McLaughlin v. Travelers Commercial Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 12 August 2019
• Docket Number: No. 78534-6-I,78534-6-I
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: Todd MCLAUGHLIN, a Washington resident, Appellant, v. TRAVELERS COMMERCIAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Respondent.

9 Wash.App.2d 675

446 P.3d 654

Todd MCLAUGHLIN, a Washington resident, Appellant,

v.TRAVELERS COMMERCIAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Respondent.

No. 78534-6-I

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

FILED: August 12, 2019

Robert Craig Levin, Washington Bike Law, 705 2nd Ave. Ste. 1000, Seattle, WA, 98104-1758, Philip Albert Talmadge, Aaron Paul Orheim, Talmadge/Fitzpatrick/Tribe, 2775 Harbor Ave. Sw, Third Floor Ste. C, Seattle, WA, 98126-2138, for Appellant.

Thomas Lether, Eric Jay Neal, Jenna Renee Mark, Lether & Associates, PLLC, 1848 Westlake Ave. N Ste. 100, Seattle, WA, 98109-8801, Julia Norwood, Ogden Murphy Wallace, 901 5th Ave. Ste. 3500, Seattle, WA, 98164-2059, for Respondent.

Ian S. Birk, Keller Rohrback, LLP, 1201 3rd Ave. Ste. 3200, Seattle, WA, 98101-3052, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of United Policy Holders.

PUBLISHED OPINION

Smith, J. ¶1 Todd McLaughlin appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his lawsuit against his insurer, Travelers Commercial Insurance Company. McLaughlin was injured after he struck an open car door while riding his bicycle. McLaughlin’s personal injury protection (PIP) policy covers injuries to a "pedestrian" but does not define that term. Because we must give an undefined term in an insurance policy its plain, ordinary, and common meaning and because the dictionary definition of "pedestrian" excludes bicyclists, we hold that McLaughlin was not a pedestrian at the time of his injury and therefore not entitled to PIP benefits. Additionally, we reject McLaughlin’s contention that a definition of "pedestrian" in Washington’s Insurance Code, Title 48 RCW, requires that a bicyclist is a pedestrian under his policy. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS

¶2 On July 31, 2017, McLaughlin was injured while riding his bicycle on Westlake Avenue in Seattle. Daniel Moore, who was parked on the street, did not see McLaughlin approach and opened his driver’s side door, striking McLaughlin.

¶3 At the time of the accident, McLaughlin was covered by a California Personal Auto policy from Travelers. The policy provided PIP benefits of up to $5,000 in medical expenses sustained by an "insured." The term "insured" was defined in relevant part as "a pedestrian when struck by" a motor vehicle. The term "pedestrian" was not defined.

¶4 McLaughlin sought coverage for his medical expenses under the policy. Travelers denied coverage, finding that McLaughlin was not a pedestrian because he was riding his bicycle at the time of the accident. McLaughlin sued Travelers for breach of contract and other related theories based on its denial of coverage. Both McLaughlin and Travelers moved for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim. The trial court concluded that the ordinary and common meaning of the term "pedestrian" does not include a bicyclist. It therefore granted Travelers’s motion for summary judgment and denied McLaughlin’s motion for summary judgment. McLaughlin appeals.

ANALYSIS

¶5 McLaughlin argues that because the ordinary meaning of "pedestrian" includes a bicyclist, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Travelers. We disagree.

¶6 " ‘This court reviews summary judgment determinations de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court.’ " Kut Suen Lui v. Essex Ins. Co., 185 Wash.2d 703, 709-10, 375 P.3d 596 (2016) (quoting Durland v. San Juan County, 182 Wash.2d 55, 69, 340 P.3d 191 (2014) ). " ‘Summary judgment is proper where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ " Kut Suen Lui, 185 Wash.2d at 710, 375 P.3d 596 (quoting Durland, 182 Wash.2d at 69, 340 P.3d 191 ). "Courts interpret language in an insurance policy as a matter of law," and this court reviews those interpretations de novo. Kut Suen Lui, 185 Wash.2d at 710, 375 P.3d 596. As the insured, McLaughlin bears the burden to prove that he was entitled to coverage under the policy. E-Z Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 106 Wash.2d 901, 906, 726 P.2d 439 (1986).

¶7 Courts construe insurance policies as contracts. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 142 Wash.2d 654, 665, 15 P.3d 115 (2000). When the court interprets an insurance policy, it considers the insurance policy as a whole, giving the policy " ‘a fair, reasonable, and sensible construction as would be given to the contract by the average person purchasing insurance.’ " Quadrant Corp. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 154 Wash.2d 165, 171, 110 P.3d 733 (2005) (quoting Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wash.2d at 666, 15 P.3d 115 ). "Undefined terms in an insurance contract must be given their ‘plain, ordinary, and popular’ meaning." Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 113 Wash.2d 869, 877, 784 P.2d 507 (1990) (quoting Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash. v. Miller, 87 Wash.2d 70, 73, 549 P.2d 9 (1976) ). "To determine the ordinary meaning of an undefined term, our courts look to standard English language dictionaries." Boeing, 113 Wash.2d at 877, 784 P.2d 507.

¶8 Here, McLaughlin’s policy covers "reasonable expenses incurred for necessary medical and funeral services because of ‘bodily injury’: 1. Caused by an accident; and 2. Sustained by an ‘insured.’ " The policy defines an "insured" as:

1. You or any "resident relative":

a. While "occupying"; or

b. As a pedestrian when struck by;

a motor vehicle designed for use mainly on public roads or a trailer of any type.

¶9 The term "pedestrian" is not defined in the policy. Therefore, we look to the dictionary definition of "pedestrian" to determine its plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines "pedestrian" as "a person who travels on foot: WALKER : as a : one who walks for pleasure, sport, or exercise : HIKER ... b : one walking as distinguished from one travelling by car or cycle." WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1664 (2002).

¶10 The plain, ordinary meaning of "pedestrian," as defined by the dictionary, defeats McLaughlin’s argument. Based on this definition, a pedestrian is distinct from a bicyclist, who travels by cycle. Therefore, the trial court did not err in concluding that McLaughlin was not an insured under the policy and that Travelers was entitled to summary judgment.

¶11 Both McLaughlin and Travelers agree that there is no conflict of law when the dictionary definition of "pedestrian" is used. But McLaughlin argues that the definition of "pedestrian" in RCW 48.22.005(11), which is part of Washington’s Insurance Code, is automatically incorporated into the policy and includes a bicyclist. In its amicus curiae brief, United Policyholders also asserts that RCW 48.22.005(11) applies here. But none of the authority cited by McLaughlin mandates that the plain meaning of an undefined term in an insurance policy be displaced if there is a definition of the same term in an insurance statute. Rather, they stand for the general proposition that insurance policies cannot violate applicable statutes. See Ringstad v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 182 Wash. 550, 553-55, 47 P.2d 1045 (1935) (merely holding that a life insurance policy could not discriminate against insureds who borrow against their policies because an insurance statute prohibited such discrimination); Mission Ins. Co. v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 37 Wash. App. 695, 699, 683 P.2d 215 (1984) (similarly holding that reformation of a policy after an injury was improper in part because a statute fixed the insurer’s liability under the policy at the time the injury occurred). Nevertheless, even if RCW 48.22.005(11) is incorporated into the policy, we disagree with McLaughlin’s narrow reading of that statute and hold that McLaughlin has not met his burden to show that a bicyclist is a pedestrian, even under RCW 48.22.005(11).

¶12 "The purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine the legislature's intent and to apply it." Segura v. Cabrera, 184 Wash.2d 587, 591, 362 P.3d 1278 (2015). "When possible, we derive the legislature’s intent solely from the statute’s plain language, considering the text of the provision at issue, the context of the statute, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole." Segura, 184 Wash.2d at 591, 362 P.3d 1278.

¶13 RCW 48.22.005(11) states that " ‘[p]edestrian’ means a natural person not occupying a motor vehicle as defined in RCW 46.04.320 ." (Emphasis added.) Title 46 RCW not only includes a definition of "motor vehicle," it also includes definitions for the terms "pedestrian" and "vehicle." See RCW 46.04.400 ("Pedestrian" is defined as "any person who is afoot or who is using a wheelchair, a power wheelchair, or a means of conveyance propelled by human power other than a bicycle."), .670 ("Vehicle" is defined as "every device capable of being moved upon a public highway and in, upon, or by which any persons or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public highway, including bicycles."). Under those related definitions, the legislature expressly determined that a bicyclist was not a pedestrian, but a vehicle. The definition of "pedestrian" in RCW 48.22.005(11) specifically refers the reader to Title 46 RCW. Therefore, we attempt to harmonize the definition of "pedestrian" in that statute with the definition of "pedestrian" found in RCW 46.04.400. Because RCW 48.22.005(11) does not explicitly refer to bicyclists, the statutes can be harmonized by excluding bicyclists from that definition of "pedestrian," in accordance with RCW 46.04.400.

¶14 McLaughlin argues that we must narrowly read RCW 48.22.005(11) to incorporate only the definition of "motor vehicle" from chapter 46.04 RCW. But doing so would violate the maxims of statutory construction that require us to determine the legislature’s intent in part by reading a statute within the context of its related provisions and the statutory scheme as a whole. See Segura, 184 Wash.2d at 591, 362 P.3d 1278. Therefore, we do not read RCW 48.22.005(11) narrowly.

¶15 Citing a non-binding Maryland case, Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, ...