McGee v. Dunnigan

• Decision Date: 17 July 1951
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: McGEE et al. v. DUNNIGAN et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 491

83 A.2d 491

138 Conn. 263

McGEE et al. v. DUNNIGAN et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 17, 1951.

James J. A. Daly and Daniel E. Brennan, Jr., Bridgeport, for appellant (named plaintiff).

Paul H. Cullinan, Bridgeport, pro se and for plaintiff Michael C. Gadus, joined in the appellant's brief.

John V. Donnelly, Bridgeport, for appellees (defendants Shenton and others).

Louis Weinstein, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was George C. Conway, Atty. Gen., for appellees (defendants Engelman and others).

Before BROWN, C. J., and JENNINGS, BALDWIN, INGLIS and O'SULLIVAN, JJ. JENNINGS, Judge.

The plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment. Their claims are numerous but basically they ask a determination of the right of the Bridgeport board of education to expend the state subsidy for education in addition to the amount appropriated for education by the board of finance from the city's general funds. The brief finding is not attacked but the defendants seek to supplement it by the addition of thirty-six paragraphs of their counterfinding. No additions to the finding are necessary to present the decisive issue on appeal.

The three plaintiffs are residents, voters, taxpayers and members of the board of education in the city of Bridgeport. The defendants are the four remaining members of the board of education and various state and city officials charged with the duty of supervision over finances. In August, 1947, and annually thereafter, the city board of education applied to the state board of education for aid under Public Acts 1947, No. 402. It was stated in the finding that amounts to be received under this grant during the municipal fiscal year commencing April 1, 1950, would aggregate approximately $578,000 and, in conformity with the present practice, would be deposited in the city's general funds; and that the defendant city comptroller would refuse to certify, and the defendant city treasurer to disburse upon, any requisition by the board of education if such requested disbursement exceeded the appropriation for education made by the city for the fiscal year, even though the requested disbursement did not exceed that appropriation plus state aid received during that year. To illustrate the matter concretely, it is not disputed that the city appropriated and spent for educational purposes approximately $3,483,000 for 1949-1950 and that the state grant for the same period was approximately $576,000. The comptroller would certify no requisition above $3,483,000. The plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to a declaratory judgment which would authorize the board of education to expend the state grant of $576,000 in addition to the city appropriation of $3,483,000. Their brief is a mine of information on the educational history and policy of the state from the earliest times.

To test the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action, it is necessary to examine the precise grounds on which it is based. The essential question posed by the complaint is whether Bridgeport should have spent an additional half million dollars on its schools. This is an important question of policy and depends in part on a construction of the relevant statutes, but it is not one which will affect the plaintiffs in any substantial way. In fact, if the plaintiffs' contention were upheld, the only practical effect on them, so far as appears, would be to increase their taxes. The Connecticut declaratory judgment statute, General Statutes, Sup.1949, § 644a, and the rules implementing it, Practice Book, §§ 249-253, ¹ have been said to be extremely broad and liberal in their provisions. Sigal v. Wise, 114 Conn. 297, 301, 158 A. 891. No Connecticut case has been found, however, supporting the thesis that a taxpayer can seek to have a statute construed where the effect of that construction does not affect his personal rights. Charter Oak Council, Inc. v. New Hartford, 121 Conn. 466, 475, 185 A. 575, is a good illustration of a situation which entitles a taxpayer to such a judgment.

In Board of Education of Stamford v. Board of Finance, 127 Conn. 345, 16 A.2d 601, on the other hand, it was held that as to all but one of the numerous issues raised the parties were not entitled to a judgment. The case concerned the respective powers and responsibilities of the two boards. The importance of this holding is emphasized because the parties were two official boards, while the case at bar is a so-called taxpayer's suit. The board of education, which would seem to have the greatest interest in the matter, is not a party as such. In fact, among the defendants are a majority of the board. The matter is fully discussed in the Stamford case, 127 Conn. on pages 347-349, 16 A.2d on page 603. This discussion is so apposite to the issues in the case at bar that it would be quoted in full if space limitations permitted. It starts as follows: 'We have hesitated whether we ought to entertain this appeal at all. The authority given to the courts of this state by the legislature to render declaratory judgments was not intended to broaden their function so as to include issues which would not be such as could be determined by the courts in ordinary actions. One of the conditions for rendering a declaratory judgment is that the person seeking it must have an interest, legal or equitable, by reason of danger of loss or of uncertainty as to his rights or other jural relations. Practice Book, 1934, p. 78, § 250. The controversy between the boards falls rather within the political aspects of government than the judicial. The town is seeking no relief. No contract or property rights of either of the boards and no contract, property or personal rights of any of their members as such will be affected by the decision; no justiciable right is involved.' The opinion goes on to say (127 Conn. at page 348, 16 A.2d 601) that the passage of time has made the issues academic and that if the contractual rights of any person are affected the presence of that person as a party would be essential under the rule.

The mere statement of this principle is sufficient to refute the claim of the plaintiffs to the relief sought. They have no standing to raise the question. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, p. 50. There is, as to them, no justiciable issue.

This conclusion appears to conform to the weight of authority. ² The danger of allowing taxpayers' suits of this character without limitation is cogently pointed out in Bryant v. Logan, 56 W.Va. 141, 142, 40 S.E. 21. There must be an issue in dispute or an uncertainty of legal relations 'which requires settlement between the parties'. Practice Book, § 250(b). An action does not lie merely to secure advice on the law....