McLean Independent School Dist. v. Andrews, 6986

• Decision Date: 14 March 1960
• Docket Number: No. 6986,6986
• Parties: McLEAN INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants, v. Clyde H. ANDREWS et al., Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 886

333 S.W.2d 886

McLEAN INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants, v. Clyde H. ANDREWS et al., Appellees.

No. 6986.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Amarillo.

March 14, 1960.

Simpson, Adkins, Fullingim & Hankins, Amarillo, for appellants.

Douglass, Thompson & Douglass, Pampa, for appellees.

CHAPMAN, Justice.

This is an appeal by The McLean Independent School District from a judgment permanently enjoining them from expelling or suspending Marsha Andrews, a senior student in the high school, for past or future violations of a regulation promulgated by the Board of Trustees of said school, reading as follows:

'Motion by McCarty seconded by Suderman that children driving automobiles to school shall park same in parking lot when they arrive at school and not move same until 3:45 P.M. unless by special permission; motion carried unanimously.'

Suit was brought by Clyde H. Andrews, individually and as next friend in behalf of his daughter, Marsha Andrews. The trial court found in its judgment that Marsha Andrews violated the quoted rule but that such regulation was void because such Board did not have the power or authority to promulgate such regulation.

Appeal is predicated upon two points; first, that the trial court erred in holding the trustees were without authority to promulgate the regulation in question and in holding the same void; and secondly, the error of the court in overruling appellant's plea to the jurisdiction because the appellees did not exhaust their rights of appeal through administrative procedures before resorting to the courts for relief.

If appellants are correct on their jurisdictional question it would obviate further writing, so we shall dispose of their second point first. If we read their brief correctly they admit in the very beginning thereof that the trial court had only questions of law before it. After giving a background of the case they say by brief:

'Consequently, the only question involved in this suit is whether or not The Board of Trustees of The McLean Independent School District had the authority to pass the regulation in question.'

We have read the record carefully and we have been unable to find any controverted fact issue in the case. Our Fifth Circuit Court in Bruce v. Stilwell, 206 F.2d 554, 557, has said:

'The rule is well-established in Texas that in all matters pertaining to the administration of school laws involving pure questions of law as contradistinguished from questions of fact immediate resort to the courts is proper. Mission Independent School District v. Diserens, 144 Tex. 107, 188 S.W.2d 568, 161 A.L.R. 877; Wilson v. Abilene Independent School District, Tex.Civ.App., 190 S.W.2d 406; State ex rel. Nevills v. Sanderson, Tex.Civ.App., 88 S.W.2d 1069.'

In the first case cited by Justice Borah in the quote just made (Mission Independent School District v. Diserens, supra) the Supreme Court of Texas put at rest any question that may have existed as to whether it is necessary to go through administrative procedures before resorting to the courts where there are no controverted fact issues involved in matters pertaining to the administration of school laws. Justice Simpson, writing for the court in the Mission Independent School District case said:

'There was left for decision only a pure question of law and obviously, immediate resort to the courts was proper in such a situation. No circumstances have been suggested, nor any do we perceive, which bring this controversy within that class of cases where resort to school authorities for administrative relief is required before application may be made to the courts. Warren v. Sanger Independent School District, 116 Tex. 183, 288 S.W. 159; Moseley v. City of Dallas, Tex.Com.App., 17 S.W.2d 36; Palmer Publishing Co. v. Smith, 130 Tex. 346, 109 S.W.2d 158; and see generally, 37 Tex.Jur., p. 918 et seq. We conclude that this suit in no sense intruded upon or interfered with the administration of the affairs of the Department of Education but to the contrary is calculated to aid in its orderly functioning.' [144 Tex. 107, 188 S.W.2d 570.]

Accordingly, we hold the trial court was correct in overruling appellant's plea to the jurisdiction. However, we cannot agree with the court that the board of trustees was without authority to promulgate the rule in question.

Article 2780, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Civ.St. having to do with the authority of Independent School District Trustees provides in part, as follows:

'Said trustees shall adopt such rules, regulations and by-laws as they may deem proper; and the public free schools of such independent district shall be under their control; and they shall have the exclusive power to manage and govern said schools, * * *.'

The courts of Texas have consistently upheld the actions of school authorities in promulgating rules to insure proper conduct and decorum of the students designed for the good of the schools as a whole where such rules have not shown a clear abuse of power and discretion or a violation of law. So let us look at the facts.

The uncontroverted testimony given in this case by the President of the McLean Board of Trustees shows that before the rule in question was passed 50 to 60 automobiles driven to school by the children would be driven away at the noon hour. The record shows the high school, its grounds and parking areas, and the grade school and playgrounds were all located in the same immediate vicinity, the grade school and playground thereof being just north of the high school and its grounds; that small children would be there at the time the cars were leaving; that before passing the regulation 'it got to be quite a traffic problem, a hazard and our sole thought in passing this rule was for the protection of 350 or 60 children that we have in school. We didn't pick out any one person, we weren't trying to make a hardship case on anybody. Our only thought was for the benefit of our children in the McLean schools. That is the reason we passed the rule. Anybody I think that could be there at the time these 50 or 60 cars were trying to leave that parking lot and go to lunch could see the problem we had.'

A former trustee of the school who lived four blocks west thereof testified his little girl, who was in the third grade at the time and who rode her bicycle to and from school, was forced off the street into the gutter and injured by school children driving cars three abreast down the street between his house and the school, and within less than a block of the school grounds. He testified they drove the cars so fast away from school he advised his wife not to drive during the noon hour and they just didn't do it if it could be avoided. He further testified he had seen as many as three cars of school boys and girls parked on a country road half a mile west of town at the noon hour and had seen them on numerous occasions out there before the rule in question was passed. He testified he had not seen them there any since the rule was passed and that it had been considerably quieter after the order was invoked.

The high school principal testified he talked to Marsha on several occasions and warned her that she would have to be suspended if she did not comply with the rule in question. The testimony shows the following conversation between them: '* * * there is no reason in the world why you shouldn't drive it in the parking lot.' She said, 'I don't think my daddy wants me to do that.'

The Superintendent of Schools testified:

'The traffic of the students leaving the school after...