McGill v. City of St. Joseph

• Decision Date: 13 October 1930
• Docket Number: No. 29984.,29984.
• Citation: 31 S.W.2d 1038
• Parties: McGILL et al. v. CITY OF ST. JOSEPH.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

31 S.W.2d 1038

McGILL et al. v. CITY OF ST. JOSEPH.

No. 29984.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

October 13, 1930.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Buchanan County; J. V. Gaddy, Judge.

Action by Charles McGill and others against the City of St. Joseph. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.

Cause transferred to Kansas City Court of Appeals.

Richard M. Duncan and Mayer, Conkling & Sprague, all of St. Joseph, for appellant.

B. M. Lockwood, Alva F. Lindsay, and Philip Slattery, all of St. Joseph, for respondents.

COOLEY, C.

This is an appeal by defendant city from a judgment of the circuit court of Buchanan county in favor of plaintiffs, enjoining defendant, its officers, agents, servants, and employees from enforcing certain provisions of an ordinance regulating the taxicab business.

The ordinance in question, among divers other regulatory provisions, required persons, firms, etc., owning or operating taxicabs for hire in carrying passengers on the streets of St. Joseph to install and maintain taximeters in their taxicabs, also to file bonds in specified amounts, depending upon the number and capacity of taxicabs used, to guarantee payment of judgments obtained against such owners or operators on account of injuries due to negligence in the operation of such taxicabs or in lieu of such bonds to carry liability insurance in designated amounts for the protection of persons injured through such negligent operation. The ordinance specifies in detail these requirements and the regulatory features thereof as well as other regulations of the taxicab business, and provides penalties by fine for violations thereof.

Plaintiffs are each, separately, engaged in the taxicab business in St. Joseph and joined in this suit to restrain the enforcement of the taximeter and the bond and insurance provisions of the ordinance. They allege in their petition that they respectively own taxicabs and are engaged in the business of transporting passengers for hire within the city; that they have complied with all the requirements of the State Motor Vehicle Law; the enactment of the ordinance and that the city is threatening to enforce same; plead the provisions of the ordinance; allege that their taxicabs are equipped with speedometers which accurately measure the distance traveled, and that the provisions of the ordinance above referred to are unreasonable and invalid and in violation of the State Motor Vehicle Law (Laws of Missouri 1921, 1st Extra Session, pp. 76 to 107, inclusive), in that they are requirements not contained in that law and by it forbidden to be made by municipalities. The petition then contains this allegation: "That said ordinance and the provisions complained of are unconstitutional and void, in that they violate the rights guaranteed to plaintiffs by section 4, article II, of the Constitution of Missouri. Said ordinance is also unconstitutional and void and the title thereof defective so that it deprives plaintiffs of rights and property without due process of law as guaranteed by section 30 of article II of the Constitution of the State of Missouri."

The prayer is that the mentioned provisions be declared null and void and that the city be enjoined from enforcing them against plaintiffs. The answer admits that defendant is a municipal corporation, that it passed and is attempting to enforce the ordinance, and denies generally other allegations of the petition.

Plaintiffs' evidence tended to show that it would cost $170 to $175 each to install taximeters, and that a taximeter would occupy space such that it would be uncomfortable for a passenger occupying the front seat of a taxicab such as plaintiffs used, and that the effect would be practically to reduce by one passenger the comfortable seating capacity of each vehicle, and that, since taxicabs are extrahazardous to pedestrians and vehicles using the streets, it would be difficult and expensive to procure the bond or the insurance required by the ordinance; that unless a person in that business were very highly rated financially he could not procure either the bond or insurance without giving security to the company issuing same in an amount equal to the liability. Defendant offered no evidence.

The court, after finding that the ordinance had been passed and the city was attempting to enforce it, found as follows:

"The court further finds that the provisions of said ordinance in requiring taximeters to be attached to and affixed to taxicabs and the provisions of said ordinance requiring indemnity bonds or policies of insurance, are not authorized by, and are in derogation of, an Act of the General Assembly of 1921, relating to motor vehicles, and found at pages 76 to 107 inclusive, of the Law of Missouri, 1921, 1st Extra Session, and for that reason said ordinance is invalid and unenforceable, as to such requirements.

"The court further finds from the evidence adduced on the question of the reasonableness of the provisions of the ordinance requiring indemnity bonds or policies of liability insurance, that said bonds or insurance cannot be obtained except upon unreasonable terms and conditions, and for that reason said provision of said ordinance is unreasonable and invalid.

"The court further finds that as a matter of law that the requirements of said ordinance, on its face, as to taximeters, indemnity bonds or policies of liability insurance are not unreasonable requirements to be placed upon taxicab operators.

"The court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to the relief prayed for in their petition."

The judgment following the above finding declares said provisions of the ordinance invalid and enjoins their enforcement.

The foregoing outline will suffice for the disposition we must make of the case. We think this court is without jurisdiction. The question of our jurisdiction has not been raised by the parties, but it is too well settled to require citation of authorities that it is our duty to note and determine it whether raised by the parties or not. If we have jurisdiction, it can only be upon the ground that a constitutional question is involved. There is nothing in the record, either by pleading or evidence, to show that the pecuniary value of the relief sought by plaintiffs, individually or collectively, or the loss or damage to defendant if relief be granted, or vice versa if it be denied, brings the case within our jurisdiction as to amount. Such facts must affirmatively appear. See City of St. Joseph v. Georgetown Lodge No. 627, I. O. O. F., et al. (Mo. Sup.) 8 S.W.(2d) 979; Village of Grandview v. McElroy et al., 318 Mo. 135, 298 S. W. 760. St. Joseph, being a city within a county, is not a political subdivision of the state so as to give us jurisdiction on that ground. Village of Grandview v. McElroy, supra, and cases cited therein; City of St. Joseph v. Georgetown Lodge, etc., supra. No other fact suggestive of appellate jurisdiction in this court appears in the record. The only...