McMichael v. Chester Housing Authority

• Decision Date: 08 April 1971
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 70-589.
• Citation: 325 F. Supp. 147
• Parties: June McMICHAEL v. CHESTER HOUSING AUTHORITY and Howard J. Gallagher, individually and as Executive Director and William R. Hall, individually and as Manager of McCaffrey Village Project.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

325 F. Supp. 147

June McMICHAEL v. CHESTER HOUSING AUTHORITY and Howard J. Gallagher, individually and as Executive Director and William R. Hall, individually and as Manager of McCaffrey Village Project.

Civ. A. No. 70-589.

United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

April 8, 1971.

Richard S. Packel, Chester, Pa., for plaintiff.

Francis G. Pileggi, Chester, Pa., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

FULLAM, District Judge.

In March 1969 plaintiff entered into a lease with the Chester Housing Authority for the rental of a unit at the McCaffrey Village Project, Chester, Pennsylvania. Chester Housing Authority is a housing authority established under the Pennsylvania Housing Authorities Law, 35 Pa.Stat.Ann. § 1541 et seq. to construct, own and operate federally assisted low-rent housing pursuant to 42 U.S. C. § 1401 et seq. The lease provides for a monthly term with automatic renewal for successive terms. The Authority can terminate the lease at the expiration of any monthly term by giving the tenant thirty days notice of its intention to do so. If the lease is so terminated, and the tenant does not deliver up possession of the premises, the Authority can, according to the lease, bring an amicable action of ejectment and confess judgment against the tenant in any competent court for recovery of the premises.

Soon after plaintiff moved into McCaffrey Village, complaints began to be made by tenants in neighboring units to Mr. Hall, the manager of McCaffrey Village, relating to noise emanating from plaintiff's unit. A case worker in tenant relations employed by the Chester Housing Authority, a Mrs. McFadden, conducted an investigation of the complaints and kept a file relating to the investigation. Mr. Hall and Mrs. McFadden on several occasions met with plaintiff and told her of the complaints, advising her that excessive noise would have to be stopped or her lease might be terminated. Plaintiff repeatedly denied that she made excessive noise. On January 13, 1970, another such meeting was held. Mr. Hall also wrote plaintiff on that date informing her that complaints concerning noise were still being received, and that the next letter would be a termination notice. At that meeting he also informed her that her housekeeping was below standard. On or about January 21, 1970, Mr. Hall, Mrs. McFadden, and another social worker met with plaintiff, repeated the same complaints and the names of the complaining tenants. Plaintiff again denied the charges, but Mr. Hall informed her that she would be evicted. Mr. Hall had informed plaintiff several hours before this meeting that he would be around to see her. Plaintiff received a written notice of termination, dated January 21, 1970, several days later.

On February 24, 1970, a meeting was held, attended by plaintiff and several of her neighbors. Mrs. McFadden, a member of the Board of Commissioners of the Chester Housing Authority, and its director of tenant relations also attended. Mr. Hall was present for a brief part of the meeting. Plaintiff had been told of this meeting several days in advance by Mrs. McFadden, and was told it might help straighten out the problems that seemed to exist. At the meeting, the neighbors voiced their complaints. No new notice of termination was sent to plaintiff after this meeting. On February 27, 1970, it appearing that eviction of plaintiff was imminent, this Court temporarily restrained defendants from evicting her, which restraining order was later enlarged into a preliminary injunction.

In Count I of the complaint, plaintiff contends that the procedures surrounding the termination of plaintiff's lease did not comport with the provisions of the HUD circular to public housing authorities dated February 7, 1967 and made mandatory by the Supreme Court in Thorpe v. Housing Authority of City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 89 S.Ct. 518, 21 L.Ed.2d 474 (1969). In Count II she contends that she has been, or is threatened with being, deprived of her rights without due process of law. Defendants have contended that this Court should not pass on the issues raised but should abstain and remit plaintiff to remedies in the state courts. Plaintiff has requested a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.

Although the complaint primarily asserts a deprivation of property rights, since the housing of a person who is not in a position to obtain alternate living quarters is threatened, this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 to assess the constitutional adequacy of the procedures involved. Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2nd Cir. 1970). And since the question of the adequacy of the procedures in constitutional terms is at issue, the adequacy of the procedures under the HUD circular is a pendent issue and may also be considered.

The Court of Appeals for the Second and Fourth Circuits have recently held that the Constitution requires that the same type of hearing be afforded tenants in public housing projects prior to their eviction as that required by the Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) before welfare benefits are terminated. Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970) cert. denied 39 U.S.L.W. 3421 (1970); Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, supra. These decisions can be read to mean that such a hearing must be held before the notice of termination of the lease, but their facts and reliance on Goldberg make it clear that they require that a hearing must be held before...