MCGLENN v. United States
| Decision Date | 11 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 18-CF-103,18-CF-103 |
| Citation | 211 A.3d 1133 |
| Parties | Royale MCGLENN Sr., Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Paige Sharpe, with whom Mary Kennedy, was on the brief, Washington, for appellant.
Steven B. Snyder, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Jessie K. Liu, United States Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Washington, and Puja Bhatia, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.
Before Fisher, Thompson, and McLeese, Associate Judges.
Appellant Royale McGlenn Sr. appeals from his convictions for firearms offenses, arguing that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, the evidence at the suppression hearing was as follows. At approximately 10:45 pm on June 5, 2017, Metropolitan Police Department officers Sherwin Charles and Angela Galli responded to a report of an assault in progress. When Officer Charles arrived he saw Mr. McGlenn standing outside in front of the location provided in the report. Mr. McGlenn, who matched the description of the suspected assailant, was sweating, not well-oriented, and confused. Officer Charles smelled alcohol or PCP coming from Mr. McGlenn. Officer Charles directed Mr. McGlenn to stop, so that Officer Charles could investigate the reported assault. Mr. McGlenn did not comply, so Officer Charles grabbed Mr. McGlenn. Mr. McGlenn continued to resist, pulling out of his shirt. In Officer Charles's experience, intoxicated individuals tend to be aggressive and noncompliant. For that reason, and given Mr. McGlenn's resistance, Officer Charles handcuffed Mr. McGlenn, to safely detain him while officers investigated the assault. Mr. McGlenn resisted being handcuffed. Officer Charles also radioed for an ambulance to come and assess Mr. McGlenn's medical condition. It is standard practice to call an ambulance to evaluate individuals who are suspected of being high on PCP, because such individuals can suddenly become incredibly aggressive and very strong, and often hurt themselves.
When Officer Galli arrived, she saw Officer Charles restraining Mr. McGlenn. Officer Galli smelled PCP coming from Mr. McGlenn's person. Mr. McGlenn "appeared to be high on something" and was displaying disorientation and "broken thought process." Officer Galli interviewed Mr. McGlenn's mother, who had called the police. Mr. McGlenn's mother explained that Mr. McGlenn had come into her home and was yelling for his son, who was in bed. Mr. McGlenn's mother concluded that Mr. McGlenn had been smoking something, because he did not usually act the way he was acting. Mr. McGlenn's mother was so frightened that she ran to a neighbor's house and called the police. Mr. McGlenn's mother indicated, however, that no actual assault had occurred. Mr. McGlenn's mother told the police that she wanted Mr. McGlenn to be treated because he was under the influence of something.
Officer Galli informed Officer Charles of her conversation with Mr. McGlenn's mother. The officers decided not to arrest Mr. McGlenn for assault, but they also decided not to release him until an ambulance came to evaluate him, because he might be a threat to himself or others if he were released. The officers decided to leave Mr. McGlenn in handcuffs until the ambulance arrived, to prevent him from leaving or hurting himself or the officers. During the officers' encounter with Mr. McGlenn, Mr. McGlenn was angry, irate, and upset; was yelling; fumbled to remember information; slurred words; was at one point incoherent; seemed to be "out of it"; and frequently repeated himself. Once he was handcuffed, however, Mr. McGlenn did not act aggressively towards the officers or threaten them. Mr. McGlenn also was able to answer a number of the officers' questions. At one point, Mr. McGlenn stated that he did not remember having seen his mother that evening.
About ten minutes after the officers decided not to arrest Mr. McGlenn, and while they were waiting for the ambulance to arrive, Mr. McGlenn told the officers that he had a gun in his pants. Officer Charles then recovered a gun from Mr. McGlenn's pants. The officers arrested Mr. McGlenn for possessing the gun. Before he was transported from the scene, Mr. McGlenn was evaluated by medical personnel, who determined that he did not need to go to the hospital.
The trial court credited the officers' testimony, much of which was corroborated by body-worn camera footage that had been admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing. The trial court determined that even after the assault investigation was over, the officers could lawfully continue to detain Mr. McGlenn until an ambulance came, "for his safety and the safety of the community." Specifically, the trial court relied upon the facts that Mr. McGlenn (1) was sweating heavily and breathing hard; (2) appeared disoriented; (3) was non-compliant to the point of pulling out of his shirt; (4) was at one point incoherent; (5) was slurring his speech; (6) did not seem to understand what was going on, particularly at the beginning of the encounter; (7) had behaved in a frightening and aggressive way in his mother's home; (8) appeared to be high on PCP; (9) stated that he did not remember having seen his mother that evening; and (10) kept repeating himself.
"When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact, but we determine questions of law de novo. " Tuckson v. United States , 77 A.3d 357, 360 (D.C. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying this standard, we affirm. Specifically, Mr. McGlenn challenges the officers' continued detention of him even after it was clear that there was no basis to charge him with assault. We hold that the officers had authority to continue to detain Mr. McGlenn under the community-caretaking doctrine. (Although neither the trial judge nor the United States specifically used the phrase "community caretaking" in the trial court, Mr. McGlenn has not argued in this court that the United States forfeited reliance upon the community-caretaking doctrine, and we therefore have no occasion to address that question.)
Nearly fifty years ago, the Supreme Court noted that local police officers frequently engage in "community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." Cady v. Dombrowski , 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). Many other courts have elaborated on that point. See, e.g. , State v. McCormick , 494 S.W.3d 673, 683 (Tenn. 2016) ( ) (internal quotation marks omitted); Ullom v. Miller , 227 W.Va. 1, 705 S.E.2d 111, 120 (2010) ( ); Williams v. State , 962 A.2d 210, 216-17 (Del. 2008) ( ) (footnote, brackets, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks omitted); see also I American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice Standard 1-1.1(b), at 1-10 (2d ed. 1980) ( ); id. Standard 1-2.2(f) cmt. at 1-42 ().
It is widely recognized that police officers' community-caretaking responsibilities can extend to those who appear to be intoxicated on alcohol or other substances. See, e.g. , Gallegos v. City of Colo. Springs , 114 F.3d 1024, 1029 n.4 (10th Cir. 1997) (); State v. Shiffermiller , 302 Neb. 245, 922 N.W.2d 763, 777 (2019) (); People v. Biagi , 409 Ill.Dec. 721, 68 N.E.3d 829, 840 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) () (internal quotation marks omitted); see generally 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2(b), at 384-87 (5th ed. 2012) (...
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