Segura v. Cabrera

Decision Date29 October 2015
Docket NumberNo. 90088–4.,90088–4.
Citation184 Wash.2d 587,362 P.3d 1278
Parties Jose SEGURA and Tabetha Gonzalez, Petitioners, v. Rogaciano and Raquel CABRERA, Respondents.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Scott Kinkley, Northwest Justice Project, Spokane, WA, for Petitioners.

Rogaciano Cabrera, Raquel Cabrera, (Appearing Pro Se), Pasco, WA, for Respondents.

George M. Ahrend, Ahrend Law Firm PLLC, Ephrata, WA, Bryan Harnetiaux, WA State Ass'n for Justice Foundation, Spokane, WA, amicus counsel for Washington State Association for Justice Foundation.

Philip Albert Talmadge, Talmadge/Fitzpatrick, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Rental Housing Association of Washington.

MADSEN, C.J.

¶ 1 RCW 59.18.085 of the Residential Landlord–Tenant Act of 1973 (RLTA), which is intended to provide relocation assistance to tenants, does not allow recovery for emotional distress. The statute's plain language and its stated purpose compel this result. The trial court and the Court of Appeals were correct in so determining. We affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2 Rogaciano and Raquel Cabrera bought a house in Pasco, Washington, in 2007. In 2011, they obtained a license from the city to rent the house as a single residential unit. Contrary to the license, the Cabreras rented the upstairs and the basement as separate apartments.

¶ 3 On July 3, 2011, the Cabreras leased the basement to Jose Segura and Tabetha Gonzalez (collectively Segura) for a year's term. Segura paid $600 for the first month's rent, $600 for a rental security deposit, and $150 as a deposit for electric utility service. Five days later, the city of Pasco Code Enforcement Office inspected the property and found that the Cabreras had converted the single family dwelling into a duplex without a permit and that the basement unit was uninhabitable. Accordingly, the city ordered Segura to vacate the premises within 20 days.

¶ 4 Segura sought compensation from the Cabreras. On July 14, Segura gave the Cabreras a written demand for refund of prepaid deposits and rent and for monetary relocation assistance, as provided by RCW 59.18.085(3). The Cabreras did not respond to the letter. Mr. Cabrera later stated in a deposition that he ignored it because an attorney told him "there was no problem."1 Clerk's Papers (CP) at 115–16.

¶ 5 On July 19, the Cabreras gave Segura a notice to vacate by August 7, 2011. Segura claimed that after sending the demand letter but before this move-out deadline, Mr. Cabrera entered the unit without notice, changed the locks, removed some of Segura's personal property, and tried to have Segura's car towed from the property.

¶ 6 Segura sued the Cabreras on July 26 for damages under the RLTA. The Cabreras filed an answer, alleging, as the only affirmative defense, that "[d]efendant had no knowledge it was illegal." CP at 199.

¶ 7 On June 22, 2012, Segura moved for summary judgment, seeking $1,200.00 for the first month's prepaid rent and the security deposit, $150.00 for the utility deposit, $2,000.00 in relocation assistance, $200.00 in gas expenses related to moving into a new home, $1,000.00 in emotional distress damages,2 and $5,209.55 in attorney fees and costs.

¶ 8 The trial court granted Segura's motion for summary judgment but rejected the request for emotional distress damages, concluding they were not recoverable under RCW 59.18.085(3). The court denied Segura's motion for reconsideration, reasoning, "The relationship of the parties arises from a contract to lease real property. The misconduct on the part of the landlord was intentional but it is not an intentional tort. The damages are limited to those identified in the statute RCW 59.18.085(3)." CP at 12.

¶ 9 The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of emotional distress damages in a published, split decision. Segura v. Cabrera, 179 Wash.App. 630, 319 P.3d 98, review granted, 181 Wash.2d 1006, 332 P.3d 985 (2014). Relying on this court's opinion in White River Estates, the majority in the Court of Appeals held that emotional distress damages were not recoverable because a landlord could violate RCW 59.18.085(3)(a) 591 " ‘by conduct not amounting to an intentional tort.’ " Id. at 637, 319 P.3d 98 (quoting White River Estates v. Hiltbruner, 134 Wash.2d 761, 769, 953 P.2d 796 (1998) ). The Court of Appeals also reasoned that the language of RCW 59.18.085(3)(e)"implies out of pocket or financial damages incurred by relocation.... This interpretation better suits the statute's purpose, which suggests the ‘actual damages' provided in RCW 59.18.085(3)(e) are limited to reasonable moving expenses." Id.

¶ 10 This court granted Segura's petition for review.

ANALYSIS

¶ 11 Statutory interpretation resolves whether the RLTA allows displaced tenants to recover emotional distress damages. See White River Estates, 134 Wash.2d at 765, 953 P.2d 796. The purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine the legislature's intent and to apply it. State v. Evans, 177 Wash.2d 186, 192, 298 P.3d 724 (2013). When possible, we derive the legislature's intent solely from the statute's plain language, considering the text of the provision at issue, the context of the statute, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Id.

¶ 12 "Whether emotional distress damages are available following a statutory violation will depend on the language of the particular statute at issue." Hiltbruner, 134 Wash.2d at 765, 953 P.2d 796. Reading RCW 59.18.085's provisions together reveals that the statute's purpose is to provide assistance to relocate displaced tenants, make the landlord responsible for such assistance, authorize the city to step in as needed to facilitate such relocation, and provide a means for the city to seek reimbursement from the landlord where the city has stepped in to provide such assistance.

¶ 13 Here, RCW 59.18.085 provides that a landlord shall not rent a unit that does not meet applicable codes. RCW 59.18.085(1). If the landlord knowingly does so, the tenant shall recover the greater of three months' rent or treble the actual damages sustained as a result of the violation. RCW 59.18.085(2). If the appropriate government agency requires that the tenant vacate the premises, the tenant shall also recover any prepaid deposit and rent. Id. Additionally, the tenant may be entitled to relocation assistance as follows:

If a governmental agency responsible for the enforcement of a building, housing, or other appropriate code has notified the landlord that a dwelling will be condemned or will be unlawful to occupy due to the existence of conditions that violate applicable codes, statutes, ordinances, or regulations, a landlord, who knew or should have known of the existence of these conditions, shall be required to pay relocation assistance to the displaced tenants.

RCW 59.18.085(3)(a). The statute sets the amount of relocation assistance ($2,000 or three times the monthly rent, whichever is greater), notes other damages the tenant is entitled to from the landlord, specifies how payment to the tenant is to be made, sets a time frame for such payments, and authorizes the governmental entity to step in and advance the relocation assistance to the displaced tenant if the landlord fails to meet the statutory time schedule for such payments.3 The statute also provides a time limit in which the landlord must reimburse the city for any relocation assistance advancements that the city has paid the tenant; civil penalties and interest for the landlord's noncompliance with the stated time limits; and attorney fees and costs to the city if it must pursue legal action against the landlord to receive such reimbursements, penalties, and interest. See RCW 59.18.085(3)(f)(h).

¶ 14 Notably, subsection (3)(e) sets the parameters of the damages available to a tenant under the statute.

Displaced tenants shall be entitled to recover any relocation assistance, prepaid deposits, and prepaid rent required by (b) of this subsection. In addition, displaced tenants shall be entitled to recover any actual damages sustained by them as a result of the condemnation, eviction, or displacement that exceed the amount of relocation assistance that is payable. In any action brought by displaced tenants to recover any payments or damages required or authorized by this subsection (3)(e) or (c) of this subsection that are not paid by the landlord or advanced by the city, town, county, or municipal corporation, the displaced tenants shall also be entitled to recover their costs of suit or arbitration and reasonable attorneys' fees.

RCW 59.18.085(3)(e) (emphasis added). In giving effect to the legislature's intent, we look to the statute's plain and ordinary meaning, reading the enactment as a whole, harmonizing its provisions by reading them in context with related provisions. Quadrant Corp. v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hr'gs Bd., 154 Wash.2d 224, 239–40, 110 P.3d 1132 (2005). Reading the provisions of the statute together, the plain language provides that the tenant is entitled to receive the relocation assistance amounts as calculated in subsection (3)(b) but may also seek, via legal action against the landlord, the tenant's actual costs of relocation that exceed the relocation assistance amount as calculated in subsection (3)(b). The statute provides relocation assistance; it simply does not address or encompass emotional distress damages.

¶ 15 Further, if there were any doubt as to the statute's purpose, the legislature expressly spelled it out. The statute's stated purpose is twofold: First, "to establish a process by which displaced tenants would receive funds for relocation from landlords who fail to provide safe and sanitary housing after due notice of building code or health code violations." LAWS OF 2005, ch. 364, § 1 (emphasis added). And second, "to provide enforcement mechanisms to cities, towns, counties, or municipal corporations including the ability to advance relocation funds to tenants who are displaced as a result of a landlord's failure to remedy building code or health code...

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