McGowen v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Biloxi

• Decision Date: 17 June 2021
• Docket Number: No. 2020-CA-00418-SCT,2020-CA-00418-SCT
• Citation: 319 So.3d 1086
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: Robert MCGOWEN, v. ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BILOXI and Sacred Heart Catholic Church.

319 So.3d 1086

Robert MCGOWEN,

v.ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BILOXI and Sacred Heart Catholic Church.

No. 2020-CA-00418-SCT

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

June 17, 2021

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JOHN F. HAWKINS, Bay St. Louis

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: CHRISTIAN STRICKLAND, ROBERT T. SCHWARTZ, Biloxi, JORDAN R. MATHEWS

BEFORE KING, P.J., COLEMAN AND BEAM, JJ.

COLEMAN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. In September 2019, Robert McGowen filed a complaint in the Forrest County Circuit Court alleging that he had been sexually abused by a priest at Sacred Heart Catholic Church in 1984 and 1985 when McGowen was twelve to thirteen years old. According to McGowen, he repressed the memories until December 2018. Sacred Heart Catholic Church and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Biloxi answered the complaint and moved to dismiss based on the expiration of the statute of limitations in Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49. On April 17, 2020, the circuit court entered an order dismissing the complaint without prejudice. McGowen appeals.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. In December 2018, McGowen allegedly recalled that, in or around 1986, while attending class as Sacred Heart, Father John Scanlon had masturbated McGowen and instructed McGowen to masturbate him. In January 2019, McGowen began receiving therapy from Dr. Deborah Dawes to work through the trauma of the alleged abuse. Dawes determined that McGowen suffered from major depression and post-traumatic stress disorder with symptoms of excessive anxiety, intrusive memories, nightmares, difficulty sleeping, and suicidal ideation. Dawes opined that McGowen's reports of abuse were credible and that he had repressed his memories of the abuse.

¶3. On September 17, 2019, McGowen filed a complaint, naming the Estate of Father Scanlon, Sacred Heart Catholic Church, and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Biloxi as Defendants. McGowen claimed that when he was twelve to thirteen years old in 1984 or 1985, Scanlon physically, sexually, and emotionally abused him in the rectory of Sacred Heart. Sacred Heart and the Diocese answered the complaint and moved to dismiss under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12, arguing that McGowen's claims were barred by the statute of limitations in Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49.

¶4. On April 17, 2020, the circuit court entered an order dismissing the complaint. The circuit court found that McGowen's claims were governed by the general statute of limitations in Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49. McGowen appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶5. "A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a claim." Children's Med. Grp., P.A. v. Phillips , 940 So. 2d 931, 933 (¶ 5) (Miss. 2006) (citing Stuckey v. The Provident Bank , 912 So. 2d 859, 865 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2005) ). "[W]e review de novo the denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Id. (citing Webb v. DeSoto Cnty. , 843 So. 2d 682, 684 (¶ 6) (Miss. 2003) ). "In order to reverse, ‘it must be such that no set of facts would entitle the opposing party to relief.’ " Id. (quoting Ralph Walker, Inc. v. Gallagher , 926 So. 2d 890, 893 (¶ 4) (Miss. 2006) ). "The Court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and consider only whether any set of facts could support [McGowen's] action." City of Vicksburg v. Williams , 191 So. 3d 1242, 1244 (¶ 7) (Miss. 2016).

DISCUSSION

¶6. McGowen argues that the circuit court erred by failing to apply the discovery rule to his claims. Under Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49(2), "In actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury." Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2) (Rev. 2019). McGowen argues that since his memories were repressed until December 2018, he suffered a latent injury and timely filed his claim.

I. The circuit court erred by failing to apply the discovery rule.

¶7. In the case sub judice , the judge stated,

The case cited by the Church Defendants, Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson , 947 So. 2d 983 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) considered whether the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment applied in a priest sex abuse case, but not in the context of repressed memory or unsound mind tolling. Without guidance from the appellate courts, or specific language from the legislature, this Court is unwilling to create a new rule to toll the period of limitations for repressed memories.

¶8. The Court of Appeals in Doe held, "[t]he discovery rule does not apply in Doe's case. Our supreme court has held that where there is no latent injury, the discovery rule cannot apply." Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson , 947 So. 2d 983, 986 (¶ 6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (citing PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. v. Lowery , 909 So. 2d 47, 50 (¶ 10) (Miss. 2005) ). However, the facts in Doe and in the case sub judice differ substantially. In Doe , the alleged acts of abuse took place over the period of ten years, from around 1972 to around 1982. Id. at 985 (¶ 1). The abuse took place throughout Doe's time in high school and then resumed after Doe's separation from her husband in 1982. Id. The court stated,

the acts of abuse alleged by Doe are physical acts of which a person is generally aware when the event occurs. Given the nature of the physical acts Doe alleges she endured ... and her age at the time of the abuse, Doe was certainly aware of the abuse at the time of its occurrence.

Id. at 986 (¶ 7).

¶9. Additionally, Doe did not argue that she did not remember the events. Doe argued that her injury was a latent injury because "she did not psychologically comprehend that the priests’ acts were abuse, she did not connect the priests’ actions to her emotional problems, and she only recently began to psychologically comprehend that the priests’ acts were abusive and the cause of her injuries." Id. at (¶ 5). In the case sub judice , McGowen argues that his injury is a latent injury because he repressed the memories of abuse, and he did not remember that any abuse occurred until 2018. Additionally, instead of the abuse taking place over the course of ten years, the alleged abuse amounted to a single incident that occurred either in 1984 or 1985, when McGowen was twelve or thirteen years old. As stated correctly by the circuit court, the court in Doe did not discuss repressed-memory tolling. However, the circuit court did err by dismissing the case under Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49.

¶10. Again, Section 15-1-49 states that the "cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury." Miss. Code. Ann. § 15-1-49(2). The Court has stated, "Because there is no bright line rule, the specific facts of the case will determine whether the plaintiff knew or reasonabl[y] should have known that an injury existed." F & S Sand, Inc. v. Stringfellow , 265 So. 3d 170, 174 (¶ 7) (Miss. 2019) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Am. Optical Corp. v. Estate of Rankin , 227 So. 3d 1062, 1075 (¶ 53) (Miss. 2017) ). The Court also stated, "[O]ccasionally the question of whether the suit is barred by the statute of limitations is a question of fact for the jury; however, as with other putative fact questions, the question may be taken away from the jury if reasonable minds could not differ as to the conclusion." Id. at 175 (¶ 11) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stringer v. Trapp , 30 So. 3d 339, 342 (¶ 12) (Miss. 2010) ). McGowen's claims accrue "upon the discovery of [his] injury, not discovery of the injury and its cause ." Angle v. Koppers, Inc. , 42 So. 3d 1, 5 (¶ 9) (Miss. 2010). The Court need go no further than the language of Section 15-1-49 to resolve the instant appeal. The complaint alleges that the Plaintiff did not know of his injury until late 2018. As the Court must take all allegations of the complaint as true in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff's allegations suffice to invoke the discovery rule in answer to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

¶11. The Church claims that the case sub judice is an issue of first impression and that the Court should "look to other jurisdictions in determining the matter." Forrest Gen. Hosp. v. Upton , 240 So. 3d 410, 418 (¶ 32) (Miss. 2018) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Sheppard v. Miss. State Highway Patrol , 693 So. 2d 1326, 1329 (Miss. 1997) ). The Church argues that repressed-memory tolling has been rejected in Alabama and Texas, citing Travis v. Ziter , 681 So. 2d 1348, 1355 (Ala. 1996), and S. V. v. R. V. , 933 S.W.2d 1, 25 (Tex. 1996). McGowen argues that repressed-memory tolling is the majority rule, citing Doe v. Roe , 191 Ariz. 313, 955 P.2d 951, 953 (1998), Moriarty v. Garden Sanctuary Church of God , 341 S.C. 320, 534 S.E.2d 672, 674 (2000), and Johnson v. Johnson , 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1364 (N.D. Ill. 1988). The Church further argues that repressed memories are "a piece of scientific folklore," citing many journals and articles to support its claim. However, it is unnecessary to consider precedent from other jurisdictions or the scientific validity of repressed memories. The statute of limitations is silent with regard to repressed memories, but it is not silent about latent injuries. The question before the Court is whether McGowen alleged a latent injury. The discovery rule requires asking whether "the plaintiff knew or reasonabl[y] should have known that an injury existed." Stringfellow , 265 So. 3d at 173-174 (¶ 7) (alteration in original) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Am. Optical Corp. , 227 So. 3d at 1075 (¶ 53) ). "Whether the plaintiff knew about the injury has typically been reserved as a jury question." Lowery , 909 So. 2d at 50 (¶ 10) (citing Barnes v. Singing River Hosp. Sys. , 733 So. 2d 199 (Miss. 1999) ). Accordingly, whether McGowen knew or reasonably...