McDaniel v. Town of Double Oak
| Decision Date | 01 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | NO. 02-10-00452-CV,02-10-00452-CV |
| Parties | MICHAEL MCDANIEL APPELLANT v. THE TOWN OF DOUBLE OAK APPELLEE |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
FROM THE 367TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY
The primary issue we address in this appeal is whether the trial court erred by determining that it did not possess jurisdiction over three claims asserted by Appellant Michael McDaniel against the Town of Double Oak (the Town). Because we hold that the trial court possesses jurisdiction over McDaniel's claims, we reverse the trial court's order dismissing McDaniel's claims for want ofjurisdiction, and we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
McDaniel owned a fourteen-acre piece of property in the Town. He wanted to construct and operate a self-storage facility on the property. Because the Town's zoning ordinance did not permit that use, McDaniel proposed and obtained approval from the planning and zoning commission for a specific use permit (SUP). The Town Council then unanimously passed Ordinance No. 04-07, granting McDaniel's SUP. After McDaniel submitted detailed architectural plans along with the rest of his building permit application, the Town approved the plans and issued McDaniel a permit. When McDaniel attempted to construct a monument sign for the self-storage facility as indicated on the SUP, the Town officials informed McDaniel that he must submit another application, pay another fee, and obtain another permit to erect the sign. McDaniel complied, and the Town then refused to grant him a permit to erect the sign. Further disputes arose between McDaniel and the Town concerning the assessments that he was required to pay for sewer connection fees at the self-storage facility and the building permit fees that he was ultimately required to pay after the Town inspected his facility. McDaniel paid all of the required fees and, subsequently, filed this lawsuit.
McDaniel's suit sought recoupment of fees he alleged were improperly charged by the Town for the sewer tap and for building permit fees and also sought a declaration that he could erect the sign. The Town filed a plea to the jurisdiction as to the two fee recoupment claims asserted by McDaniel; the Town expressly conceded that it did not possess immunity for McDaniel's declaratoryjudgment claim concerning the sign.2 The Town sought summary judgment on that claim. McDaniel also sought summary judgment on the sign claim. The trial court granted McDaniel summary judgment on his sign claim and denied the Town's plea to the jurisdiction. The Town perfected an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's ruling on its plea to the jurisdiction,3 and this court reversed the trial court's ruling on the Town's plea to the jurisdiction; we specifically required, however, that McDaniel be given an opportunity to replead his claims.4 Back in the trial court, the Town filed a second plea to the jurisdiction asserting the same grounds as its first plea to the jurisdiction, and in accordance with our opinion, the trial court then entered an order granting the Town's plea to the jurisdiction and permitting McDaniel to replead.
McDaniel repleaded his two fee claims, adding constitutional challenges to the sewer tap fee claim and the building permit fee claim.5 The Town filed a third plea to the jurisdiction, again asserting the same grounds as its other two pleasto the jurisdiction except incorporating claims that the trial court also lacked jurisdiction over McDaniel's constitutional claims. The trial court denied the Town's third plea to the jurisdiction, and McDaniel's two fee claims proceeded to a two-day nonjury trial. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court signed an order of dismissal, specifically finding that it lacked jurisdiction and ordering "all claims herein be and are hereby dismissed." The trial court also signed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
McDaniel perfected this appeal from the order of dismissal. In two issues, McDaniel claims that the trial court does possess jurisdiction over all three of his claims: the sign claim, the sewer tap fee claim, and the building permit fee claim. The Town responds that it possesses immunity from all of McDaniel's claims under various theories; the Town also argues that McDaniel lost his standing after he filed suit by selling the storage facility and that, therefore, the trial court properly dismissed all of McDaniel's claims.
The parties disagree on the applicable standard of review. McDaniel urges us to apply the standard of review applicable to pleas to the jurisdiction, arguing that by signing an order that dismissed his "case and all claims" and that expressly stated that "the Court finds that it does not have jurisdiction," the trial court granted the Town's third plea to the jurisdiction and did not reach the merits of any of McDaniel's claims. The Town, on the other hand, urges us to apply the legal and factual sufficiency standards of review applicable to findings of fact and conclusions of law, arguing that McDaniel's claims were tried in a two-day bench trial, that the trial court signed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and thatthe order of dismissal must be upheld on any theory supported by the findings of fact and conclusions of law, whether merit-based or related to jurisdiction.
McDaniel and the Town are both partially correct. We agree with McDaniel that, because the trial court signed an order dismissing all of his claims for want of jurisdiction, the trial court ruled only on the jurisdictional issue and did not reach the merits of his claims except to the extent necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues. See, e.g., Cnty. of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002) (). We agree with the Town that because the trial court resolved the jurisdictional issue at the trial on the merits, acting as the factfinder to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts implicating the merits of McDaniel's claims, see Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex. 2004) (), its unchallenged jurisdictional-related findings of fact are binding on this court unless the contrary is established as a matter of law. Id.; McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986). Because the appellate record contains a complete reporter's record of the trial, the trial court's jurisdictional-related findings of fact may be challenged for and reviewed for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. See Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996); Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994).The trial court's nonjurisdictional-related findings of fact, however, are not relevant to our review of whether the trial court properly dismissed all of McDaniel's claims for want of jurisdiction. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226, 228 (); Cnty. of Cameron, 80 S.W.3d at 555 ().
Thus, in summary, as set forth above, because the trial court ruled on the jurisdictional issues following a bench trial, we review the trial court's findings of fact related to jurisdiction that are challenged on appeal for legal and factual sufficiency; we review the trial court's legal conclusions regarding jurisdiction de novo; and we do not review at all the trial court's findings of fact or conclusions of law that are related only to the merits of McDaniel's claims and not to jurisdiction. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226, 228.
In reviewing the trial court's findings of fact related to jurisdiction that are challenged on appeal, we utilize the same standards that we apply in reviewing jury findings. Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991); Ahmed v. Ahmed, 261 S.W.3d 190, 193-94 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of fact, we determine whether the evidence would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the finding under review. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). In conducting this review, we credit favorable evidence if reasonable factfinders could and disregard contraryevidence unless reasonable factfinders could not. Id. We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding under review and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. Id. at 822. We must, and may only, sustain no-evidence points when either the record reveals a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact. Id. at 810.
Before addressing McDaniel's challenges to the trial court's dismissal of his claims, we address the Town's contentions that, regardless of the propriety of the trial court's ruling on the Town's plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court properly dismissed all of McDaniel's claims because (1) although McDaniel may have possessed standing when he filed suit, he "lost" standing to assert all of his claims when he sold the property during litigation; (2) McDaniel did not challenge the validity of the sewer tap fee ordinance or the building permit fee ordinance; and (...
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