McGhee v. Odell

• Decision Date: 07 June 2012
• Parties: Stephen McGHEE, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Nancy Brensson ODELL, etc., Defendant–Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

96 A.D.3d 449
946 N.Y.S.2d 134
2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 04397

Stephen McGHEE, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
Nancy Brensson ODELL, etc., Defendant–Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

June 7, 2012.

Lynn & Cahill LLP, New York (John R. Cahill of counsel), for appellant.

Wells, Jaworski & Liebman, LLP, New York (Sylvia Hall of counsel), for respondent.

GONZALEZ, P.J., FRIEDMAN, RENWICK, MANZANET–DANIELS, ROMÁN, JJ.

[96 A.D.3d 449]Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Saliann Scarpulla, J.), entered on February 2, 2012, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the complaint, unanimously modified, on the law, to [96 A.D.3d 450]grant plaintiff leave to file the proposed amended complaint except insofar as it asserts the cause of action for

[946 N.Y.S.2d 135]

breach of contract against defendant individually, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

During the administration of decedents Juris and Baiba Brensson's estates, plaintiff informed defendant executrix of his claim to co-ownership of the bottom portion of a rare cello located among the estates' assets. Although defendant informed plaintiff that efforts would be made to locate the cello upon some proof of his claim, which he subsequently provided, the cello was not produced. Accordingly, plaintiff brought suit alleging breach of fiduciary duty and conversion. During discovery, it was revealed that the Surrogate's Court had been informed that plaintiff's claim to the cello was without foundation, and that thereafter, the cello was sold at a Christie's auction for $21,500. Plaintiff then sought leave to amend his complaint to add claims for fraud and breach of contract, which Supreme Court denied.

Leave to amend pleadings under CPLR 3025(b) should be freely given, and denied only if there is “prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay” (McCaskey, Davies & Assoc. v. New York Health & Hosps. Corp., 59 N.Y.2d 755, 757, 463 N.Y.S.2d 434, 450 N.E.2d 240 [1983] ), or if the proposed amendment “is palpably improper or insufficient as a matter of law” ( Shepherd v. New York City Tr. Auth., 129 A.D.2d 574, 574, 514 N.Y.S.2d 72 [1987] ). A party opposing leave to amend “must overcome a heavy presumption of validity in favor of [permitting amendment]” ( Otis El. Co. v. 1166 Ave. of Ams. Condominium, 166 A.D.2d 307, 307, 564 N.Y.S.2d 119 [1990] ). Prejudice to warrant denial of leave to amend requires “ ‘some...