McKaig v. Kansas City
Decision Date | 09 March 1953 |
Docket Number | No. 43474,43474 |
Parties | McKAIG et al. v. KANSAS CITY et al. |
Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Robert M. Murray and Charles V. Garnett, Kansas City, for appellants.
David M. Proctor, City Counselor, Byron E. Mintonye, Asst. City Counselor, Kansas City, for respondents.
The appellants are engaged in the business of selling automobiles in Kansas City, Missouri. They filed this action in the circuit court of Jackson County to enjoin the respondents, Kansas City, its mayor, William E. Kemp, and its chief of police, Bernard Brannon, from enforcing the provisions of Ordinance Number 15794, enacted by the city council on August 22, 1952, for the reason that this ordinance is unconstitutional. This ordinance prohibits any dealer from keeping open his place of business for the purpose of selling or trading automobiles on Sunday and six named national holidays. After a hearing the trial court sustained respondents' motion to dismiss, dissolved the temporary restraining order that had been granted and denied appellants' application for a permanent injunction. From this decree appellants duly appealed to this court.
The ordinance in question reads:
The second section of this ordinance merely provides for the penalty to be imposed upon violation of the first section.
Respondents contend this ordinance is a valid exercise of its police power. The laws of this state that prohibit work on Sunday State v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company, 239 Mo. 196, loc. cit. 209, 143 S.W. 785, loc. cit. 786.
Appellants in their brief frankly admit that Kansas City, both under its charter and under its general police power, does have authority to provide for the general welfare of the inhabitants by proper ordinances relating to Sunday closing of places of business. But appellants do contend that the ordinance before us is void because it is a special law and, therefore, violates Article III, Section 40 of our state constitution. That section reads: 'The general assembly shall not pass any local or special law: * * * (30) where a general law can be made applicable, and whether a general law could have been made applicable is a judicial question to be judicially determined without regard to any legislative assertion on that subject.'
'We pointed out, in City of Springfield v. Smith, 322 Mo. 1129, 19 S.W.2d 1, 3, that there are only As also pointed out in that case 'the above constitutional inhibition applies to city ordinances as well as to state laws.'' Laclede Power & Light Co. v. City of St. Louis, 353 Mo. 67, 182 S.W.2d 70, loc. cit. 72.
Therefore, in determining whether a statute or an ordinance is a special or general law, except for the above-named states, authorities of other states are of little value.
In the case of City of Springfield v. Smith, supra, the city of Springfield had passed an ordinance which prohibited any person from keeping open any theatre, playhouse or any other place where theatrical performances, vaudeville shows or moving picture exhibitions were shown on Sunday.
In ruling that the ordinance was invalid, we said, 19 S.W.2d loc. cit. 5-6:
'The demands of the organic law are satisfied if all similarly situated are included and none are omitted whose relationship to the subject-matter cannot by reason be distinguished from that of those included.
'We are not here so much concerned with determining how many activities which threaten to disturb the subject-matter sought to be protected could or might be included in the one piece of legislation, but our problem of instant concern is whether some have been omitted from the ordinance now involved which it would be clearly unreasonable and arbitrary to omit. * * *
'The question at once arises, Why was there an omission from the ordinance of the keeping open and operation of such public amusement businesses as concerts, circuses, amusement parks, public halls, sparring exhibitions, wrestling exhibitions, and like public amusement businesses, which under its charter (section 7976, Rev.St. 1919) the city of Springfield also had the power to regulate?
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