Mcginnis v. Ragsdale

• Decision Date: 08 August 1902
• Citation: 42 S.E. 492,116 Ga. 245
• Parties: McGINNIS et al. v. RAGSDALE, Ordinary.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

42 S.E. 492

116 Ga. 245

McGINNIS et al.

v.RAGSDALE, Ordinary.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Aug. 8, 1902.

GRAND JURY—RECOMMENDATIONS—ALTERNATIVE ROAD LAW.

1. When a special term of a superior court is convened for the purpose of disposing of any and all business before the court, and the grand jury which served at the preceding regular term is required to be in attendance at such special term, such grand jury has authority to make a recommendation, under the provisions of the Political Code (section 573 et seq.), that the alternative road law be adopted in the county.

2. The alternative road law as contained in the Code sections above referred to was not repealed by the act of 1890, providing an additional scheme for working the roads in the different counties, which might be adopted by a popular vote, nor by the act of 1898 which was amendatory of the act just referred to.

3. An act of the general assembly which operates uniformly upon all persons within a designated class is a general law, and not in violation of that provision of the constitution of this state which requires that ail laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the limits of the state, unless it is manifest that the classification is arbitrary or unreasonable.

4. An act dividing the people of the state into two general classes, one embracing all those residing within the limits of incorporated cities and towns, and the other all those residing without such limits, and making provision for working the roads by the latter class, which is different from that prescribed by law as the method to be followed by the former, does not make an arbitrary or unreasonable classification.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from superior court, De Kalb county; John S. Candler, Judge.

Action by C. B. McGinnis and others against William R. Ragsdale, ordinary. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs bring error. Affirmed.

W. W. Braswitt, for plaintiffs in error.

Candler & Thomson, for defendant in error.

COBB, J. This was an application by citizens and taxpayers of De Kalb county for an injunction to restrain the ordinary from causing the roads of that county to be work-ed under what is known as the alternative road law, embraced in the Political Code (sections 573-583), and from assessing or levying any commutation or ad valorem tax under the provisions of that law, or executing any of the provisions of the same. The judge refused to grant the injunction prayed for, and the plaintiffs excepted.

At a special term of the superior court of De Kalb county, held in December, 1900, the grand jury serving at that term made a recommendation in the following language: "We recommend that the alternative road law, contained in title 2, c. 11, art. 2, §§ 573-583, inclusive, of volume 1 of the Code, he put in operation in said county, " this recommendation being contained in the general presentments. This special term was held pursuant to an order, passed by the judge of the circuit, calling a special term to begin on Monday, December 17, 1900, "for the purpose of trying and otherwise disposing of the business pending in said court, either civil or criminal." The order directed that the grand jury which had served at the August term, 1900. of that court should report for service at the special term, and that they should be notified to this effect by the sheriff of the county. Pol. Code, § 583, as amended by the act of 1897. provides: "This article shall not go into effect in any county in this state until it is recommended by the grand jury of said county, said recommendation to be made at any term of court; and the operation of this article shah be suspended in any county of this state upon a like recommendation of the grand jury, made at any term of court, after the lapse of three years from the time this article goes into effect" Acts 1897, p. 20; Van Epps' Code Supp. § 6130. It is contended that, under the provisions of the statute just quoted, a grand jury would have no authority at a special term of the court to make any recommendation in reference to the alternative road law; that the expression "any term of court" means a regular term; and that, therefore, the recommendation in the present instance was void.

Under the law of this state, the terms of the superior court which are authorized to be held by the judges thereof are divided into three classes: regular, adjourned, and special terms. The law provides for the holding of two regular terms of the superior court in each county each year, except in the county of Chatham, in which there are annually held three regular terms under the provisions of a statute passed long before the adoption of the constitution of 1877. An adjourned term of the court is said to be held where the regular term has never been adjourned, but the session has been continued by an order providing that the court shall reconvene as in regular term after the lapse of a recess other than the ordinary recess when the court is in session from day to day. A special term is a term called to convene after the adjournment of one regular term, and before the time ar rives for the holding of another regular term. The law provides that the judges of the superior courts "are authorized to hold special terms of said courts for the trial of criminals, or for the disposition of civil business, either or both, in any county of their circuits, at discretion, and to compel the attendance of grand or petit juries, either of a previous term, or to draw new jurors for the same, according to the laws now in force." Civ. Code, § 4345.

At a special term called by the judge for the purpose of disposing of any civil or criminal business before the court, the judge is certainly authorized to dispose of any business that may be on the dockets of the court at the time the special term is convened; and, as the judge is authorized expressly to compel the attendance of the grand jury, the court can also dispose of any criminal business which may be brought before it upon presentments or indictments made at the special term. We do not think it will be questioned that the grand jury at a special term may return an indictment or presentment, and that the judge may at that term try the...