McFadden v. State, 97-3074.
Decision Date | 15 October 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 97-3074.,97-3074. |
Citation | 732 So.2d 335 |
Parties | Jimmy Lee McFADDEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Carol Ann Turner, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Giselle Lylen Rivera, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
The appellant was adjudged guilty of attempted robbery with a weapon. In that he had been convicted of felony petit theft within five years of the latest conviction, he was sentenced as an habitual felony offender. The issue presented is whether the trial court erred in using felony petit theft as a predicate for imposition of the habitual felony offender sentence. We affirm but certify a question deemed to be of great public importance.
The applicable provisions of the habitual offender statute, section 775.084, state:
Prior to 1992, a person adjudicated guilty of felony petit theft was subject to sentencing as provided by sections 775.082, 775.083, and 775.084, the habitual offender statute. See § 812.014(2)(d), Fla.Stat. (1991)[now renumbered as § 812.014(3)(c)]. However, in 1992, the legislature amended the petit theft statute, and in so doing, deleted any reference to section 775.084. See Ch. 92-79, § 1, Laws of Fla.; Ridley v. State, 702 So.2d 559 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). See Berch v. State, 691 So.2d 1148, 1149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).
In Brown v. State, 647 So.2d 214, 215 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), the trial court relied upon a 1989 felony DUI conviction and a 1983 conviction of dealing in stolen property as the predicate for imposition of habitual offender sentencing on Brown's 1990 conviction for felony DUI. The applicable DUI penalty provision, section 316.193(2)(b), provides:
(b) Any person who is convicted of a fourth or subsequent violation of this section is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084; however, the fine imposed for such fourth or subsequent violation may be not less than $1,000.
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that Brown had a sufficient criminal record to be convicted of felony DUI and to be treated as an habitual offender.
In Brown, as in this case, the qualifying conviction within the preceding five years was a misdemeanor conviction elevated to a third degree felony by virtue of prior convictions. The use of the felony DUI as the predicate conviction was approved in Brown. The only distinction between this case and Brown seems to be that the applicable DUI penalty provision expressly provides that one convicted of felony DUI may be sentenced in accordance with section 775.084, the habitual...
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