McLaughlin v. State Bd. of Education

• Decision Date: 27 September 1999
• Docket Number: No. A084730.,A084730.
• Citation: 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 295,75 Cal.App.4th 196
• Parties: Jack McLAUGHLIN et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

89 Cal.Rptr.2d 295

75 Cal.App.4th 196

Jack McLAUGHLIN et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. A084730.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2.

September 27, 1999.

Review Denied December 21, 1999.

Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, Charlton G. Holland, III Chief Assistant Attorney General, Frank S. Furtek, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Paul Reynaga, Deputy Attorney General, Angela M. Botelho, Deputy Attorney General, for Defendants and Appellants.

Ruiz & Sperow, LLP, Celia M. Ruiz, San Francisco, Laura Schulkind, Jennifer M. Joaquin, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Joseph Jaramillo, for amicus curiae Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Robert Pongetti, Peter Simshauser, Los Angeles, and Paul M. Eckles and Mark T. Gallagher, Sacramento, for amicus curiae One Nation/One California, Las Familias del Pueblo, Gloria Matta Tuchman and Travell Louie, for Defendants and Appellants.

Olson, Hegel, Leidigh, Waters & Fishburn, N. Eugene Hill, George Waters and Abhas Hajela, Sacramento, for amicus curiae Education Legal Alliance of the California School Board Association, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Sharon L. Browne and Mark T. Gallagher, Sacramento, for amicus curiae Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy and Center for Equal Opportunity, for Defendants and Appellants.

Barbosa Garcia LLP, Jonathan B. Stone, Los Angeles, and Benjamin D. Nieberg, for amicus curiae Sweetwater Union High School District, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

RUVOLO, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

In the primary election held in June 1998, the voters of California passed Proposition 227, the "English Language in Public Schools" initiative statute, creating a new chapter in California's Education Code¹ (the Chapter). The enacted statutory scheme requires children in California's public schools who are of "Limited English Proficiency" (LEP) to be taught only in English, subject to the right of the parents of each affected child to seek a waiver from the requirement of English-only instruction. We are asked to decide solely² whether the Chapter is subject to the waiver provision of Education Code³ section 33050, which generally allows local school districts to apply to the State Board of Education (State Board) for waivers from program requirements of the Education Code not enumerated in that section.⁴ The parties and amici⁵ agree that Proposition 227 is silent as to section 33050.

We conclude that the plain meaning of Proposition 227 was to guarantee that LEP students would receive educational instruction in the English language, and that English immersion programs would be provided to facilitate their transition into English-only classes. Proposition 227 also vests parents of LEP students with the sole right to seek a waiver from the Chapter's provision requiring English-only instruction for their own children. The Chapter's language permits no other means by which the program requirements may be waived, and in fact, allows for civil action against school districts, educators, and administrators who fail or refuse to provide English-only instruction (§ 320). To the extent there is any ambiguity as to the intent of Proposition 227, the legislative history clarifies that the Chapter was designed to wrest from school boards and administrators decisionmaking authority for selecting between LEP educational options, and repose this power exclusively in parents of LEP students. Thus, the Chapter is in direct and irreconcilable conflict with section 33050. In the face of such a "`positive repugnancy'" (Blanchette v. Connecticut General Insurance Corp. (1974) 419 U.S. 102, 134, 95 S.Ct. 335, 42 L.Ed.2d 320), under well-recognized principles of statutory construction, the enactment of the Chapter amends by implication section 33050 to except these core provisions of the Chapter from the general waiver process.

Therefore, respondent school boards cannot apply for waivers from the requirements of the entire Chapter under the general waiver authority of section 33050, and the writ of mandamus granted by the trial court is hereby reversed.⁶ The case is remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate its writ, and instead to issue an order denying the petition.

II. FACTUAL HISTORY

A. Pre-Proposition 227 History of LEP Education in California

It has been repeated innumerable times that "the Legislature's power over the public school system [i]s `exclusive, plenary, absolute, entire, and comprehensive, subject only to constitutional constraints.' [Citations.]" (State Bd. of Education v. Honig (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 720, 754, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 727.) Of course, the voters, acting through the initiative process in enacting statutory law, fulfill the same function and wield the same ultimate legal authority in matters of education, as does the Legislature. (Cal. Const., art. II, §§ 1 and 8; Rossi v. Brown (1995) 9 Cal.4th 688, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 363, 889 P.2d 557.)

The administration of California's public school system by the executive branch has been, and is, vested in four primary public entities; three at the state level, and one at the local level. At the local level, the functioning of districtwide (unified school districts) or countywide schools is administered by school boards elected by their respective voter constituencies (school districts). (See generally Cal Const., art. IX, § 3.2; §§ 35100 et seq.; Elec.Code, § 1302.2.) At the state level, administrative authority is primarily vested in the State Board, which is comprised of 10 persons appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the California State Senate. (§§ 33000, 33030-33031.) The chief executive of the public school system is the elected state Superintendent of Public Instruction (Superintendent) (except where a vacancy exists allowing the Governor to make an interim appointment under § 33100). (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 2.) The executive branch of state government also includes within its departmental ranks the State Department of Education (Department) (§ 33300).

The State Board exercises direct administrative control over local school districts by adopting rules and regulations consistent with state law for the governance of local schools and school districts. (§ 33031.) How the state entities and offices are allocated or share responsibilities for public instruction in our state would entail a complex discourse that is mercifully unnecessary to our analysis. (But see generally State Bd. of Education v. Honig, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th 720, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 727.) It is enough to quote the holding of the Third District in State Bd. of Education v. Honig, which summarized the hierarchical relationship of the three state entities as follows: "We conclude the Legislature intended the Board to establish goals affecting public education in California, principles to guide the operations of the Department, and approaches for achieving the stated goals. Its role as `the governing ... body of the department' (§ 33301, subd. (a)) refers to governance in the broad sense by virtue of its policymaking authority. The Legislature did not intend the Board to involve itself in `micro-management.' Thus, its responsibility to `direct and control' the Department (Black's Law Diet., [5th ed.1979], p. 625, col. 2) necessarily involves general program and budget oversight as a means of monitoring the effectiveness of its policies. [¶] By contrast, the Legislature intended the Superintendent to be involved in `the practical management and direction of the executive department.' (Black's Law Diet., supra, p. 41.) In this role, the Superintendent is responsible for day-to-day execution of Board policies, supervision of staff, and more detailed aspects of program and budget oversight." (Id. at p. 766, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 727.)

Relevant recent legal history of public instruction of LEP students in California begins with enactment of the Bilingual-Bicultural Education Act of 1976 (§§ 52160 et seq.) (the Act). The Act set forth a comprehensive legislative structure designed to provide funding and to train bilingual teachers sufficient to meet the growing student population of LEP students (§ 52165) through bilingual instruction in public schools (§ 52161). The avowed primary goal of the programs was to increase fluency in the English language for LEP students. Secondarily, the "programs shall also provide positive reinforcement of the self-image of participating students, promote crosscultural understanding, and provide equal opportunity for academic achievement, ..." (§ 52161.)

The Act remained in effect until its sunset by subsequent law on June 30, 1987. (§ 62000.2, subd. (e).) While still in effect, certain central provisions of the Act were enumerated as exceptions to the waiver provision of section 33050. (§ 33050, subd. (a)(8).) Even after the Act's provisions became inoperative, bilingual education continued to be the norm in California public schools by virtue of the extension of funding for such programs provided in section 62002: "If the Legislature does not enact legislation to continue a program listed in Sections 62000.1 to 62000.5, inclusive, the funding of that program shall continue for the general purposes of that program as specified in the provisions relating to the establishment and operation of the program.... The funds shall be used for the intended purposes of the program, but all relevant statutes and regulations adopted thereto regarding the use of the funds shall not be operative, except as specified in Section 62002.5."

Bilingual education continued through extended funding under section 62002 until Proposition 227 was passed. Inexplicably, although the operative sections of the Act lapsed with the sunset of the law in 1987, school districts continued to request waivers from the State Board under section 33050 seeking to...