McGregor v. Autozone, Inc., 98-6124.
Decision Date | 14 July 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 98-6124.,98-6124. |
Parties | Tom McGREGOR, as Trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Alicia Regenia Cox, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AUTOZONE, INC., Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Susan Shirock Depaola, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Anne Payne Fugett, Attorney, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, DC, for Secretary of Labor, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Amicus Curiae.
Sam Zurik, III, Robert B. Worley, Jr., The Kullman Firm, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant-Appellee.
Corrie Fischel, McGuiness & Williams, Washington, DC, for Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. Equal Emply. Advisory Council, Amicus Curiae.
Before TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, and GODBOLD and HILL, Senior Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Alicia Cox,1 a former supervisor in one of defendant AutoZone, Inc.'s stores, took 15 weeks off when she gave birth. When plaintiff returned to work she was demoted. She has brought suit and makes two claims in her original complaint: 1) failure to restore her to prior or equivalent position under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2614; and 2) retaliatory harassment for attempting to exercise her FMLA rights under 29 U.S.C. § 2615. The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff contends she was entitled to 13 weeks of employer-provided paid disability leave and then 12 weeks of unpaid FMLA leave because her employer failed to notify her—as required by 29 C.F.R. § 825.208— that the two leaves would run concurrently. Therefore, plaintiff contends she was entitled to be restored to her prior or equivalent position when she returned to work after a 15 week absence. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). The district court held plaintiff was not entitled to be restored to her prior position because the regulations requiring an employer to notify the employee that the leaves run concurrently are invalid.
Regulations are given "controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Chevron described a court's duty in reviewing regulations as a two-step process. First, the court is to determine if the intent of Congress is clear; if so, the court must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If Congress has not spoken directly to the precise question at issue, the court must determine whether the agency's answer to the question Congress left open "reflects a permissible construction of the statute." Jaramillo v. INS, 1 F.3d 1149, 1152 (11th Cir.1993).
FMLA provides "an eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12 month period ... (D) Because of a serious health condition." 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). The statute further provides "an eligible employee may elect, or an employer may require the employee, to substitute any of the accrued paid vacation leave, personal leave ... for any part of the 12-week period of FMLA leave...." 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2)(A); 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2)(B). The statute does not impose any specific requirements for the type of notification an employer must provide or when that notification must occur.
Some of the regulations promulgated under FMLA require employers to notify the employee that the absence is being counted as FMLA leave before the employer can count the leave against the 12 week entitlement. 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(a) (). 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(b) provides further detail as to the manner in which the notice must be given. If the employer fails to give prospective notice that an absence is being counted as FMLA leave, the leave taken does not count against an employee's 12 week entitlement and the employer would be required to give 12 weeks in addition to any other leave the employer provided. 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c); 29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a). However, 29 C.F.R. § 825.208 conflicts with another regulation that appears to create a presumption that paid disability leave for the birth of a child runs concurrently with unpaid FMLA-guaranteed leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.207(d)(1) () .
29 C.F.R. § 825.208 converts the statute's minimum of federally-mandated unpaid leave into an entitlement to an additional 12 weeks of leave unless the employer specifically and prospectively notifies the employee that she is using her FMLA leave. The statute provides for only 12 weeks of leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (); see also 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(1) (). The Act's legislative history also indicates FMLA establishes a baseline of 12 weeks of leave. S.Rep. No. 103-3, at 4 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6 ( ); S.Rep. No. 103-3, at 28 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 30 () (emphasis provided).
The statute does not suggest that the 12 week entitlement may be extended. Where Congress wanted explicit notice provisions with significant consequences, it provided for them. 29 U.S.C. § 2613 ( ); 29 U.S.C. § 2614 ( ).
The regulations not only add requirements and grant entitlements beyond those of the statute but they also are inconsistent with the stated purpose of the statute. One of the explicit purposes of the Act is to "balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families ... in a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of employers." 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(3); see also 29 U.S.C. § 2653 (). Where an employer such as defendant exceeds the baseline 12 weeks by providing not only more leave than FMLA but...
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