Mcleod v. Chase

• Decision Date: 17 April 1928
• Citation: 116 So. 858,95 Fla. 736
• Parties: McLEOD v. CHASE, Sheriff.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

116 So. 858

95 Fla. 736

McLEOD v. CHASE, Sheriff.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

April 17, 1928

Error to Circuit Court, Dade County; H. F. Atkinson, Judge.

Proceeding by G. A. McLeod, as relator, for habeas corpus to be directed to Henry R. Chase, as Sheriff of Dade County. Judgment remanding the relator to custody, and he brings error.

Relator discharged.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings goes to legality of alleged detention. The inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings goes to the legality of the alleged detention of the prisoner.

Person may be discharged on habeas corpus from confinement, under state of facts constituting no offense. A person held in confinement under a state of facts which constitutes no offense under the law is held unlawfully and may be discharged from such confinement on writ of habeas corpus.

Petitioner for habeas corpus unlawfully imprisoned, released on bond pending proceedings in error after judgment remanding him to custody, should be discharged where no offense is shown. Where a person, held in unlawful imprisonment under a state of facts which constitutes no criminal offense, takes a writ of error to a judgment in habeas corpus proceedings remanding him to the custody of the officer by whom he is held, and pending the proceedings in error is released on bond, the writ should not be dismissed, but the petitioner should be discharged where the facts alleged and shown to exist constitute no criminal offense.

COUNSEL

Loftin, Stokes & Calkins, of Miami, for plaintiff in error.

Fred H Davis, Atty. Gen., and Roy Campbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

OPINION

ELLIS C.J.

McLeod the plaintiff in error, was arrested upon a warrant charging him with the crime of embezzlement. He was committed to await the action of the criminal court of record and was required to enter into an appearance bond in the sum of $15,000. He obtained a writ of habeas corpus from the circuit court of Dade county and moved for his discharge on the sheriff's return. The writ was issued on November 16, 1927, and the sheriff's return was made the same day. He produced the body of McLeod and the original commitment of him as issued by the magistrate. The writ of commitment is regular in all respects and recited that from an examination held by him it appeared that there was just reason to believe that McLeod was guilty of the offense charged.

On the 26th of November McLeod's attorneys caused to be filed what is termed 'McLeod's reply to the sheriff's return,' denying that he was guilty of the offense charged, and denying that there was any evidence before the committing magistrate to show that a crime had been committed or that there was good cause for believing that he was guilty.

On December 8th the honorable circuit judge reviewing the evidence held that McLeod should have been discharged by the committing magistrate as the evidence was insufficient upon which to hold the petitioner, McLeod, upon the charge preferred against him. The learned judge, however, declined to order McLeod's discharge because he said the Supreme Court, in the case of White v. Penton, 92 Fla. 837, 110 So. 533, held that the use of the writ of habeas corpus to test the sufficiency of the evidence upon which a charge may have been based was not sanctioned by the court. The petitioner was remanded to the custody of the sheriff, but was ordered to be released upon his own recognizance in the sum of $15,000.

On the 10th day of December the sheriff caused to be filed in the clerk's office another return in which it was stated that the petitioner had made the bond for $15,000 before Hon. H. F. Atkinson, judge of the circuit court, on the 16th day of November. Judge Atkinson's order was that, while he would not discharge the relator, he would be relieved from the necessity of finding sureties upon his bail.

So it appears from these proceedings that upon the evidence adduced the honorable circuit judge deemed the petitioner to be innocent of the crimes charged, that the facts in evidence constituted no offense, and that he should have been discharged by the committing magistrate. We agree with the learned judge in that conclusion.

The difference between McLeod and the Prosecutor Jos. T. Kingsley grew out of a contract for the sale of lands located in Liberty and Franklin counties in which a sum of money as a 'binder' had been placed in a bank in Miami for McLeod, to be paid over to him, or the corporation of which he was president, at such time as he should produce a warranty deed for the lands conveying a marketable title to 80 per cent. of them.

It seems that the money was transmitted by the bank to McLeod's corporation through a bank in Tampa and the sum was disbursed for the use and benefit of McLeod's company. Afterwards it was discovered that title could not be perfected to a requisite amount of acreage and the negotiations failed. The depositor of the money demanded return of it by McLeod, with which request he failed to comply.

It also appears that, although McLeod is technically not discharged, he is in fact not restrained of his liberty and is under his own recognizance. In this state of the case, it appears to us that the question is purely a moot one. The relator is not deprived of his liberty, and the evidence, being reviewed by a court of competent jurisdiction, is found to constitute no offense of the kind charged.

The writ of habeas corpus was designed as a speedy method affording a judicial inquiry into the cause of an alleged unlawful actual deprivation of personal liberty. See Porter v. Porter, 60 Fla. 407, 53 So. 546, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 867, note.

An inquiry in such proceedings goes to the legality of the alleged detention of the prisoner. Crooms v. Schad, 51 Fla. 168, 40 So. 497.

Since a conviction under a void statute is void and a person held under a judgment would be discharged, see Ex parte Knight, 52 Fla. 144, 41 So. 786, 120 Am. St. Rep. 191; Harper v. Galloway, 58 Fla. 255, 51 So. 226, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 794, note, 19 Ann. Cas. 235, a person held in unlawful confinement under a state of facts which constitutes no offense under the law will be discharged on writ of habeas corpus. The case of White v. Penton, supra, does not apply.

The relator should be discharged because nothing may be accomplished by a dismissal of the writ of error.

WHITFIELD, TERRELL, BROWN, and BUFORD, JJ., concur.

CONCURRING

WHITFIELD J.

Within their authority, officers may enforce the law that is applicable to the facts of the case, and to act without supporting appropriate facts would be to enforce the individual will, not the law.

The writ of habeas corpus has been used in this state to release a person held under a commitment issued on a preliminary hearing before a county judge acting as a committing magistrate, where the evidence wholly failed to sustain the charge on which the commitment was made. See Ex parte Brandau, 26 Fla. 142, 7 So. 528. See, also, Ex parte Eagan, 18 Fla. 194; Ex parte Harfourd, 16 Fla. 283; 29 C.J. 63.

The writ of habeas corpus is more far reaching in such classes of cases for the reasons that committing magistrates are courts of inferior and limited jurisdiction and that no appeal or writ of error lies from their commitment. See Bronk v State, 43 Fla. 461, text 471, 31 So. 248, 99 Am. St. Rep. 119. In State v. Vasquez, 49 Fla. 126, 38 So. 830, the petitioner was held upon an information filed in the Criminal Court of Record. In White v. Penton, Sheriff, 92 Fla. 837, 110 So. 533, the sufficiency...