McDowell v. State
Decision Date | 05 July 2001 |
Docket Number | No. SC00-403.,SC00-403. |
Citation | 789 So.2d 956 |
Parties | Jimmy McDOWELL, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Allen J. DeWeese, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, FL, for Petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Celia Terenzio, West Palm Beach Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals, and Sarah B. Mayer, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent.
We have for review McDowell v. State, 764 So.2d 619 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
The petitioner challenges his sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act (the "Act") on several grounds, many of which have been previously addressed by opinions of this Court. See Grant v. State, 770 So.2d 655 (Fla.2000)
( ); McKnight v. State, 769 So.2d 1039 (Fla.2000) ( ); State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla.2000) ( ); Ellis v. State, 762 So.2d 912 (Fla.2000) ( ).
Petitioner also argues that the Act impinges on his constitutional right to plea bargain. The United States Supreme Court has definitively held that there is no such constitutional right. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977)
. Additionally, we also find McDowell's reliance on cases from Florida courts to support his assertion that a fundamental right to plea bargain exists to be entirely misplaced.
Finally, the petitioner asserts that he is entitled to relief pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). First, the petitioner did not properly preserve the issue for appellate review. Even if he had done so, we would also hold that an argument for relief under Apprendi lacks merit here. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court stated:
Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63. The petitioner now asserts that because sentencing under the Act requires that a defendant "commit[], or attempt[] to commit" any of an enumerated list of crimes "within 3 years of being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor," § 775.082(9)(a)(1),1 Fla. Stat. (1998), the reasoning in Apprendi requires that a defendant's release be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.
In our view, Apprendi did not overrule the Supreme Court's previous decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986). In McMillan, the Supreme Court considered a statute which imposed a mandatory minimum sentence in connection with an offense committed while a defendant possessed a visible firearm and held that proof of the possession of the firearm was not required because the possession did not alter the maximum penalty or create a separate offense calling for a separate penalty. The Apprendi Court made clear that it was not overruling McMillan when it stated:
The principal dissent accuses us of today "overruling McMillan." We do not overrule McMillan. We limit its holding to cases that do not involve the imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury's verdict-a limitation identified in the McMillan opinion itself.
Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2361 n. 13. The Apprendi Court reasoned that the statute addressed in McMillan neither altered the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor created a separate offense calling for a separate penalty. The statute was viewed solely as a limitation upon the sentencing court's discretion to select the penalty within the range already available.
It is our opinion that the Act does not increase the maximum statutory penalty. Here the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the statutory range is simply limited. Accordingly, proof to the jury of a defendant's release which subjects a defendant to a sentence under the Act is not required.
We agree with the reasoning of the Fourth District in Kijewski v. State, 773 So.2d 124 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000),review denied, No. SC01-181, 790 So.2d 1105 (Fla. Apr.30, 2001). We hold that Apprendi does not require that the petitioner's release be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. We also determine that the petitioner's related arguments based on Apprendi are similarly unavailing.2 Moreover, it is important to note that we have previously reached a similar conclusion in connection with sentencing under another recidivist sta...
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