McGlinchy v. Fid. & Cas. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 March 1888
• Citation: 14 A. 13,80 Me. 251
• Parties: MCGLINCHY et al. v. FIDELITY & CASUALTY CO.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

14 A. 13

80 Me. 251

MCGLINCHY et al.

v. FIDELITY & CASUALTY CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 8, 1888.

Report from supreme judicial court, Washington county.

Assumpsit to recover $1,000, the amount insured in an accident insurance company on the life of the plaintiffs' father. The opinion states the facts.

A. McNichol, for plaintiffs. N. & H. B. Cleaves, and E. B. Harvey, for defendant.

PETERS, C. J. The plaintiffs, who are minor children, sue for $1,000, an amount insured in accident policy on the life of their father by the defendant company. The circumstances of the father's death were these: On a morning, while a resident of Calais, he was driving in a covered carriage, containing himself and his two small boys, on the principal public way in St. Stephen, N. B., when his horse, frightened at a load of hides passing on the same way, suddenly sprang into a run, first jumping to the side of the way, and nearly colliding with other teams, and ran a considerable distance before he was brought under control. The result was that there was no collision, nor was the carriage upset, or any one thrown therefrom. Immediately afterwards the insured experienced great sickness and pain. and, going directly to his house, died in about an hour from the moment of the accident. He was in good health on that morning before the accident, and there is no suggestion that he was not a person of generally sound and strong constitution. His business was that of a commercial traveler. The case is reported for our determination upon the law and facts. We think, on these facts, that the common judgment of men would instinctively declare, irrespective of the refinements which are often indulged in over primary and secondary causes, that here was a plain accident causing death, and that the company should pay the sum promised in the policy. In any reasonable view that can be taken of the series of happenings, our minds go to the same conclusion. We believe that the common-sense view is also the legal view. The company insures against death by accident; and as, in some cases, it is difficult to determine whether the death is caused by disease or by accident, in order to prevent fraud or mistake, the company provides its own tests by which the fact shall be ascertained. The leading provision of the policy is that those interested in the insurance, in order to establish the liability of the company, shall prove that death was caused "by bodily injuries effected through external, violent, and accidental means," within the meaning of the contract. The company having chosen its definition of liability, and having the opportunity of annexing conditions which usually are not closely observed by persons accepting insurances, the meaning of the terms employed need not be enlarged or restricted for the benefit of the company, but should be liberally interpreted in favor of the insured. Was the death, in this instance, caused by bodily injuries effected through external, violent, and accidental means? Certainly, there was an accident. The definition of "accident," generally assented to, is an event happening without any human agency, or, if hapening through human agency, an event which, under the circumstances, is unusual, and not expected to the person to whom it happens. This definition exactly fits the facts here. Argument cannot be necessary to satisfy any one that the injury happened by violent means. A well man suddenly meets a perilous emergency, which taxes all his physical and mental strength, and his death is caused thereby in an hour.

The greater question is whether the death was caused by external means. We have no doubt it was. And really all the questions of the case may be resolved into the single inquiry as to what was the real cause producing death, and here a question of fact must, to some extent, be determined. The testimony is meager. Possibly, the counsel for the plaintiffs relies on the preliminary proofs of loss as evidence in chief, which are fuller than the general testimony; but that is not allowable. Leaving the proofs of loss to serve only the proper purpose for which they could be introduced, all the evidence we have, more than the facts already stated, is that the insured became deathly sick, and after death a discoloration appeared on the surface of the body in the region of the heart. There is no pretense that the body bore any marks of contact with anything inflicting injury, or that it came in contact with any physical object during the time of the accident. Our belief is, on the facts legitimately before us, that death was produced by a ruptured blood vessel about the heart, and that such rupture was caused by the extraordinary physical and mental exertion which the deceased put forth to save his children and himself from injury. The physical strain and mental shock was more than he could bear. In this calculation of the facts, we have come easily to the conclusion that, as between these parties, physical and external causes effected the death. The misconduct of the horse, and, inseparably connected therewith, the conduct of the man on the occasion, in his effort to avoid the threatened catastrophe, brought death. The defendants, however, do not agree to this version of the facts. They contend that death was produced purely by fright, and not by the aid of any physical means whatever, and that the means through which death was produced must be considered as internal only. But if it is to be admitted that death was caused through fright, even then we are just as strongly convinced...