McLaughlin v. Zoning Board of Review for Town of Tiverton
| Decision Date | 25 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | NC-2011-0535 |
| Parties | WILLIAM C. MCLAUGHLIN, Plaintiff, v. ZONING BOARD OF REVIEW for the TOWN OF TIVERTON, DAVID COLLINS, SUSAN KRUMHOLTZ, LISE J. GESCHEIDT, Chairperson, JOHN R. JACKSON, Vice-Chairperson, RICHARD D. TAYLOR, in their capacities as members of the Zoning Board of Review of the Town of Tiverton, Defendants. |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
Newport County Superior Court
For Plaintiff: Daniel Calabro, Jr., Esq.; Thomas Connolly, Esq.
For Defendant: Peter Frederick Skwirz, Esq.; Gina A. DiCenso Esq.
DECISION
This matter came before the Court on May 25, 2016, when Plaintiff William C. McLaughlin (McLaughlin or Plaintiff) filed a Motion to Vacate this Court's April 7, 2014 Order requiring him to remove a garage from his property, and all subsequent orders derived therefrom, pursuant to Super. R Civ. P. 60(b). Plaintiff argues that the Court was without jurisdiction and, therefore, the judgment was void. For the reasoning set forth herein, the Plaintiff's Motion is denied.
McLaughlin owned property located at 1640 Fish Road in Tiverton, Rhode Island (the Property). In 2007, he applied for a building permit to build a forty foot by sixty foot garage on the Property. Subsequently, a permit was issued and the garage was constructed. However- responding to complaints from neighbors-in 2009, the Tiverton Building Official inspected the Property and found that the placement of the garage was in violation of both the front and side yard setback requirements of the Tiverton Zoning Ordinance. See Tiverton Zoning Ordinance, art. V, § 1; art. VI §§ 1, 3.
Thereafter, in 2010, Plaintiff filed an application for a variance from the Tiverton Zoning Board of Review, listing himself as the applicant and owner of the offending structure. Following some continuances, a hearing on the application took place on September 7, 2011, and the application was denied the following month. Then, on October 26, 2011, Plaintiff appealed the Tiverton Zoning Board of Review's decision to this Court, and roughly two years later, judgment was entered in favor of the Town.[1] McLaughlin filed a notice of appeal that was denied and dismissed by the Supreme Court on January 14, 2014.
On March 11, 2014, the Town filed a motion with the Court requesting that Plaintiff remove the garage within ninety days-having lost his application for relief from the Zoning Ordinance. That motion was granted on April 7, 2014 by Order of this Court. Defendant never appeared at the hearing on the motion, nor did he file an objection. Nonetheless, McLaughlin filed a motion to reconsider the Court's April 7 2014 Order, which was heard by the Court and denied in part on May 9, 2014. When the Court asked McLaughlin what he was seeking, he responded that "I'd be happy if you just started the clock over [on the enforcement and imposition of the fine], ninety days [from] today." Indeed, the Court did modify its April 7, 2014 order to the extent that it allowed McLaughlin ninety days to remove the garage, effective May 9, 2014, and the imposition of a two hundred dollar a day fine for each day the garage remained in place beyond the ninety day period. Thereafter, on July 22, 2014, McLaughlin filed for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court which was denied on June 12, 2015.
On November 14, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to hold Plaintiff in contempt of the Court's earlier order for noncompliance. After a continuance, the Town's motion was granted, and, on August 5, 2015, the Court entered an Order fining McLaughlin $69, 300 for failure to comply with the Court's earlier Order. On October 16, 2015, Defendants filed a motion with the Court seeking permission to remove the garage as McLaughlin had still failed to do so. On November 18, 2015, this Court entered an Order giving McLaughlin ninety days to remove the structure on his own; following that time, the Town could remove the structure without any further order of the Court. Following the expiration of those final ninety days, the Town did indeed elect to have the structure removed on March 28, 2016.
On May 26, 2016, McLaughlin filed a Motion to Vacate pursuant to Rule 60(b). In essence, McLaughlin argued that this Court never had subject matter jurisdiction to order injunctive relief against him and, as such, the Court must now vacate the previous judgment. The Town objected arguing that the Plaintiff's instant motion is either: 1) barred by res judicata; 2) untimely; or 3) simply without merit. The Court heard argument from both parties on June 6, 2016, and indicated that it would issue a written decision on the matter. Decision is herein rendered in favor of the Town for the reasoning set forth in further detail below.
"[A] motion to vacate a judgment is left to the sound discretion of the [trial] justice." Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174, 187 (R.I. 2008) (citing Greenfield Hill Invs., L.L.C. v. Miller, 934 A.2d 223, 224 (R.I. 2007)); see Brown v. Amaral, 460 A.2d 7, 11 (R.I. 1983) (); see also Chase v. Almardon Mills, Inc., 102 R.I. 579, 580, 232 A.2d 390, 391 (1967) (). However, "judgments, once entered, are not to be disturbed without substantial reason." Chase, 102 R.I. at 581, 232 A.2d at 391-92.
Under Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b), Rule 60(b)(6) vests this Court with its power to vacate a decision when appropriate to effectuate justice. See Brown, 460 A.2d at 11; Bendix Corp. v. Norberg, 122 R.I. 155, 158, 404 A.2d 505, 506 (1979). However, Rule 60(b)(4) grants the Court the power to vacate a void judgment. Labossiere v. Berstein, 810 A.2d 210, 215 (R.I. 2002). "[R]elief is available under Rule 60(b)(4) only when the court entering the judgment lacked jurisdiction, or the court's actions amounted to 'a plain usurpation of power constituting a violation of due process.'" Id. (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lombardi, 773 A.2d 864, 869 (R.I. 2001)).
Further, a motion to vacate "shall be made within a reasonable time, " and in some instances, must be made within one year of the judgment. Super R. Civ. P. 60(b); see Waldeck v. Domenic Lombardi Realty, Inc., 425 A.2d 81, 83 (R.I. 1981) () (citing Murphy v. Bocchio, 114 R.I. 679, 685, 338 A.2d 519, 523-24 (1975)). A trial justice may vacate a decision, at his or her discretion, to accomplish justice in the eyes of the court. See Super. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6); Brown, 460 A.2d at 11. But, the burden is on the moving party to show the motion to vacate is justified by legally sufficient grounds. McBurney v. Roszkowski, 875 A.2d 428, 439 (R.I. 2005); Iddings v. McBurney, 657 A.2d 550, 553 (R.I. 1995).
In his memorandum, McLaughlin advanced several arguments regarding the instant motion.[2] Essentially, he maintains that the Court was without jurisdiction to enter the original order granting injunctive relief following the denial of his zoning appeal thereby resulting in a void judgment. He goes on to argue that-because the judgment was void-the Court must now vacate its previous order and corresponding judgment. The Town has objected on various grounds, each of which is addressed in seriatim below.
Initially the Town asks the Court to deny McLaughlin's motion because he already filed a motion to vacate the April 7, 2014 Order. The Town argues that because McLaughlin failed to raise the jurisdictional issue in that motion, he is now precluded from raising it in his second motion to vacate. In response, McLaughlin argues that the previous motion was not a motion to vacate but rather, a motion for reconsideration.
Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that "[a]lthough our rules of procedure do not provide for motions to reconsider, such motions may be treated as motions for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure." Vaillancourt v. Motta, 986 A.2d 985, 988 (R.I. 2009) (citing Tonetti Enterprises, LLC v. Mendon Road Leasing Corp., 943 A.2d 1063, 1068 (R.I. 2008)). Furthermore, "[r]es judicata, or claim preclusion, 'bars the relitigation of all issues that were tried or might have been tried in an earlier action.'" Reynolds v. First NLC Fin. Servs., LLC, 81 A.3d 1111, 1115 (R.I. 2014) (quoting Huntley v. State, 63 A.3d 526, 531 (R.I. 2013)). "'[T]he doctrine precludes the relitigation of all the issues that were tried or might have been tried in the original suit, ' as long as there is '(1) identity of parties, (2) identity of issues, and (3) finality of judgment in an earlier action.'" Id. (quoting E.W. Audet & Sons, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. of Newark, New Jersey, 635 A.2d 1181, 1186 (R.I. 1994)); see also Colvin v. Goldenberg, 101 R.I. 338, 341, 223 A.2d 350, 351 (1966) ().
Plaintiff states that both parties agreed that the original motion he filed was a motion for reconsideration and not a motion to vacate. However, this argument is unavailing to McLaughlin. As previously noted, our Supreme Court has stated that a motion to reconsider is synonymous with a motion to vacate under Rule 60(b). Vail...
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