McFarland v. McFarland
Decision Date | 28 March 1919 |
Docket Number | No. 20108.,20108. |
Citation | 278 Mo. 1,211 S.W. 23 |
Parties | McFARLAND v. McFARLAND et al. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Nodaway County; Charles H. Mayer, Judge.
Action by Lou McFarland against Selena McFarland and others. From an adverse judgment, the plaintiff and the named defendant appeal. Reversed and remanded.
Plaintiff, Lou McFarland, the widow of Seth McFarland, deceased, instituted this action in said court on February 9, 1916, against the respondents, children by a former wife and heirs at law of Seth McFarland, who died seized of an estate of inheritance in the lands in controversy May 15, 1904. The land embraced about 200 acres in Nodaway county.
The petition, after stating these facts, proceeds as follows:
The defendants answered, pleading, among other Things, the following:
"Further answering these defendants allege that the right of the plaintiff to dower, if any, in the real estate of which their father, Seth McFarland, died seized of an estate of inheritance, is barred by limitation under section 391, R. S. Mo. 1909."
The plaintiff replied by general denial, and pleaded affirmatively as follows:
When the cause came on for trial, Salena McFarland, of unsound mind, was made a defendant. George P. Wright, an attorney at the bar, was appointed by the court her guardian ad litem, and filed an answer which is not set out in the record. The cause was submitted on an agreed statement of facts which, so far as it affects the matters at issue in this appeal, states that plaintiff is the widow of Seth McFarland, and the defendants are his children by his wife who died in 1900. He was married to plaintiff in 1902, and died May 15, 1904, without having any children by her.
The land in which plaintiff seeks to have dower assigned was a part of a large tract of which one John McFarland died seized of an estate of inheritance in 1872, leaving his widow, the defendant Salena McFarland, and eight children, among whom were Seth McFarland and J. E. McFarland, who afterward acquired the interest of the other children subject to the dower interest in the entire tract of the defendant Salena, who at the time of the trial was 83 years old. Seth and J. E. afterward partitioned the land between themselves, the former acquiring the entire title of the land in question, subject to the rights, if any, of their mother, Salena. A small tract of the land was omitted from the deeds made in this partition, but it is admitted that the equitable title was in Seth at the time of his death, so that the omission is unimportant.
With respect to the dower of Salena McFarland:
"The facts are that for a number of years after the death of her husband she lived upon said 314 acres of land and managed the same. Finally she discontinued her management of the farm, and thenceforward the possession of said lands was turned over to the said Seth McFarland and J. E. McFarland, each assuming charge of that part of said 314 acres which was deeded to him in said voluntary partition. From that time forward each paid the said Salena McFarland an annuity of $100 per year, and each paid all the taxes on the land occupied by him and kept up and constructed improvements thereon, without any contribution from the said Salena McFarland; it being the understanding that the payment of said annuity and taxes and the keeping up and construction of said improvements should be, and it was, accepted by the said Salena
With respect to the dower of the plaintiff, the agreed statement is as follows:
Upon these facts the court held that both plaintiff and defendant Salena McFarland are barred by the provisions of section 391 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri 1909 by reason of the fact that no action for the recovery of dower was commenced by the plaintiff within 10 years from the death of her husband on May 15, 1904, and that no action for the recovery of dower was brought by the defendant Salena McFarland within 10 years from the death of her husband in 1872, and so adjudged, and that they take nothing by reason thereof, and also adjudged the costs...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State ex Inf. Shartel v. Mo. Utilities Co.
...or implied admission which has in good faith and in pursuance of its purpose been accepted and acted upon by another." [McFarland v. McFarland, 211 S.W. 23, 278 Mo. 1, 16.] To constitute estoppel in pais, three things must occur; First, an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the ......
-
Coleman v. Kansas City
...advantage. Bridges v. Stephens, 132 Mo. 524, 34 S.W. 555; Swofford Bro. Dry Goods Co. v. Goss, 65 Mo. App. 55; McFarland v. McFarland, 278 Mo. 1, 211 S.W. 23; Branner v. Klaber, 300 Mo. 306, 49 S.W. (2d) 169; Sugent v. Arnold's Estate, 340 Mo. 603, 101 S.W. (2d) 715. (21) The threat of loss......
-
Falvey v. Hicks
...and therefore wished to compel parties having such undivided possessory rights to assert them within ten years." In McFarland v. McFarland, 278 Mo. 1, 12, 211 S. W. 23, 26, we said, in speaking of the purpose and effect of the special statute of "It exhibits the intention to limit the quara......
-
Branner v. Klaber
...65 Mo. App. 55; Bridges v. Stevens, 132 Mo. 524, 34 S.W. 559; Shearlock v. Life Ins. Co., 193 Mo. App. 430, 182 S.W. 91; McFarland v. McFarland, 211 S.W. 23, 278 Mo. 17; Glass v. Templeton, 170 S.W. 667. (5) The Statute of Limitations is no bar to Annie J. Scott Branner's defense to cause N......