McEniry v. Landi

• Decision Date: 08 December 1994
• Citation: 620 N.Y.S.2d 328,644 N.E.2d 1019,84 N.Y.2d 554
• Parties: , 644 N.E.2d 1019, 3 A.D. Cases 1772, 6 NDLR P 227 In the Matter of William McENIRY, Appellant, v. Anthony M. LANDI, as Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Facilities of the County of Westchester, et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 328

620 N.Y.S.2d 328

84 N.Y.2d 554, 644 N.E.2d 1019, 3

A.D. Cases 1772, 6 NDLR P 227

In the Matter of William McENIRY, Appellant, v. Anthony M. LANDI, as Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Facilities of the County of Westchester, et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 8, 1994.

[84 N.Y.2d 555] [644 N.E.2d 1020] James M. Rose, White Plains, for appellant.

Marilyn J. Slaatten, County Atty. of Westchester County, [84 N.Y.2d 556] White Plains (Vincent M. Cascio and Carol L. Van Scoyoc, of counsel), for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

CIPARICK, Judge.

We must determine in this case whether petitioner, a recovering alcoholic, was terminated from his employment in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law. We conclude that he was.

I.

Petitioner William McEniry, a laborer employed by respondent Westchester County Department of Environmental Facilities (DEF), experienced an alcohol dependency problem in approximately 1985 or 1986. In 1988, DEF charged petitioner with 31 specifications of time and attendance abuses. The charges were settled by stipulation and petitioner accepted a 15-day suspension. Petitioner performed his job properly until early 1989 when he again manifested attendance and lateness problems. In July 1990, petitioner sought assistance from the Westchester County Employees' Assistance Program (EAP). EAP arranged for petitioner's admission to a 28-day in-patient detoxification program, followed by a two-week out-patient alcohol abuse program. At EAP's request, DEF gave permission for petitioner to be absent from work during treatment and agreed to charge the time to petitioner's accrued leave and to grant a leave of absence to cover the balance of the time requested.

On August 31, 1990, while petitioner was still participating in the rehabilitation program, DEF charged him with 47 separate specifications of misconduct stemming from absenteeism, lateness, and failure to provide requested documentation for absences between March 13, 1989 and June 18, 1990. Petitioner was discharged from the rehabilitation program on September 9, 1990, and returned to work the next day. Petitioner's over-all job performance after he returned to work was rated satisfactory by DEF.

On December 13, 1990, at a hearing conducted pursuant to Civil Service Law § 75, petitioner admitted all the charges against him, but argued that, as a rehabilitated alcoholic, he could not be fired under the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law art. 15) and the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.) for misconduct occurring prior to rehabilitation. The Hearing Officer found petitioner guilty of all 47 specifications of misconduct, recommended that he be suspended for 60 days, and suggested that any further infraction by petitioner, however slight, should result in his dismissal. The Hearing Officer stated that petitioner had far exceeded the protective scope of the antidiscrimination statutes cited by him, and that the laws enacted to protect rehabilitated individuals "were not intended to shield them from the rules and regulations of the workplace as they apply to those not so handicapped. There are many documented instances whereby an alcoholic can and may stay 'dry' for three, four, five months or so before going 'off on a toot' so to speak. How many attempts have to be made by an employer to allow that person to seemingly rehabilitate himself?"

On March 22, 1991, the Commissioner of DEF adopted the Hearing Officer's findings of fact and decision. However, the Commissioner departed from the recommendation of suspension and instead terminated petitioner's employment. Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the Commissioner's determination and to be reinstated with back pay and benefits. The Appellate Division confirmed the determination and dismissed the proceeding, opining that the record did not "clearly establish a connection between the petitioner's attendance abuses and his alleged alcoholism" (198 A.D.2d 417, 418, 604 N.Y.S.2d 124). The Court observed that the State Human Rights Law "would not bar the dismissal of one whose disability prevents him from performing his assigned duties" (id., at 418, 604 N.Y.S.2d 124, citing Matter of Miller v. Ravitch, 60 N.Y.2d 527, 532, 470 N.Y.S.2d 558, 458 N.E.2d 1235), and that petitioner failed to demonstrate that the Federal Rehabilitation Act was applicable or would warrant a different result if applicable.

We granted petitioner leave to appeal.

II.

The New York State Human Rights Law prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee because of a disability (Executive Law § 296[1]. A complainant states a prima facie case of discrimination if the individual suffers from a disability and the disability caused the behavior for which the individual was terminated. Once a prima facie case is established, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the disability prevented the employee from performing the duties of the job in a reasonable manner or that the employee's termination was motivated by a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason (see Matter of Miller v. Ravitch, 60 N.Y.2d 527, 532, 470 N.Y.S.2d 558, 458 N.E.2d 1235, supra; Matter of Maloff v. City Commn. on Human Rights, 46 N.Y.2d 908, 910, 414 N.Y.S.2d 901, 387 N.E.2d 1217).

The Human Rights Law broadly defines the term "disability" as "a physical, mental or medical impairment resulting from anatomical, physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is demonstrable by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques" (Executive Law § 292[21][a]. Alcoholism is considered a "mental disability" under the Mental Hygiene Law, which defines "alcoholism" as a "chronic illness in which the ingestion of alcohol usually results in the further compulsive ingestion of alcohol beyond the control of the sick person to a degree which impairs normal functioning" (Mental Hygiene Law § 1.03[3], [13]; see, Matter of Francis [New York City Human Resources Admin.--Ross], 56 N.Y.2d 600, 602, 450 N.Y.S.2d 471, 435 N.E.2d 1086 [alcoholism is an illness]. Manifestly, alcohol dependency qualifies as a disability within the meaning of the Human Rights Law.

This record, under our limited review, supports the conclusion that petitioner suffered from the disability of alcoholism. We are also satisfied on this limited review that petitioner was terminated solely because of his alcohol-related chronic absenteeism. Although the Appellate Division concluded that petitioner failed to establish a causal connection between his alcoholism and his attendance problems, petitioner testified at the hearing that his absenteeism was caused by his alcoholism and that an EAP representative had repeatedly urged him to enter an Alcoholics Anonymous program. Significantly, DEF neither challenged the truthfulness of these statements nor offered any evidence to the contrary at the hearing. Indeed, it should be noted that the Commissioner of DEF expressly adopted the findings of fact and decision of the Hearing Officer, who, in recommending petitioner's suspension, specifically...