McLaughlin v. Royster

• Decision Date: 25 July 1972
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 5667-R.
• Citation: 346 F. Supp. 297
• Parties: John W. McLAUGHLIN v. M. L. ROYSTER, Superintendent of the Virginia State Farm.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

346 F. Supp. 297

John W. McLAUGHLIN v. M. L. ROYSTER, Superintendent of the Virginia State Farm.

Civ. A. No. 5667-R.

United States District Court, E. D. Virginia, Richmond Division.

July 25, 1972.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Francis M. Fenderson, Jr., Richmond, Va., for plaintiff.

Vann H. Lefcoe, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Virginia, Richmond, Va., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

MERHIGE, District Judge.

Petitioner, herein, who has for the past several years been one of the more prolific writ-writers, comes before the Court on his primary complaint of a conviction rendered by the Circuit Court of Roanoke County, Virginia, under date of November 14, 1962, wherein he was, upon a plea of guilty, found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Having concluded by memorandum filed January 13, 1971, copy of which is attached hereto as an appendix to this memorandum, that petitioner had fully exhausted his State remedies, the Court now addresses itself to the merits of petitioner's habeas corpus claim. The Court has considered the transcript of the State court hearing and has, in addition thereto, conducted a plenary hearing.

The primary issue before the Court centers around the plea of guilty entered by petitioner. The facts disclose as follows:

Petitioner was charged with the murder of his estranged wife. Shortly after his arrest, upon motion of the Commonwealth's Attorney, petitioner was admitted to Southwestern State Hospital, Marian, Virginia, where he remained for a period in excess of 130 days. The conclusion of the examining physicians at the State mental hospital was to the effect that McLaughlin was competent to stand trial. Indeed, there seems to be no doubt but that the purpose of the State's motion for his confinement at the mental hospital was to insure against any subsequent claim that McLaughlin was insane at the time of the alleged offense. At the very least, the conclusions of the physicians, while seemingly precluding any such effective defense, give rise to such a defense. At least one of the doctors found McLaughlin to be a potential suicide and a person suffering from acute alcoholism.

The facts adduced at the several hearings show that the plea of guilty was made solely upon the decision of the petitioner himself. McLaughlin, who had had several minor brushes with the law arising primarily from his marital difficulties, sought the assistance of an attorney who was well acquainted with McLaughlin by reason of his having represented him in those difficulties. Shortly after McLaughlin's arrest and prior to McLaughlin's being sent to the Southwestern mental hospital, the attorney, upon conferring with him at the Roanoke County Jail, advised McLaughlin that he would accept employment on receipt of a fee of Five Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollars. Subsequent to this meeting, McLaughlin by order of court was sent to the mental hospital. The then prospective attorney was not advised of these proceedings. Upon being returned from the hospital McLaughlin once again conferred with the attorney who, while not receiving the requested fee, agreed to, as he put it, stand by the petitioner.

In the interim, petitioner had addressed a letter to the judge of the county court requesting the appointment of counsel. The record does not disclose any action having been taken on that request. The evidence discloses, however, that the Commonwealth's Attorney and the trial judge were both under the impression that McLaughlin was represented by counsel. That representation however was, according to counsel's own testimony, a limited one. Indeed, counsel's position was that had he been employed, as he put it, he would have handled the matter differently. It was his position that his services were limited to negotiating to the extent that McLaughlin, who was in extreme fear of the death penalty, would receive a life sentence.

The Court finds that no investigation was made by the attorney, although there were avenues of investigation which were required. The attorney quite frankly stated that had he "been employed and paid to represent McLaughlin, he would have proceeded in the case differently. Not as he requested me to do. I would have proceeded differently with it. I would have interviewed more people, for instance." The practical result of McLaughlin being unable to raise the required fee was that he was represented in a first degree murder case by one who was marked as counsel of record but who considered his responsibility to be limited solely to a negotiation for a life sentence. Indeed he waived preliminary hearing and indictment and was tried on a warrant charging first degree murder.

The issue before the Court is whether McLaughlin, who the Court finds was literally paralyzed with fear of the death penalty, can be said to have acted voluntarily when he seized the better of two grim alternatives which the State extended to him.

The Court finds that his counsel of record in an effort to alleviate the concern expressed by McLaughlin, expressed to McLaughlin the fact that the State Judge had, prior to trial, agreed to concur in the recommendation of the Commonwealth's Attorney that upon a plea of guilty he would be sentenced to life imprisonment.

It appears to this Court that the primary foundation upon which rests the rule that a voluntary guilty plea is not subject to attack is that a defendant entering such a plea does so assisted and informed by adequate counsel. The constitutional requirement is not satisfied upon a perfunctory appearance by counsel who does nothing whatever before or during trial to advise a client or to protect his rights except to acquiesce with the client's wishes. Perfunctory or hand-holding representation is simply not consistent with the right to counsel. See Turner v. Maryland, 303 F.2d 507 (1962); Jones v. Cunningham, 297 F.2d 851 (1962). A client's professed desire to plead guilty is not the end of an attorney's responsibility. See Fields v. Peyton, 375 F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1967); Martin v. Commonwealth, 365 F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1966). See also, Ware v. Cox, 324 F.Supp. 568 (E.D.Va.1971). When a defendant convicts himself in open court the Constitution recognizes that the critical stage of adjudication has proceeded for the most part outside the courtroom. That process contemplates the pursuit by counsel of factual and legal theories in order to reach a conclusion as to whether a contest would best serve the attorney's client's interest. In short, effective representation when a guilty plea is contemplated to a great extent entails affirmative action on the part of counsel. The facts adduced before this Court demonstrate more than a mere possibility that investigation by counsel might well have unearthed favorable evidence. Such possibility, standing alone, is a sufficient showing of prejudice.¹

McLaughlin's counsel stated at the State post-conviction hearing that had he been aware of the facts which emerged there concerning his client's mental state he would have given consideration to a possible insanity defense. Indeed, the evidence discloses that there was a fairly substantial family history of mental instability not only as to McLaughlin himself, but as to his brother and other members of his family. It is, in this Court's opinion, immaterial that counsel was not court appointed, for retained counsel are subject to the same fundamental constitutional requirement of effectiveness. See Stern v. Turner, 370 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1966). It is not fatal to petitioner's claim that he may, indeed did, insist to his counsel that he wished only to plead guilty in exchange for a life sentence. The mere securing of the sought after bargain does not fulfill counsel's duty in such a case, for to so rule would be to reduce the role contemplated by the Constitution to that of a messenger, and to cast the responsibility for the fairness of the entire proceeding upon the individual defendant who the law recognizes is most in need of assistance.

The Supreme Court has recognized that even an intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. Indeed he frequently lacks both the skill and knowledge adequate to prepare a defense even though he may have a perfect one. "He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step of the proceedings against him." See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 64, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (June 12, 1972). If, as the United States Supreme Court has said, it be true of men of intelligence that they lack the ability to establish their innocence, it is even more a truism that the danger exists more profoundly for a person such as McLaughlin who was literally paralyzed with fear of the electric chair, and whose mental condition was so suspect that the State kept him under observation for more than four months. Coupled with McLaughlin's fear of the electric chair is the fact that he was told by his attorney friend that he would "stick by him purely because he wanted me to do it, and with the understanding of the sentence that he would receive and that there wouldn't be any trial." Indeed, the evidence discloses that McLaughlin's mental condition was such that even after he had received the life sentence and was transported to the State Penitentiary, the psychiatrist there who saw him some three days after his admittance described him as confused and delusional. The psychiatrist, Dr. Brick, testified that McLaughlin even then thought he was going to be electrocuted, "and we tried to convince him that he was not going to be electrocuted, and that he was in the hospital, but we couldn't convince him." The evidence discloses that subsequently McLaughlin was returned for an additional 120 days to the State mental hospital.

We deal here not with a situation where a defendant is precluded from complaint by virtue of his refusal to assist his lawyer in...