McGowan v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act
| Decision Date | 25 May 1966 |
| Citation | 153 Conn. 691,220 A.2d 284 |
| Parties | Marie McGOWAN v. ADMINISTRATOR, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT. |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Warren A. Luedecker and Arthur Levy, Jr., Bridgeport, for appellant (plaintiff).
Harry Silverstone, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Carl D. Eisenman, Asst. Atty. Gen., and, on the brief, Harold M. Mulvey, Atty. Gen., for appellee (defendant).
Before KING, C.J., and MURPHY, ALCORN, SHANNON and HOUSE, JJ.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court sustaining the decision of the unemployment compensation commissioner for the fourth congressional district which denied the plaintiff's claim for unemployment compensation benefits after January 3, 1965. The facts are undisputed. The plaintiff, for a long time previous to March 13, 1964, had been employed by Columbia Records Corporation, hereinafter called the company, at Bridgeport. On March 13, 1964, she received notice from the company that her employment was terminated. She received payment of thirteen weeks' severance pay and three weeks' vacation pay, which amounted to $1171, during the benefit year ending January 2, 1965. She has not been employed since she was laid off by the company.
The plaintiff filed a claim for unemployment compendation benefits on March 15, 1964, establishing a benefit year ending January 2, 1965. She collected for twenty-six weeks in that benefit year. On January 3, 1965, she again filed a claim for benefits, commencing a new benefit year ending January 1, 1966. The administrator determined that the $1171 received by the plaintiff as vacation pay and severance pay were not 'wages' within the meaning of § 31-236(8) General Statutes, 1 and he determined that she was ineligible to receive benefits inasmuch as she had not been paid wages since the commencement of the prior benefit year. The plaintiff contends that her vacation pay and severance pay were 'wages' for the purpose of satisfying the requirement of the statute and that her claim should not have been denied.
The question raised by this appeal, therefore, is whether the lower court erred in concluding that severance pay and vacation pay do not qualify as wages within the meaning of the statute. The plaintiff admits that she received no other pay as remuneration for employment during her benefit year from March 15, 1964, to January 2, 1965. The Unemployment Compensation Act (General Statutes, c. 567) defines 'wages' as 'all remuneration for employment.' General Statutes § 31-222(b). The term connotes all remuneration for any service performed in the course of an employer-employee relationship. Geremia v. Administrator, Unemployment Comp. Act, 146 Conn. 264, 270, 150 A.2d 203. When employment ceases, so do wages. Brannigan v. Administrator, Unemployment Comp. Act, 139 Conn. 572, 575, 95 A.2d 798. Vacation pay does not constitute 'wages'. Rather it is payment 'by way of compensation for loss of wages.' Conon v. Administrator, Unemployment Comp. Act, 142 Conn. 236, 245, 113 A.2d 354, 359; Kelly v. Administrator, Unemployment Comp. Act, 136 Conn. 482, 487, 72 A.2d 54.
Since, in the connotation of the statute, wages cease when employment does, severance pay cannot be considered wages. Brannigan v. Administrator, Unemployment Comp. Act, supra. Severance pay is 'a form of compensation for the termination of the employment relation, for reasons other than the displaced employees' misconduct, primarily to alleviate the consequent need for economic readjustment but...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Stevenson v. BRANCH BANKING & TR. CO.
...itself to the concept that "wages" include nonrecurrent benefits such as severance pay. Id. In McGowan v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 153 Conn. 691, 220 A.2d 284, 286 (1966), the Connecticut Supreme Court held that severance pay is not "wages" for purposes of determining w......
-
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Dubno, KIMBERLY-CLARK
...that, assuming he is subject to estoppel, the requisite elements have not been established in this case. Citing McGowan v. Administrator, 153 Conn. 691, 694, 220 A.2d 284 (1966), the commissioner argues that he is not subject to estoppel. Specifically, he maintains that "he cannot waive the......
-
Fulco v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp.
...for labor or services rendered, and does not include vacation pay, which is compensation for loss of wages. See McGowan v. Administrator, 153 Conn. 691, 693, 220 A.2d 284 (1966); Conon v. Administrator, 142 Conn. 236, 245, 113 A.2d 354 (1955); Kelly v. Administrator, 136 Conn. 482, 487, 72 ......
-
Metropolitan Distributors, Inc. v. Illinois Dept. of Labor
...contrary was erroneous and must be reversed. Metropolitan urges a contrary result, relying upon McGowan v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act (1966), 153 Conn. 691, 220 A.2d 284; and Department of Labor v. Green Giant Co. (Del.Super.Ct.1978), 394 A.2d 753, as authorities for the p......
-
Significant 2005 Employment Law Decisions
...for wage claims does not apply to the state. The statute of limitations for a wage claim is two years unless a willful vio- 48 153 Conn. 691, 228 2d 284 (1966) 49 ABC Office Equipment, Inc. v. Royal Consumer Business Products,721 F.Supp. 1557, 1559 (D. Conn. 1989) 50 Mangiofico, supra, n. 4......