and brands of fire escaped from the smokestack of such engine, and were carried and thrown upon and ignited said barn of the plaintiffs, and said barn and its contents * * * were entirely consumed and destroyed.' A demurrer to the declaration was overruled, a motion for compulsory amendment was denied, a plea of not guilty was filed, and at the trial the plaintiffs obtained verdict and judgment. A writ of error was taken.

It is contended that the demurrer should have been sustained because the declaration 'does not allege how the sparks were carried and thrown upon the building,' and that the facts alleged do not show that any negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of the burning of the building.

A declaration in an action at law should, by direct allegations or by fair inference from direct allegations, contain all the essentials of a cause of action. When negligence is the basis of recovery, the declaration should contain allegations of the negligent act or omission complained of, and also allegations of the injury sustained, and should show that such injury was the proximate result of the negligence alleged. When the declaration, fairly considered, shows that the negligence therein alleged was not a proximate cause of the injury stated, an approximate demurrer should be sustained. But when fairly considered as an entirety, if the declaration states facts from which it may reasonably be inferred that the negligence alleged was a proximate cause of the stated injury, a demurrer addressed to that point should be overruled. German-American Lumber Co. v. Brock, 55 Fla. 577, 46 So. 740; Leynes v. Tampa Foundry & Mach. Co., 56 Fla. 488, 47 So. 918; Benedict Pineapple Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 55 Fla. 514, 46 So. 732.

The allegation that, 'as a result of defendant's negligence * * * in failing to provide its engines with proper and necessary appliances, instruments, and spark arresters, sparks and brands of fire escaped from the smokestack of such engine, and were carried and thrown upon and ignited said barn,' is fairly susceptible to the meaning that, 'by reason of defendant's negligence the sparks and brands of fire escaped from the smokestack, and that such sparks and fire brands so negligently allowed to escape, and by the manner of such escape, and the ordinary forces of nature, were carried and thrown upon and ignited such barn.' Thus construed, the declaration shows that the alleged negligence was a proximate cause of the stated injury, since the ordinary forces of nature are not an independent efficient cause, and the allegation that the building was 'within a short distance from the track' does not indicate that the sparks and fire brands could not have been, by the manner of their...