McKinney v. Hoffner

Decision Date19 July 2016
Docket NumberNo. 15–1374,15–1374
Citation830 F.3d 363
PartiesJames McKinney, Petitioner–Appellee, v. Bonita J. Hoffner, Warden, Respondent–Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

ARGUED: Jerrold E. Schrotenboer, Jackson County Prosecutor's Office, Jackson, Michigan, for Appellant. Brett DeGroff, State Appellate Defender Office, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Jerrold E. Schrotenboer, Jackson County Prosecutor's Office, Jackson, Michigan, for Appellant. Brett DeGroff, Valerie R. Newman, State Appellate Defender Office, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellee.

Before: BATCHELDER, McKEAGUE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

McKEAGUE

, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which BATCHELDER, J., joined. STRANCH, J. (pp. 375–76), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

OPINION

McKEAGUE

, Circuit Judge.

James McKinney shot and killed his partially paralyzed roommate, James Harper. McKinney then fled in Harper's van, carrying Harper's wallet and in possession of the gun he used to kill Harper. After McKinney was arrested, he confessed to murdering Harper. McKinney successfully moved to suppress the confession before trial, but on an interlocutory appeal the Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that McKinney did not unequivocally request counsel. McKinney was convicted of first degree murder after his videotaped confession was admitted and played at trial. McKinney now seeks habeas corpus relief in federal court, arguing that the Michigan Supreme Court erred because McKinney unequivocally requested counsel and the police continued to interrogate him. The district court agreed and conditionally granted McKinney's habeas petition pending a new trial, but the district court failed to show the requisite deference afforded to state court decisions on habeas review. Because the Michigan Supreme Court's decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, we reverse the grant of habeas relief.

I

Factual Background. In 2007, James Harper, who was around 70 years old at the time, allowed James McKinney to move into his home in exchange for doing various chores around the house. Harper's caretaker, Marcia Wilkinson, also lived there. According to Wilkinson, McKinney and Harper would sometimes argue, and at one point McKinney voiced a desire to move out. On October 22, 2009, Wilkinson went to stay with her mother, leaving Harper and McKinney by themselves. After Wilkinson left, McKinney shot Harper in the face at pointblank range while Harper slept, killing him. McKinney fled in Harper's van, and police soon arrested him in Illinois following a traffic stop during which McKinney claimed to be Harper. The officers searched the van and discovered two handguns—including the one used to kill Harper—a handgun magazine, and Harper's wallet.

Detectives from the Hillsdale County Sheriff's Department came to Illinois to investigate Harper's death. On October 29, 2009, Detective Mark Hodshire interviewed McKinney prior to extradition to Michigan. Hodshire advised McKinney of his Miranda

rights and began questioning him. Soon after, the following exchange occurred:

Detective Hodshire: So, you know why I'm here to talk to you, right?
James McKinney: Yeah, yeah.
Hodshire: So, I'm here to get your side of the story of what happened and why. Okay. When we do investigations, we understand that things happen for certain reasons and some of those reasons we don't understand ... so that's why I wanted to talk with you today to get your side of the story of what happened.
McKinney: Well if you don't mind, I just assume wait until I get a public defender or whatever.1
Hodshire: Well that's fine, but like I said....
McKinney: We can talk over all the other circumstances.

R. 1–3, McKinney Interview Tr. at 6–7, Page ID 58–59. McKinney went on to confess to Harper's murder. He was then extradited and ultimately convicted in the Hillsdale County Circuit Court.

Procedural Background. McKinney was charged with three offenses: first-degree premeditated murder, unlawfully driving away an automobile, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The trial court granted McKinney's pre-trial motion to suppress his confession. The State filed an interlocutory appeal, and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. People v. McKinney , No. 296455, 2010 WL 4226761, at *2–3 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2010)

. But the Michigan Supreme Court issued a one-paragraph reversal in a 6–1 decision, concluding that McKinney's two statements were not an unequivocal request for an attorney. People v. McKinney , 488 Mich. 1054, 794 N.W.2d 614, 614–15 (2011).

The prosecution relied heavily on McKinney's confession at trial, playing it almost in full and mentioning it often in opening and closing arguments. The jury found McKinney guilty of all three charges, and the state trial court sentenced him to life in prison for the murder conviction and lesser terms for the other crimes. McKinney appealed on the ground that his confession was inadmissible, but the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment because the Michigan Supreme Court had settled the issue in its earlier order. People v. McKinney , No. 305093, 2012 WL 4039706, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2012)

. The Michigan Supreme Court denied McKinney's request for leave to appeal. People v. McKinney , 493 Mich. 940, 826 N.W.2d 729 (2013).

McKinney then filed a habeas petition in district court. He contended that the Michigan Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in ruling that he failed to unequivocally invoke his right to counsel. He also asserted that this error had a substantial effect in determining the jury's verdict. The district court agreed and granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

, ordering that the writ be granted unless the state retries McKinney within 90 days without the use of his confession. McKinney v. Hoffner , No. 2:13–CV–15284, 2015 WL 1219527 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 17, 2015). Respondent (the State) appeals that decision.

II

We review the district court's decision to grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus de novo . Harris v. Stovall , 212 F.3d 940, 942 (6th Cir. 2000)

. Habeas review of state court decisions is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As an initial matter, we must determine whether AEDPA even applies here.

The Michigan Supreme Court held, in a one-paragraph opinion, that McKinney's two statements were not an unequivocal request for counsel:

The defendant's statement that he would “just as soon wait” until he had an attorney before talking to the police [Statement 1], followed immediately by his statement that he was willing to discuss the “circumstances” [Statement 2], was not an unequivocal assertion of the right to counsel or a statement declaring an intention to remain silent.
People v. McKinney , 794 N.W.2d at 614–15

(internal citation omitted). However, the crux of this case is whether Detective Hodshire's comment “Well that's fine, but like I said” was interrogation. If Hodshire's statement was interrogation, then the Michigan Supreme Court improperly used McKinney's second statement in determining that he did not unequivocally request counsel. See

Smith v. Illinois , 469 U.S. 91, 100, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (holding that, after a suspect unambiguously requests counsel, the suspect's “responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request”). The Michigan Supreme Court's decision did not explicitly address whether Hodshire's comment was interrogation. However, the State asserts that the Michigan Supreme Court must have concluded it was not, because only then could the court have used Statement 1 and Statement 2 together to decide that McKinney did not unequivocally request counsel. We agree.

“When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 99, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011)

; see also

Johnson v. Williams , ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1096, 185 L.Ed.2d 105 (2013). Thus, AEDPA “does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been adjudicated on the merits.” Johnson , 133 S.Ct. at 1094

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The presumption also applies “when a state-court opinion addresses some but not all of a defendant's claims.” Id. (emphasis added). “This is so whether or not the state court reveals which of the elements in a multipart claim it found insufficient, for § 2254(d) applies when a ‘claim,’ not a component of one, has been adjudicated.” Harrington , 562 U.S. at 98, 131 S.Ct. 770.

Applying this legal presumption, we hold that the Michigan Supreme Court determined that Hodshire's statement was not interrogation. Under Smith

, the court could not consider McKinney's second statement if Hodshire's statement was interrogation. And interrogation was the key question throughout the state court proceedings. The state trial court granted Hodshire's motion to suppress after finding that Hodshire's statement was continued interrogation under Rhode Island v. Innis , 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), and that the police therefore violated Smith. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed and specifically addressed whether Hodshire's statement was interrogation, citing both Smith and Innis. See

People v. McKinney , 2010 WL 4226761, at *2–3. The State also asserted in its briefs that both parties cited the Smith rule to the Michigan Supreme Court, and noted at oral argument that the only argument made to the Michigan Supreme Court was whether Hodshire's statement was interrogation. With that record...

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