McLaughlin v. State, 30725
| Decision Date | 06 April 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 30725,30725 |
| Citation | 236 Ga. 577,224 S.E.2d 412 |
| Parties | Michael Charles McLAUGHLIN v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
John Kirby, Atlanta, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Donald J. Stein, Asst. Atty. Gen., Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., John W. Dunsmore, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.
Michael McLaughlin pled not guilty by reason of insanity to an indictment for armed robbery in three counts. He was tried, found guilty on two counts, and received concurrent sentences of fifteen years. He appeals.
The evidence at trial showed that a young man clad in a flowered shirt, jeans, and lavender sunglasses entered a bakery on June 16, 1975, where the manager was alone at the time. While the manager was changing his $20 bill for a twenty-five cent purchase, he gestured with a gun in his hand and said, 'Stand back, this is a robbery, and let me have the money.' He took the money (about $300) out of the cash drawer and left.
Two days later, on June 18, 1975, the man came into the store again. Again the manager was alone in the bakery. 'He immediately drew the gun on me when he stepped in the doorway, and I guess I must have a had a look of utter shock on my face at seeing this man again . . . and he laughed and said, 'I see you recognize me. " He again took the money out of the cash register and left on foot.
Again two days later, on June 20, 1975, the man robbed the bakery according to the testimony of one of the customers who was in the store at the time. The manager present during the two prior robberies was not there on June 20.
The witnesses identified the defendant as the robber at a lineup held the week after the robberies and also in court.
The defense presented a psychologist who testified that the defendant was addicted to drugs, that at the time of the robberies he was intoxicated with drugs, and that although he had the mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong during the commission of the crimes, the distinction had no meaning for him.
The state called a psychiatrist in rebuttal, the count of the indictment for the robbery on June 20 was withdrawn, and the jury found the defendant guilty of the remaining two counts.
1. The defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict in view of his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The defense psychologist testified that although the defendant's ability to determine the difference between right and wrong was lessened by his taking of drugs just prior to the robberies, he probably had the mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong. The evidence was sufficient to support the verdict of guilty. Hulsey v. State, 233 Ga. 261(1), 210 S.E.2d 797 (1974); Searcy v. State, 233 Ga. 165, 210 S.E.2d 701 (1974).
2. In the course of qualifying the defense psychologist defense counsel was not permitted to ask the witness if defense counsel or anyone else had tried to influence the formation of the expert's opinion. The trial judge sustained the State's objection to this question as cross examination of one's own witness. Defense counsel made no tender of proof at trial but contends on appeal that the defense had the right to show that the witness had not been influenced in reaching his opinion as to the defendant's sanity. The State did not contend that the witness had been influenced. We find no reversible error.
3. The defendant raises as error two rulings of the trial judge overruling his objections to the manner in which the State examined its expert witness.
Earlier in the trial a police officer had testified that the defendant had been located by tracing an auto tag number, obtained at the time of the third robbery, to the owner of the vehicle and then to the defendant. The officer's testimony was allowed by the court as an exception to the hearsay rule to explain the officer's conduct. Code Ann. § 38-302.
The prosecutor sought to use the defendant's obtaining of this vehicle as part of a hypothetical question to the state psychiatrist to show the defendant's...
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Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison
...not involuntary and is no defense to a criminal act); McEver v. State, 258 Ga. 768, 373 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1988) ; McLaughlin v. State, 236 Ga. 577, 224 S.E.2d 412, 414 (1976). Additionally, "[v]oluntary intoxication shall not be an excuse for any criminal act or omission." Ga.Code Ann. § 16–......
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Mitchell v. State
...in this case was Mitchell's chronic drug abuse, which, like chronic alcoholism, is not involuntary under the law. McLaughlin v. State, 236 Ga. 577(4), 224 S.E.2d 412 (1976). Concerning voluntary intoxication, the trial court did charge the jury in accordance with OCGA § 16-3-4(c) that volun......
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Blankenship v. State, 36970
...271 S.E.2d 471 (1980), and that the charge was more favorable to the defendant than required, Code Ann. § 26-704; McLaughlin v. State, 236 Ga. 577, 224 S.E.2d 412 (1976), we find no Sandstrom violation in the first sentence of the jury's instructions under attack. The trial judge charged th......
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