McMullen v. Starkville Oktibbeha Consol. Sch. Dist., CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-CV-00196-SA-DAS
| Decision Date | 29 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-CV-00196-SA-DAS |
| Citation | 200 F.Supp.3d 649 |
| Parties | Angela MCMULLEN, Plaintiff v. STARKVILLE OKTIBBEHA CONSOLIDATED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Mitchell Dee Thomas, Robert M. Logan, Jr., Logan & Mayo, P.A., Newton, MS, for Plaintiff.
Robert O. Allen, William Robert Allen, John Chadwick Williams, Allen, Allen, Breeland & Allen, PLLC, Brookhaven, MS, for Defendants.
The individual Defendants in this public school employment action have moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.1 The Court has considered the motion, responses, record, and pertinent authorities, and finds as follows:
Factual and Procedural Background
Angela McMullen transferred from Columbus Municipal School District to Starkville Oktibbeha Consolidated School District during the 2013-2014 school year to serve as a special education instructor at Armstrong Middle School. The District renewed her employment for the 2014-2015 school year, and McMullen commenced teaching sixth grade science at Armstrong.
In February 2015, McMullen and her mother began experiencing medical issues, and McMullen anticipated that she may miss work in the near future. She twice emailed District employees Kelly Smith and Elsie Hopkins, requesting paperwork for a potential absence covered by the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). Hopkins emailed back, stating that McMullen was not eligible for FMLA paperwork unless she had already missed four consecutive days of work.
As McMullen anticipated, she missed a significant amount of work beginning April 16. Armstrong Principal Timothy Bourne emailed McMullen on April 23, informing her that paperwork for FMLA leave should have been submitted prior to her absence, and that because she had not done so, she was required to present a doctor's excuse for the time she had missed. McMullen responded to Bourne's email, recounting her unsuccessful attempts to retrieve the paperwork from Hopkins in advance of her time off.
During her absence, McMullen and other Armstrong employees received an email informing them to "come by" on May 1 and sign their contracts for the 2015-2016 school year. McMullen responded and requested that Armstrong mail her contract or send it home with another teacher. McMullen never received her contract.
On May 15, McMullen notified Principal Bourne by email that she had not been cleared to return to work and was uncertain if she would be back before the end of the school year, May 26. Sometime after receiving this email, Bourne met with District Superintendent Lewis Holloway to discuss McMullen's situation. According to Holloway, in the meeting, Bourne relayed that McMullen was reprimanded following a "testing irregularity"2 and had since "failed to return to work, failed to do lesson plans, failed to provide tests, failed to provide information to her team members, failed to do anything, and that he had students who were going unserved or being served by a substitute teacher who was not as qualified as Ms. McMullen ...." Based on Principal Bourne's account and on what Superintendent Holloway described as McMullen's email "notification that she had no intention to return for the rest of the year [,]" Holloway recommended Bourne draft a termination letter.
McMullen went to Armstrong on May 21 and asked to sign her contract, but was directed to discuss her employment with Superintendent Holloway. According to McMullen, Holloway informed her she had been terminated and gave her the reasons, i.e., that she had not signed her contract and that Principal Bourne had not heard anything from her in days. McMullen told Holloway this was false, as she claims to have met with Bourne around May 15 to discuss her leave of absence and medical complications. Holloway summoned Bourne to his office, where the three had an impromptu meeting. McMullen testified that she confronted Bourne and in turn, was questioned about whether she was actually receiving medical treatment.
The evidence provides an unclear picture of how the May 21 meeting was resolved. At some point, either Bourne or Holloway provided McMullen with a termination letter dated that day. On May 22, the School Board ratified the decision to terminate McMullen, deemed effective May 21.
McMullen commenced this action against the District and against Principal Bourne and Superintendent Holloway in their individual and official capacities. Although the complaint lacks some clarity, the substance of the pleadings reveals alleged violations of due process and the FMLA brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. She also asserts contract-related claims under Mississippi law.
Bourne and Holloway filed the pending motion, requesting summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity as to the federal claims,3 as well as summary judgment on any state-law claims against them. McMullen's response only addresses federal due process. Thus, any other claims arguably listed in the complaint and raised by Defendants' summary judgment motion are abandoned. See Sanders v. Sailormen, Inc. , No. 3:10–CV–606–CWR, 2012 WL 663021, at *3 (S.D.Miss. Feb. 28, 2012), aff'd , 506 Fed.Appx. 303 (5th Cir.2013). For purposes of this motion, the Court considers whether Bourne and Holloway are entitled to qualified immunity on McMullen's procedural and substantive due process claims.
Summary judgment is warranted under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The party moving for summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The nonmoving party must then "go beyond the pleadings" and "set forth ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citation omitted).
The normal "summary judgment burden of proof is altered in the case of a qualified immunity defense." Wolfe v. Meziere , 566 Fed.Appx. 353, 354 (5th Cir.2014) (citing Michalik v. Hermann , 422 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir.2005) ; Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo Cnty. , 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir.2001) ). As a defense to Section 1983 claims, "[t]he doctrine of qualified immunity shields ‘government officials performing discretionary functions ... from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Luna v. Mullenix , 773 F.3d 712, 718 (5th Cir.2014) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ). To raise qualified immunity, "[a]n officer need only plead his good faith, which then shifts the burden to the plaintiff, who must rebut the defense by establishing that the officer's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law." Id. The plaintiff "cannot rest on conclusory allegations and assertions but must demonstrate genuine issues of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the officer's conduct." Id.
A civil rights "plaintiff can overcome a qualified immunity defense by showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct." Allen v. Cisneros , 815 F.3d 239, 244 (5th Cir.2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) ; Harlow , 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727 ). The second prong is satisfied "only if ‘the state of the law at the time of the incident provided fair warning to the defendants that their alleged [conduct] was unconstitutional.’ " Kimbriel v. City of Greenville, Miss. , 2016 WL 1719108, at *2, 647 Fed.Appx. 353, 356 (5th Cir. Apr. 28, 2016) (quoting Cass v. City of Abilene , 814 F.3d 721, 728 (5th Cir.2016) ; Tolan v. Cotton , –––U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) ). The Court may conduct this two-pronged inquiry in any order. Crostley v. Lamar Cty. Tex. , 717 F.3d 410, 422–24 (5th Cir.2013) (citing Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) ).
To establish her procedural due process claims, McMullen must demonstrate (1) that she was deprived of a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) that the process attendant to the deprivation was constitutionally deficient. Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson , 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989) ; Wilson v. Birnberg , 667 F.3d 591, 601 (5th Cir.2012) (quoting Welch v. Thompson , 20 F.3d 636, 639 (5th Cir.1994) ). The Court addresses each element in turn.
Property interests do not derive from the Constitution, "but from an independent source such as state law, a contract, or other ‘understandings.’ " Stem v. Gomez , 813 F.3d 205, 210 (5th Cir.2016) (quoting Evans v. City of Dallas , 861 F.2d 846, 848 (5th Cir.1988) ). For a property interest in public employment, there must be more than "an abstract need, a desire, or a unilateral expectation to continued employment." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The public employee must have a "legitimate claim of entitlement ...." Id. (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth , 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) ).
Multiple sources gave McMullen a clearly established property interest in continued employment with the District. As of May 21, the day of McMullen's termination, she was under a contract for employment set to expire on May 26. Though it is not certain whether...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Cook v. Par. of Jefferson
...back before the end of the school year. Id. at 652-53. She also failed to provide lesson plans for more than the first week she was away. Id. at 660. Acknowledging that the May 15 notice was less than absolute about whether she would return, the court nonetheless found sufficient facts to s......
-
McLean v. Miss. State Univ.
...program, but rather on whether the government had an adequate reason for doing so. McMullen v. Starkville Oktibbeha County Consolidated Sch. Dist., 200 F. Supp. 3d 649, 658 (N.D. Miss. 2016). Because federal courts are usually "not the appropriate forum in which toreview the multitude of pe......
-
Taylor v. Greenville Pub. Sch. Dist.
...be heard before a tribunal that possess some expertise and an apparent impartiality toward the charges. McMullen v. Starkville Oktibbeha Consolidated Sch., 200 F. Supp. 3d 649 ( 2016 )(Citing Wells v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 793 F. 2d 679(1986 )). In the instant civil action, Plaintiff's ......
-
Silby v. Par. of Jefferson
...on May 15 that she had not been cleared to return to work and was uncertain if she would be back before the end of the school year. Id. at 652-53. She also failed to provide lesson plans for more than the first week she was away. Id. at 660. Acknowledging that the May 15 notice was less tha......