England v. Hart

• Decision Date: 17 August 2020
• Docket Number: No. 18-6039,18-6039
• Parties: Stevie L. ENGLAND, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Deedra HART, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

970 F.3d 698

Stevie L. ENGLAND, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.Deedra HART, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 18-6039

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: April 28, 2020

Decided and Filed: August 17, 2020

SILER, Circuit Judge.

Stevie L. England, a Kentucky prisoner serving a life sentence, appeals from a district court's judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We granted a certificate of appealability ("COA") on three issues raised by England. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). First, England claims that the trial court erroneously admitted his police confession given that he had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Second, he argues that the trial court's improper admission of hearsay statements from the deceased victim was erroneously deemed harmless error. Finally, England argues that the prosecution suppressed evidence in violation of Brady . Because the state court did not err in its interpretation or application of federal law, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of England's habeas petition.

I.

On July 10, 2000, Lisa Halvorson was found deceased in her driveway. It was later determined that she had been dead for approximately three days and that the cause of death was asphyxia

. Police immediately began investigating Halvorson's death as a homicide.

Early in the investigation, the focus was on two of Halvorson's romantic partners:

Tyrone McCary, her former boyfriend and father of her child, and Pat Halvorson, her former husband. While the investigation was ongoing, Karl Woodfork came forward after hearing of a $10,000 reward for testimony leading to a conviction. He alleged that McCary had paid him and England to murder Halvorson and to make it look like an accident. He claimed that McCary paid them $1,000 each as a down payment, with an understanding that they were to be paid an additional $10,000 each following the completion of the murder. Woodfork agreed to wear a wire, allowing the police to obtain a secretly recorded conversation between him and England. In this conversation, England complained about McCary's not having paid him the owed money and made various threats that he would cause physical harm to McCary if he was not paid.

Police subsequently brought England to the station for questioning and informed him that he had been recorded speaking with Woodfork. After the police accused him of participating in the murder plot, England responded: "Well, I mean you know, I guess you'll just have to go on and lock me up then and call my lawyer, cause I don't, I don't know what you're talking about." The interrogation continued, and England ultimately admitted that he was present at the murder scene with McCary, but claimed only to have punched Halvorson in the jaw once to "soften her up," which knocked her to the ground. England stated that he unsuccessfully attempted to talk McCary out of committing further violence. He also claimed that Halvorson was still alive when he and McCary departed the scene.

At trial, the prosecution's theory of the case was that England took part in a plan to make it appear that Halvorson was accidentally run over by her own truck while exiting her garage. "McCary and/or [England]: drove to [Halvorson's] house; knocked her to the ground in or near the garage; beat her severely; accelerated the truck backward out of the garage, causing [Halvorson's] face to be caught in the right bumper and spinning her into the wheel well; got on top of her and broke her windpipe, resulting in death by asphyxia

." The jury convicted England of murder and recommended a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

In 2005, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed England's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. The following year, England filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging twenty-six grounds for relief. In 2017, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal of the petition in its entirety, and in 2018 the district court adopted the magistrate's findings. On appeal, we granted a COA on three issues.

II.

This habeas petition is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) ("AEDPA"). It instructs that federal courts shall not grant a habeas petition filed by a state prisoner with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by a state court, absent applicability of either of two specific exceptions. The first exception is when a state court issues a judgment "that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) ; Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). The second exception applies when a state court decision "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts" in light of the record before it. § 2254(d)(2).

AEDPA's requirements reflect a " ‘presumption that state courts know and follow the law,’ " Woods v. Donald , 575 U.S. 312, 135 S. Ct. 1372, 1376, 191 L.Ed.2d 464 (2015) (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti , 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) ), and its "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings ... demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt," Cullen v. Pinholster , 563 U.S. 170, 181, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011) (quoting Visciotti , 537 U.S. at 24, 123 S.Ct. 357 ). In essence, under § 2254(d), federal habeas review is a safeguard against "extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 102-03, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ).

We review the district court's factual findings for clear error, and its legal conclusions de novo. Railey v. Webb , 540 F.3d 393, 397 (6th Cir.2008). The state court's factual findings enjoy a presumption of correctness, and will only be disturbed upon clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Id.

III.

A. Fifth Amendment Claim

England's first claim is that his police station confession should have been suppressed because he had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel prior to making the inculpatory statements. The Kentucky Supreme Court found that England's statement was not an unambiguous request for attorney, and that in any case, the admission of the police confession was harmless error in light of the other evidence the Commonwealth presented. Regardless of whether we believe the state court's determination to be correct, it was nevertheless grounded in a reasonable interpretation of clearly established Supreme Court law. As such, the Kentucky Supreme Court's determination must stand under AEDPA's deferential standard of review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) ; Cullen , 563 U.S. at 181, 131 S.Ct. 1388.

In Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court delineated certain safeguards that must be afforded to criminal suspects. These safeguards include the right to consult with an attorney before speaking to law enforcement officials and to have an attorney present during a custodial interrogation. Id. at 469-473, 86 S.Ct. 1602. These rights must be explained to a suspect before the questioning begins "to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time." Id. at 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602. In Edwards v. Arizona , the Supreme Court emphasized that "having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel," a suspect must not be "subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him." 451 U.S. 477,484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). Of particular relevance here, the Edwards rule is "designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights," Michigan v. Harvey , 494 U.S. 344, 350, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990), and to ensure that officers "will not take advantage of the mounting coercive pressures of ‘prolonged police custody.’ " Maryland v. Shatzer , 559 U.S. 98, 105, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010) (quoting Arizona v. Roberson , 486 U.S. 675, 676, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988) ).

In Smith v. Illinois , the Court noted that occasionally "an accused's asserted request for counsel may be ambiguous or equivocal." 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984). And in Davis v. United States. , 512 U.S. 452, 457, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), the Court addressed the question of how police should interpret such a statement. The suspect in Davis stated "[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer," and the Court found that such a remark was not an unambiguous request for counsel. Id. at 462, 114 S.Ct. 2350. The Court refused to adopt a rule that would require police to cease questioning just because "a suspect makes a statement that might be a request for an attorney." Id. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350. To do so would eviscerate the "clarity and ease of application" provided by the Edwards bright-line rule. Id. Recognizing the argument that this rule might lead to harsh results for suspects, the Davis Court explained that "the primary protection afforded suspects is the Miranda warnings themselves." Id. at 460, 114 S.Ct. 2350.

The inquiry for reviewing courts is whether the suspect has "articulate[d] his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney." Id. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350. The inquiry is objective. Franklin v. Bradshaw , 545 F.3d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 2008). The suspect must "make some affirmative ‘statement’ or ‘request’ whose ordinary meaning shows his desire to deal with the police through counsel." United States v. Suarez , 263 F.3d 468, 483 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); see also Edwards , 451 U.S. at 484, 101...