McGrath v. Piedmont Mut. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 April 1906
• Citation: 54 S.E. 218,74 S.C. 69
• Parties: McGRATH v. PIEDMONT MUT. INS. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

54 S.E. 218

74 S.C. 69

McGRATH v. PIEDMONT MUT. INS. CO.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

April 7, 1906

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Abbeville County; Klugh Judge,

Action by Sallie McGrath against the Piedmont Mutual Insurance Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Carlisle & Carlisle, for appellant. Wm. N. Graydon, for respondent.

JONES J.

The plaintiff brought this action on an alleged contract of fire insurance, and recovered judgment against defendant for $200.

1 The defendant first raises the question whether the circuit court for Abbeville county had jurisdiction to try this case. The summons was served upon one J. P. Smith at McCormick, in Abbeville county, as an agent of defendant company, but did not reach the principal office of defendant corporation in Spartanburg, S. C., until after the time for answering had expired. Judgment by default was taken against defendant and thereafter a motion was made before Special Judge McDonald for leave to answer on two grounds: (1) That the court in Abbeville county had no jurisdiction, as defendant corporation was a resident of Spartanburg county and did not maintain any office for transacting business in Abbeville county; (2) that defendant's neglect to answer was excusable. Judge McDonald sustained the second ground and opened the default and granted defendant leave to answer within 20 days; but, as to the first ground, Judge McDonald under authority of Glaize v. Railroad Co., 1 Strob. 70, and Boyd v. Railroad Co., 65 S.C. 326, 43 S.E 819, held that the court for Abbeville county had jurisdiction. The defendant answered to the merits, but, on the trial before Judge Klugh and a jury, and at the close of the testimony, again raised the question of the court's jurisdiction on a motion for nonsuit. Judge Klugh declined to grant the motion. Jurisdiction has two aspects: Jurisdiction of the person, and jurisdiction of the subject-matter. In so far as jurisdiction of the person is concerned, it is settled by numerous cases that a general appearance or answer to the merits is a waiver of such objection to jurisdiction. Garrett v. Herring Co., 69 S.C. 278, 48 S.E. 254. When, however, jurisdiction of the subject-matter is concerned, it is not waived by appearance and answer, but may be urged at any time. Ware v Henderson, 25 S.C. 387; Bell v. Fludd, 28 S.C. 314, 5 S.E. 810. The last-cited cases show that the present question relates to jurisdiction of the subject-matter, the power of the court for Abbeville county to hear the cause notwithstanding jurisdiction of the person was acquired by the service of process upon defendant's alleged agent in Abbeville county or by the answer to the merits. This action falls under section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1902, which provides: "In all other cases the action shall be tried in the county in which the defendant resides at the time of the commencement of the action," etc. The cases of Ware v. Henderson, and Bell v. Fludd, supra, show that this provision is imperative, and that a judgment rendered in the wrong county may be set aside as without jurisdiction.

The real question, then, is: Did the defendant reside in Abbeville county at the commencement of the action? The defendant is a domestic corporation chartered as a mutual protection association, under section 1912 et seq., 1 Code Laws 1902. The statute requires that the certificate of association (which upon compliance with requirements becomes its charter) shall state, among other things, the place which shall be known and regarded as its principal place of business and head office, and in defendant's charter Spartanburg, S. C., is designated as the principal place of business and head office. But the statute does not provide that the corporation shall be sued only in the county where its principal office is, but, on the contrary, provides that it "may sue and be sued and plead and be impleaded in all courts of law and equity." In the absence of a statute requiring suit in the county where the principal office of a corporation is located, a domestic corporation, with power to conduct its business throughout the state, may be sued in any county where it may be deemed a resident. The case of Cromwell's Ex'rs v. Insurance Co., 2 Rich. Law, 512, holds that a domestic corporation has its place of legal residence where its corporate business is done, and in that case the jurisdiction of the city court of Charleston was maintained because the defendant insurance company had an office and did business in the city of Charleston. The case of Glaize v. S.C. R. R. Co., 1 Strob. 70, holds that the legal residence of a corporation is not confined to the locality of its principal office of business, but extends to the territorial limits of the jurisdiction which granted its charter, which, for judicial purposes, defines its locality; that, if a local residence can be affirmed of it, such residence is obviously where it is actively present in the operation of its enterprise. In that case the jurisdiction of the court in Richland county, where the defendant had an office and did business, was maintained, although defendant's principal office was in Charleston. So, in Tobin v. Chester & Lenoir R. R. Co., 47 S.C. 387, 25 S.E. 283, 58 Am. St. Rep. 890, it was held that a suit brought against the defendant company in Barnwell county, where it had no office or roadbed and did no business, was properly transferred for trial to Chester county, where it had an office and agent and did business, as a county of its residence. In the case of Boyd v. Railroad Co., 65 S.C. 326, 43 S.E. 817, it was held that the court in Greenville county had jurisdiction, although defendant's line was not located in that county, and although...